

## **Adapting our Aim: A Balanced Army for a Balanced Strategy**

Less than a decade into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, its perils and challenges are increasingly evident. September 11, 2001 shattered the United States' sense of domestic invulnerability to external threats. Since then, we have been at war in a long-term ideological struggle with a global extremist network. Over one million have served in the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq and over 4,800 Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen have sacrificed their lives.

Yet these opening engagements of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century are but harbingers of the emerging security environment. In the years ahead, the United States will confront complex, dynamic and unanticipated challenges to our national security and the collective security of our friends and allies. These challenges will occur in many forms and will be waged across the spectrum of conflict – ranging from peaceful competition to general war and at all points in between – and in all domains: land, sea, air, space and cyberspace.

To succeed in this new environment, our Secretary of Defense has reinforced the principle of balance in our defense strategy: balance in our response to the current conflict vice preparing for future conflicts; balance in preparing for irregular warfare vice conventional warfare; and balance between the cultural advantages that have given us security vice the cultural changes needed to preserve it. To support a balanced strategy, our Army must continue the holistic adaptation of our force.

### **An Era of Persistent Conflict**

Several global trends will shape the emerging security environment and exacerbate the ideological struggle before us. Although such trends pose both dilemmas and opportunities, their comprehensive impact will increase security challenges and shape the conflicts confronting our Nation.

**Globalization** can spread prosperity through accelerating the transfer of trade, technology and ideas, but it can also propagate destabilizing influences. While globalization has brought change, its benefits are unequally distributed, creating “have” and “have not” conditions that can spawn conflict. Additionally, the interdependence of a globalized economy amplifies the local impact of distant shortages or crises, as demonstrated by the food, energy, and financial disruptions over the last year.

**Technology** is another double-edged sword. Inexpensive access to information enables entrepreneurs and innovators to collaborate in developing new technologies and improve existing ones. Yet our adversaries can exploit these same technologies to export terror around the globe.

**Population growth** in the developing world expands markets, but can also increase the potential for instability and extremism. In some portions of the developed world, population ‘growth’ is negative, and *depopulation* undermines established economies and cultures, inviting potentially destabilizing immigration. As much as 60% of the world’s population lives in cities.

This increased urbanization offers adversaries large targets of opportunity while simultaneously providing concealment and protection against counteraction.

Increased **resource demand** is a consequence of growing global prosperity and populations. While this demand may encourage more efficient use of natural resources and the development of alternatives, burgeoning middle classes in newly industrialized countries such as China and India exacerbate demands on already scarce resources. These rising demands for energy, water and food may enhance the potential for conflict.



**Climate change and natural disasters** have energized states and international institutions to work closer together to alleviate suffering. They can also compound already difficult conditions in developing countries, causing humanitarian crises, driving destabilizing population migrations and raising the potential for epidemic diseases.

The two trends of greatest concern are proliferation and failing states. **Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction** increases the potential for catastrophic attacks that may be globally destabilizing and can undercut the confidence that spurs economic development. Al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist groups already seek WMD and will use them against American/Western interests given the opportunity. Meanwhile **failed or failing states** that lack the capacity or will to maintain territorial control can provide safe havens for terrorist groups to plan and export operations. The merging of these two trends is particularly worrisome: failing states that offer safe haven to terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction.

The combined impact of these trends makes it likely that the next decades will be ones of ***persistent conflict – protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.*** To be clear, *persistent conflict* does not imply *perpetual warfare*. Protracted competition and friction will manifest themselves in many forms as interests collide across the globe. Our pre-9/11 commitment of military forces was rare and episodic. Our commitments in the future will be more frequent, and continuous. Conflicts will arise unpredictably, vary in intensity and scope, and last for uncertain durations.

### **The Evolving Character of Conflict**

Conflict is indeed “normal” to the human condition. Nations and other actors always seek their interests; the fundamentals of conflict do not change. Although the fundamental *nature* of conflict is timeless, its *character* reflects the unique conditions of each era. The global trends that shape an era of persistent conflict will significantly alter its character: how conflicts manifest themselves, the attributes of the protagonists, and the processes and techniques of conflict resolution.

Conflicts will be waged between and among **diverse actors**, both state and non-state, with the former frequently acting covertly, and the latter sometimes acting through state



sponsorship or as a proxy for a state. The Second Lebanon War in 2006 pitted the state of Israel against a non-state actor, Hezbollah, directly supported by Iran, inside the territory of Lebanon. Such situations pose special challenges to an international system that has been focused on conflict between and among nation states. Conflict motives, objectives, and even the identities of protagonists may be difficult to discern and will shift over time. The presence and power of non-state actors, in particular their ability to challenge nation states, is a significant shift in the character of conflict. States no longer hold a monopoly on the means of violence.

Ideological competition for sovereignty and influence over populations also characterize current conflict. Gaining the support of indigenous populations, always instrumental to the outcome of conflict, is now so important that conflict cannot be waged “around the people,” it is unavoidably waged “**among the people.**” Many of the safe havens we encounter today are “safe” not because of their geographic location, but because of the popular support our adversaries find in those locations. Adversaries will seek to mitigate conventional advantages, operating anonymously among indigenous populations to avoid detection and counteraction. Hezbollah, for example, made extensive use of civilian areas to deter Israeli counterstrikes.



Future conflicts will be **unpredictable** and may arise suddenly, expand rapidly into unanticipated locations, and last for unexpected durations. Adversaries will pursue a dynamic combination of means, shifting their employment in rapid succession and exploiting the element of surprise. Conflicts may also expand to areas historically immune to conflict, such as space and cyberspace. Previous trends may be suddenly reversed: Hezbollah inflicted more Israeli casualties per Arab fighter in 2006 than did any opponent in 1956, 1967, 1973 or 1982.

Local conflicts and their social, economic, and political consequences are no longer locally confined, but offer increasing potential for spillover, creating regional and global destabilizing effects. Moreover, the interconnectedness of a globalized world will cause crises – such as a high level of lawlessness and violence – to arise quickly. The conditions resolving crises, however, such as governance or effective rule of law, evolve slowly. There will be a premium on being able to anticipate and adjust the type, amount and rate of efforts applied to achieve stability, metering strategic objectives against sustainable strategic resources.

Conflicts will continue to take place under the **unblinking scrutiny** of the 24-hour media cycle. A global media presence and increasingly universal access to information will ensure that details of a conflict are rapidly available through social, communications, and cyber networks. Adversaries now have many fora to disseminate their messages worldwide.



Future conflicts will also present a new array of threats that defy simple categorization. Formerly, we could differentiate and categorize threats as conventional or unconventional; regular or irregular; high intensity or low intensity; traditional, terrorist, or criminal. Such categorization was useful because each categorized threat had an associated counter. It is no longer enough to discern the ‘correct’ conflict category and then pursue a singular solution approach. We are more likely to face **hybrid threats** – dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities.



The Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in 2006 also illustrates the potential impact of hybrid threats. Hezbollah employed modern civil technology (secure cell phones, computers, and video telecommunications systems) combined with military means (anti-tank, surface-to-air, and anti-ship missiles, rockets, mortars, unmanned aerial vehicles and improvised explosive devices (IEDs)) in an innovative array of unanticipated patterns. Additionally, Hezbollah placed an emphasis on holding ground, concentrated its forces and engaged in sustained fights associated more with conventional forces. Hezbollah’s methods and tactics were a mixture of the conventional and unconventional.

Hezbollah demonstrates that today’s non-state actors are not limited to irregular, guerrilla methods. The future is not simply irregular warfare by non-state actors: adversaries can be expected to use a full spectrum of options, including every political, economic, informational, and military measure at their disposal. The dominance of cultural and demographic factors will present leaders with complex challenges that will require increasingly complex solutions. Hybrid threats necessitate hybrid solutions, and such solutions increasingly require military forces adaptive enough to function in a variety of situations against myriad threats with a diverse set of national, allied and indigenous partners.

### Adapting Our Aim

Either explicitly documented or implicitly understood, an Army always has an “aim:” a unifying strategic concept that guides its response to the demands of strategy. The strategic challenge is that this aim must address the preponderance of our projected requirements, while recognizing the imperative to address any mission of the Nation – whether projected or not. Our aim can never be exactly right; indeed, we can only aspire to be “not too wrong.” Therefore our aim is not only a ‘point of aim’ to address the broadest reach of potential requirements, it is equally a ‘point of adaptation’ – a base from which we shift to meet reality as it unfolds – perhaps with unsettling surprise and speed. **Given the volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity of current and future strategic demands, versatility is the defining quality that must inform every dimension of our Army.**

In retrospect, the aim that informed the United States Army from its Vietnam experience to the end of the Cold War benefited from a strategic environment of unusual clarity. The nature of the Soviet threat, together with the primacy of our interests in Europe and Asia, muted any debate: our aim point was major combat operations. Throughout most of the Cold War we

configured and sized the Army to swiftly defeat an adversary in one major regional conflict while holding another at bay long enough to ready the forces to defeat him in turn. This strategic concept was inherently sequential and relied on tiered readiness that could be progressively improved with a deliberate mobilization process. We viewed major combat operations as exceptional, episodic events in limited duration campaigns to achieve clearly definable end states. Our emerging strategic concept for an era of persistent conflict views operations as routine and enduring. These operations are inherently expeditionary, with unforecast areas of commitment and unpredictable durations. End states evolve as conditions shift and adversaries adapt. **At no time in our history has versatility been at a higher premium in our Army.**

The Army has been progressively shifting its aim to match this emerging strategic concept since the end of the Cold War. Once again, the Army led with doctrine. Initially in the early 90's there was the recognition that military operations entail both "war" and "other than war," and at the start of this decade a more mature conceptualization of military operations emerged as a combination of offense, defense, and stability operations. But although our ideas were progressing, our aim did not significantly shift: our aim point, in fact the aim point for the entire Department of Defense, remained at the high end of the spectrum, on major combat operations (MCOs). We still believed that requirements outside of MCOs were "lesser and included" – easily addressed by forces prepared for the Big Fight.


The MCO aim point proved to be increasingly difficult as a base for adaptation. The successful deployment of the 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division to Bosnia to conduct stability operations required extraordinary measures, and a later deployment to Albania was viewed as too slow and inflexible. Although our 2001 doctrine recognized full spectrum operations, our visualization of the combination of offense, defense and stability was incomplete. The lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan taught us the inextricable, seamless, simultaneous nature of full spectrum operations. We have reinforced that lesson in our most recent 2008 doctrine. Our fundamental operational concept is *full spectrum operations*: "Army forces combine offensive, defensive, stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to generate decisive results."<sup>1</sup> The emphasis on these different elements of full spectrum operations changes with echelon, time, and location. Full spectrum operations is an inherently versatile doctrinal approach.

Doctrine alone cannot drive comprehensive change. Our shift in aim has extended to organizational design. The modular redesign shifted the Army from a division-centric to a brigade-centric approach, reallocating organic enablers to lower echelons. To further adaptability in a COIN-focused, irregular environment, intelligence assets were increased and some maneuver flexibility of brigades were traded to their organic battalions. Similarly, our training policies have evolved to distinguish the core training associated with unit design from the mission-specific training of imminent deployment. In addition, numerous material adjustments have been applied to respond to the operational needs of forces in contact – while in contact. Our entire approach to readiness has transformed as we implemented a cyclic force generation process.

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<sup>1</sup> FM 3-0, Operations, Headquarters Department of the Army, February 2008, p 3-1.

But this is only a beginning. Our current institutional processes and programs devolved from a different aim point, and an expired strategic concept. The culture of our Army has not totally assimilated a new aim point, one refocused at the middle of the spectrum of conflict and on full spectrum operations. We – and in truth the entire defense community – are still prone to categorize operations as either “war” or “irregular war,” “conventional” or “non-conventional.” This is a simplification that conceals the reality of full spectrum operations as we already experience them in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is the challenge posed to us by the Secretary of Defense: we must completely change our thinking and further adapt our aim if we are to be a Balanced Army for a Balanced Strategy.



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Our new aim point, represented by the green oval above, recognizes that we must shift our focus on a broader range of operational requirements, encompassing operational themes of peace operations, limited intervention, irregular warfare and major combat operations. From this central position, we can rapidly adapt and focus anywhere along the spectrum of conflict weighting offense, defense and stability operations according to mission requirements. What this green oval should not imply is that we are optimizing our operational and institutional Army for irregular warfare. While we realize the importance of irregular warfare, the Army does not view it as a distinct, unique category of conflict: *warfare is warfare*. The same capabilities developed for regular, symmetric adversaries can and must be adapted for use against unregulated “irregular” enemies, particularly as they present themselves in hybrid combination with conventional systems. Shifting our aim is not exchanging one “Either-Or” position for another. Aiming at the center of the conflict spectrum will enable us to respond quickly and effectively to these hybrid threats *across* the spectrum, as the situation and mission dictate.

## **Building a Balanced Army: A Holistic Approach**

A Balanced Army adapted to a new aim will be fundamentally different in every dimension of doctrine, organization, training, manning, equipping, stationing, and supporting. An Army that can do this must be capable enough to be *versatile*; mobile enough to be *expeditionary*; responsive enough to be *agile*; precise enough to be *lethal*; robust enough to be *sustainable*; and flexible enough to be *interoperable* with a wide range of partners. These qualities -- **versatile, expeditionary, agile, lethal, sustainable, and interoperable** – will be the defining qualities of a Balanced Army. They will describe not only the Operating Force, but also the institutional Army that prepares and sustains our force. Moreover, our adaptation must mature those qualities while we simultaneously win the current fight.

### **Versatile**

*Versatility* is the central organizing principle of a balanced Army, for it is this quality that will enable our forces and institutions to effectively execute operations across the spectrum of conflict. Versatility acknowledges that exact precision is impossible in predicting force requirements in this volatile and uncertain strategic environment, and that our Army must be able to react to the future as it actually presents itself. A versatile force must possess a balanced mix of multi-purpose capabilities, and sufficient capacity to accomplish a broad range of tasks across the spectrum of military operations, from peacetime engagement to major combat operations.



Versatility begins with how the Army *thinks* - a solid foundation of coherent, relevant and adaptive concepts and doctrine. We have already cited the recent revision of Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, which established full spectrum operations as our capstone operational concept. The concepts supporting full spectrum operations are further refined in updates to subordinate doctrinal manuals such FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, and FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*.

The Army's modular design efforts of the past five years have immeasurably enhanced the inherent versatility of Army units. We have distributed key enablers previously held at division level and higher to brigade combat teams (BCTs), improving their adaptability. These key enablers include intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, critical stability operations enablers (civil affairs, psychological operations, and public affairs), and expanded logistics support, providing them the versatility to effectively perform a variety of missions. The Army can use these modular units and augmentation packages to tailor forces to

meet a variety of mission requirements, thereby increasing the options available to combatant commanders.

The advent of the modular brigade is a great first step in building a versatile Army. It is not the only step. In this unpredictable strategic environment, MCOs cannot be ruled out, nor can infantry intense operations in dense urban areas or impassable terrain. Versatility must therefore afford operational commanders a balanced mix of force types – heavy, medium, light – so that they can devise effective combinations for each tactical situation. It is our strategic estimate, supported by our experience over the last two decades, that for the foreseeable future we need a multi-weight force, composed of light infantry BCTs, medium Stryker, and heavy armored BCTs; forces of high mobility and robust protection: a force aimed at the middle of the spectrum of conflict. All of these formations have some utility at any point on the spectrum of conflict, while each BCT type possesses relative advantages that compensate for the disadvantages of other types. Moreover, these units can be enhanced as soon as feasible by evolving technologies. The Army can further increase its versatility by increasing the proportion of our units at medium weight, thereby shifting our multi-weight center of balance toward the middle of the conflict spectrum. If the reality of our future proves to be at the left end of the spectrum, the personnel-rich formations in our medium forces will have great utility. If our future is dominated by major combat operations, we can leverage the joint effects of the Air Force and Navy.

Some have concerns that a full spectrum force cannot be expert at *every* – or in fact *any* – point of the conflict spectrum. Some would advocate an Army that is the sum of its parts – each part optimized against a narrow band of the strategic requirement. They would optimize *capability* at the cost of *capacity*. Can we afford a set of small armies, none of which has the capacity to meet a significant strategic demand? Operational demands are admittedly diverse, but there is a broad range of common requirements that span the spectrum of conflict. A force designed for this common core of requirements will, by definition, not be an ideal match for every specific requirement. Our challenge is to maximize the multi-purpose qualities of our force while investing in those capabilities that posture us to rapidly adapt to specific threat requirements. The gap between design (“about right”) and reality (win decisively) is closed by leveraging our demonstrated competencies: tailoring, task organization, training, materiel adaptation and joint effects. To be sure, this approach does not preclude the need for significant specialized capabilities. We should always be alert for that, as we were in standing up Task Force Odin, the Asymmetric Warfare Group, and our Transition Team training capability. Generating force capabilities that optimize our ability to adapt are of premium value.

Versatility can be further enhanced by relaxing the linkages we perceive between units and their equipment. Our recent operational experience illustrates the potential of this as Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) extends the utility of unit designs, and equipment sets are globally ‘maneuvered’ to match unit deployments. We can extend this versatility by rethinking the composition of our Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), ensuring that they contain a wide range of capabilities, to include those that increase the survivability of Infantry BCTs within an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) environment. In this way, we can fully prepare our units and Soldiers for the broadest range of challenges they may face.




Most importantly, the Army is only as versatile as its Soldiers. Every Soldier is a Warrior, and each must be trained and ready to effectively conduct traditional combat operations. However, we must also train Soldiers on a wide range of other tasks that do not relate directly to combat, such as relief, reconstruction and peacekeeping activities. Versatile Soldiers are competent in their core proficiencies, yet adaptive enough to operate across the spectrum of conflict. Only by developing versatile Soldiers can we hope to build the versatile Army we need to overcome 21<sup>st</sup> Century challenges.

## Expeditionary

The dynamic and global character of conflict will require the Army, as part of a joint force, to respond to unanticipated conflicts in austere, unfamiliar locations across the globe and be able to fight upon arrival: we must be *expeditionary*. The Army must be organized, trained, and equipped to go anywhere in the world, conduct forcible entry operations in remote, anti-access environments, if necessary, and sustain that response for uncertain durations.

America’s recent combat employments in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate that neither the duration nor the character of military campaigns in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century is readily predictable. The Army should possess not only the ability to decisively win combat operations, but also the ability to persistently engage and sustain full spectrum operations for as long as necessary to accomplish our operational and strategic objectives. The routine commitment to operations of indeterminate duration has necessitated a complete transformation in the Army’s readiness concept. Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) is a rotational readiness model that is designed to effectively and efficiently generate trained and ready forces for combatant commanders at sustainable rotational levels.



The ARFORGEN model consists of three force pools:

- **RESET:** Focuses on recovery from deployment and sets conditions for Soldiers and units to train for their next anticipated or assigned mission. It involves programs to restore Soldiers, Families, units, and equipment to pre-deployment levels.
- **Train-Ready:** Restores training readiness levels. Currently, units in “dwell” (time between deployments) for 18 months or less focus on the skills and capabilities required for their directed deployment mission. Units in dwell greater than 18 months also train on core (conventional) tasks, in addition to the skills required for their next assigned mission. Units from the Train-Ready force pool can be “surged” for unforeseen contingencies.
- **Available:** Units deploy, as directed by our national leadership, to implement the national defense strategy at home or abroad.

Although the Operating Force has experienced several cycles of the ARFORGEN model, our Generating Force manning, equipping and training processes continue to transform.



The Army’s global force posture defines the available start points for expeditionary response. Our recent strategic trend has been to shift to a CONUS-based posture, adjusting our forward-stationed presence. There is a natural tension between the flexibility of a CONUS-based response posture and the immediacy of forward presence. This posture – both our stationing and activities – must rapidly generate the forces required by combatant commanders to conduct full spectrum operations across the globe.

An expeditionary Army must retain an expeditionary mindset – confident and competent enough to quickly adapt and function effectively in any physical or cultural environment. Such a mindset requires that Soldiers and leaders are mentally prepared to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice. Once on the ground, an expeditionary mindset facilitates the ability to accomplish missions with the forces on hand and prepares Soldiers to thrive in austere conditions. Soldiers possessing an expeditionary mindset have the critical-thinking skills necessary to adapt quickly to unexpected situations in unfamiliar physical surroundings.

An expeditionary mindset also has a cultural component. In an era characterized by conflicts among the people, in which personal interaction between Soldiers and indigenous populations could mean the difference between victory and defeat, Soldiers and leaders must feel confident leaving the relative safety of a fixed forward operating base to interact day-to-day with people of different cultural backgrounds and perspectives within an unfamiliar social environment. Developing this confidence demands that Soldiers and leaders become culturally astute and able to use this awareness and understanding to conduct operations innovatively. While resident in the Operating Force, the Army must expand this mindset to include the

Generating Force, the portion of the Army that builds capacity. Given emerging strategies that will emphasize the building of partner capacities, our Generating Force, too, must have an expeditionary mindset.

## Agile

While versatility is the ability to do different tasks, agility is the ability to rapidly shift from one task to another. An *agile* Army must have forces able to quickly adapt to exploit opportunities in complex environments. An agile force requires not only agile units but also agile doctrine, minds and institutions.

To build and maintain our agility, we must remain a learning organization, quickly absorbing lessons learned and applying them to current and future problems. One key to institutionalizing our learning is adaptive doctrine. While we have produced new, innovative concepts to improve our effectiveness in operations, simply publishing new manuals isn't enough. Doctrine must grow and adapt based on the hard-earned lessons being learned daily in the field. Through the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), our institutions are able to quickly collect, analyze and disseminate best practices from units in contact to ensure that Army doctrine remains agile in confronting hybrid challenges.

Armed with agile doctrine, Soldiers must possess the mental agility to react quickly and appropriately to constantly changing situations and complex environments. There is substantial evidence that our post-9/11 deployments are creating a culture of agility within the ranks. Our Soldiers understand that the mission is the determining factor for manning and equipping. They are the ones who make it possible for tank companies to operate as dismounted infantry; artillery units to operate as motorized infantry; or food service sections to operate as personal security detachments. They have self-learning and adaption skills honed in dealing with dynamic enemies in a diverse, complex human environment.

To direct agile Soldiers, the Army must continue to develop agile leaders able to handle the challenges of full spectrum operations. Agile leaders are adaptive thinkers that use their individual initiative and understanding of the environment to quickly and boldly seize and exploit opportunities as they present themselves. While our junior officers and non-commissioned officers have had ample opportunities to develop their mental agility on the battlefield, we must develop and empower agile, adaptive leaders at all levels, from the tactical to the strategic.



To further develop agile minds, we must prepare Soldiers and leaders to function effectively in complex operational environments through a variety of institutional, operational, and self-development educational and training opportunities. Army training and education

programs must be dynamic and adaptive, developing full spectrum capabilities within the operating force while keeping pace with constantly evolving doctrine and operational requirements. We will continue to incorporate hard-learned battlefield tactics, techniques and procedures into individual and collective training so that Soldiers and leaders possess the requisite and relevant skills required for full spectrum operations. Diverse, realistic training and education will develop the agile Soldiers and leaders that make up agile units.

Agile units deserve agile institutions. While focused on building versatile, agile units capable of adapting to changing environments, the institutional Army has continued to utilize processes and procedures designed for the Cold War. Consequently, the Army as an institution must fundamentally transform its organization and processes to be able to rapidly respond to unforeseen strategic challenges. Once the mission is defined, our institutions must seamlessly and continuously adapt – tailoring force packages and quickly readjusting training, manning and equipping – to ensure units have all of the physical and mental tools necessary to succeed. Without institutional adaptability, agility will not be obtainable.

To achieve this agility, we have established organizations such as the Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, which continuously identifies and assesses capability gaps through first-hand observation and quickly develops solutions to fill these gaps. Furthermore, we continue to provide deploying Soldiers with the equipment they need to complete their assigned missions through Rapid Equipment Fielding and the Rapid Fielding Initiative as well as through Operational Needs Statements. Our challenge is to incorporate these adaptive processes into our institutions without stifling the initiative and flexibility they possess.

## **Lethal**

Only the armed forces possess the core competency of applying lethal force. This competency requires the capability to overmatch any enemy across the spectrum of conflict while mitigating collateral damage. The Army achieves such competency by operating as part of a joint team with air, naval, and special operations forces.

The Army does not employ its lethality indiscriminately. Conflicts among populations require the employment of proportional lethal force with precision. To do so effectively, Soldiers and leaders must be able to quickly and accurately discriminate between hostile, friendly and neutral actors and apply precise lethal effects on identified targets.



Lethal precision requires precise delivery systems, superior intelligence capabilities and broad situational awareness. As the Army “spins out” advanced capabilities to BCTs currently fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, these systems are providing precision fires and advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, exponentially increasing Soldiers’ ability to positively identify and apply precision lethality to legitimate threats. Concurrently, these systems enable commanders at the

operational level to gain broader situational awareness and shift resources appropriately to gain an advantage over the threat, while mitigating collateral damage to the surrounding populace.

Finally, the requirement for precision also extends to how we execute non-lethal “fires”. In a population-centric operating environment, we must be precise in the execution of information operations, including psychological operations (PSYOPS), to ensure that we are sending the most effective message to the right audience in a timely manner.

## Sustainable

Strategically, the Army’s long-term sustainability is inextricably linked to how we manage and balance our force structure, readiness, equipping priorities and, ultimately, our ability to sustain the All-Volunteer Force. To sustain the force over the long term, we must first provide some rotational predictability for our Soldiers and Families. The ARFORGEN model will achieve this predictability while ensuring we have sufficient capacity available to meet operational demands. To build a more sustainable force structure, we will grow to 1.1 million personnel, an increase of 65,000

soldiers in the Active Component (AC), 8,200 in the Army National Guard by 2010, and 1,000 in the Army Reserve by 2013. Upon completion, the Army will

	Steady-State	Surge Conditions
<b>AC Rotation Goal</b>	<b>1:3 (9:27 mo)</b>	<b>1:2 (12:24 mo)</b>
<b>RC Rotation Goal</b>	<b>1:5 (12:60 mo)</b>	<b>1:4 (12:48 mo)</b>

be able to continuously supply 15 BCTs and their support forces at the preferred “Steady-State” rate of 1:3 (AC) and 1:5 (RC). If we must surge to support operations or respond to contingencies, we can sustain a supply of 20 BCTs at a 1:2 (AC) and 1:4 (RC) deployment ratio. Though 20 BCTs are still insufficient to meet our current strategic demand, it is a substantial improvement over current capacity.

The Army cannot meet its BCT steady state and surge supply goals without the support of our Reserve Component (RC). The increased demands of our combatant commanders, coupled with the size of our Active Component (AC) force, require that we routinely employ RC forces as part of our operational force. Continued and routine access to our RC forces is essential to sustaining current operations, and is improving the overall operational experience and quality of our RC forces. Additionally, adequate Army National Guard (ARNG) forces must be ready and immediately available to their State and Territorial authorities to respond to domestic crises. We are building a Total Force in which our RC forces are also on a rotational cycle, but at a deployment rate about half that of their AC counterparts. This cyclical readiness model will increase predictability for Soldiers, Families, employers, and communities, and enable our RC to remain an integral element of the operational force while also providing the Nation with a strategic reserve (i.e., those non-deployed RC units which are two years from commitment).

The Army’s top priority is to sustain the All-Volunteer Force. To do this, we must provide Soldiers and Families a level of support commensurate with their dedicated service. A key element of this support is the implementation of the RESET model, a program that provides a reconstitution period (6 months for AC Soldiers, 12 months for RC Soldiers) after a unit



returns home to help Soldiers and their Families re-integrate and reverse the cumulative effects of months apart. Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force over the long term is also directly tied to the quality of people we recruit and retain. While recruiting initiatives are meeting scheduled goals to enlist quality Soldiers, our retention initiatives are ensuring that the combat-seasoned Soldiers winning the current fight will provide the leaders the Army needs in the future.

Sustaining our forces in current and future operations also requires survivable vehicles and equipment. Although we have made great strides in ensuring our Soldiers are more survivable on today's complex battlefield with advanced body armor and better-protected vehicles, we must continue to develop even more effective capabilities. Additionally, a smaller logistical "footprint" enabled by advances in energy efficiency will make our forces more sustainable in austere environments and decrease the frequency of Soldiers driving down IED-strewn lines of communication.

Finally, sustaining unit and personnel readiness requires maintenance and upgrade of Army facilities and infrastructure. As the Army grows, our installations must provide the facilities capable of sustaining the future force while remaining committed to improving the services available to Soldiers and their Families, especially to our Wounded Warriors. Our Soldiers' and Families' service and sacrifice warrant nothing less.

## Interoperable

Well beyond the capability to operate on the same radio frequencies and utilize the same caliber ammunition, an interoperable Army must be able to build unity of effort with other government agencies, indigenous forces and international partners. The Army can lead the development of interoperability with the interagency, allies and indigenous forces by sharing our planning and organizational skills. The Army can also facilitate unity of effort through the development of both an interoperable mindset and interoperable technologies.

Recognizing the need to build partner capacities, the Army has increased the size of the Special Forces as well as shifted personnel to fill critical enablers. We fully appreciate the unique contributions these Soldiers make to the current fight and have incentivized these billets with increases in pay and promotion. The Army is also preparing its general purpose forces to fulfill these missions, with the goal of providing select BCTs with a regional focus.



To enhance the Army's interoperability and ensure a common view of how the Army, the joint force, and civil government agencies should work collaboratively, we must actively contribute to the development of interagency doctrine. Such doctrine would provide the

intellectual and institutional basis for success in full spectrum operations, and would ensure that we are integrating all Joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts to achieve our common strategic objectives.

Furthermore, we must expand educational and experiential opportunities for leaders and Soldiers beyond the Department of Defense, including graduate school, training with industry, other government agencies, and with allies and partners. The Army's asymmetric advantage is its people; therefore, we must commit the resources necessary to maximize their intellectual abilities to operate effectively within the human terrain of an era of persistent conflict.

### **Balancing an Army at War**

The adaptation of our aim described in this paper augurs for fundamental change, and that change is already underway. Our strategic environment has evolved dramatically, and so too has the Army. However, our test must not be "*Have we changed?*" It must be "*Have we changed enough?*" Everything is on the table. What further changes must we make in order to improve our effectiveness in overcoming the myriad challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century? Finding the right answers to these questions will ensure that the Army always remains the Strength of the Nation.

