



Joint Contracting Command Iraq / Afghanistan

The Way Ahead...



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JCC-I/A Evolution



Operational Contracting C² Issues



FACT: No one contracting agency has oversight over all agencies executing contracts in theater

INSCOM

SOCCENT

CENTAF

AFSC

AFCEE

Operational Effects

- Inaccurate and untimely Situational Awareness of contracting activities
- Lack of ability to enforce command-wide contracting policies
- Inability to achieve unity of contracting effort to support the warfighter
- Difficulty managing and directing contractor accountability & arming

Recent MNF-I FRAGOs dealing with Contractors

- Trafficking
- Contractor Accountability
- Arming Contractors & PSCs

GOAL: All Contracting Activities in Theater align to support CJOA Commanders Objectives

Incorporating Lessons Learned




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Lessons Learned

The Joint Contracting Command Model WORKS!

- **Flag officer** required to engage Host Nation leadership, Embassy Staff, COCOM, and MSC's (Large Scale, Long Term Operations)
- **HCA** forward with the warfighter improves responsive support
- Each Services **strengths** and **weaknesses** highlighted
- The "**Joint Team**" provides theater-wide critical expertise for complex acquisitions and direct support to Brigade Combat Teams
- **Centralized contracting** support provides more capability, flexibility and responsiveness
- **Host Nation Capacity Building** supports transition to self-reliance
- Provides **extensive knowledge** of vendors, Host Nation leadership, Embassy and NGO players
- **Rotation period** of less than 6 months is counterproductive
- A single contracting agency provides **theater-wide perspective** and oversight and a central contract clearing house



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
- Organization
- Policy
- Doctrine

Army vs Joint

- Training
- Engagement

Army MACOMs
COCOMs
Sister Services

On Going Actions to...



...incorporate Lessons Learned

- **Joint Contracting – Contractor Management Working Group**
 - Develop Joint Doctrine
 - Address Joint Policy on Contingency Contracting authorized by the 2006 NDAA Defense Authorization Act
- **Developing Joint Contingency Contracting**
 - Supplemental Training Module
 - CON 234 Refresher Course
 - Create a Joint DAU Course for Contingency Contracting Officers
- **Improving Joint Contingency Contracting Information Capability**
 - SF44
 - Data Management
 - Contracting Writing
 - Contractor Accountability
- **Regulatory Improvements**
 - New Subpart 18
 - Update PGI 225.74



What is Contingency Contracting?



Quick

Response

Deliberate

Support of Disaster Relief

Any Quick Response Contracting?

Supporting Early Entry Forces

Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) efforts

LOGCAP

CONUS contracting supporting a War

Supporting Training Deployments

Theater Sustainment Contracting

Capacity Building

Rebuilding HN Military Forces

HN Peacetime Engagement

OCONUS War Fighter Support e.g. (Korea, USAEUR)

Reconstruction Contracting

Low

Threat

High




**Questions &
Comments...**

Lessons Learned



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- A Joint Contracting Command, with a **viable JMD**, should be integrated with initial flow of CS/CSS forces and grow it after cessation of major combat operations
- Implementation of **Procurement Automation Systems** must be planned for in advance and tailored to a contingency environment
- Better control over **contracts written from CONUS** is needed
 - Coordination of Logistics Support
- C2 of **“Contractors on the Battlefield”** is still a large challenge
 - Policies on Arming
 - Accountability
 - Logistics Support

Working these issues from “in theater” while supporting combat operations is tough!!