2014

Major General Harold J. "Harry" Greene Awards *for* Acquisition Writing

The ACQUISITION MUSE

Major General Harold J. "Harry" Greene Awards celebrate thoughtfulness and clarity in the profession

by Ms. Margaret C. Roth

In his 34 years of service to the Army, MG Harold J. "Harry" Greene was known as a thinker who was always willing to share his expertise. An engineer by training, Greene held five graduate degrees—a Ph.D., three masters of science and a bachelor of science—but was adept at communicating with Soldiers and civilians at all levels.

Now, several months after he was killed Aug. 5, 2014, while serving as deputy commanding general of Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, the Army has chosen a select group of acquisition professionals as winners of the 2014 Major General Harold J. "Harry" Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing. Their exemplary work emulates Greene's dedication to communicating and solving problems to make Soldiers' lives better.

"Harry Greene was a Soldier, a leader, a mentor and a friend who inspired all of us to tackle complex problems on behalf of Soldiers," said LTG Michael E. Williamson, principal military deputy to the assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology and director, acquisition career management. "I can think of no better way to honor Harry's 34 years of distinguished service than by naming this award after him." Williamson noted that "the competition is designed to foster dialogue and discourse on the way forward for the acquisition community, to get people not only reflecting on lessons learned, but thinking about the future."

Competitors from across the DOD acquisition spectrum submitted articles, opinion pieces and essays on acquisition in four categories: Acquisition Reform/Better Buying Power (BBP), Future Operations, Innovation and Lessons Learned. Entries were judged on persuasiveness, clarity and strength of argument, innovation, relevance to the current or future environment and feasibility.

A distinguished panel of judges, including a deputy assistant secretary of the Army, a former Army acquisition executive, two-, three- and four-star generals and other defense dignitaries, selected the award winners.

MS . MARGARET C. ROTH is the senior editor of Army AL&T magazine. She has more than a decade of experience in writing about the Army and more than three decades' experience in journalism and public relations. Roth is a MG Keith L. Ware Public Affairs Award winner. She is also a co-author of the book "Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama." She holds a B.A. in Russian language and linguistics from the University of Virginia.

2014 Major General Harold J. "Harry" Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

The winners and honorable mentions are:

Category: Acquisition Reform/Better Buying Power

Winner: *The Contract Closeout Management Tool (C2MT): Achieving BBP by Enabling Rapid Contract Closeout*

Authors: **COL Linda R. Herbert** is chief of staff for the Land Warfare and Munitions Directorate and senior program analyst in a joint specialty position, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

Ms. Veronica Alexander is the director of programs for the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement.

Dr. Christina M. Bates is a contractor supporting the Project Manager (PM) for Extraterrestrial Sensors in the Program Executive Office (PEO) for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors.

Abstract: The DOD obligated more than $3 trillion in contracting for goods and services to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Once performance on a given contract is completed, it must be closed within a specified time or it is considered "overage." Currently, DOD faces a substantial backlog of overage contracts requiring closeout. The Contract Closeout Management Tool (C2MT) enables rapid and accurate identification of contracts as "closed" within the given contract writing system. In December 2013, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement was modified to allow for a greater population of contracts to be closed electronically using the new tool. And, due to the success of the C2MT, it is now broadly available for all Army agencies to use.

Honorable Mention: *Contracting Officer Representative's Inspection Reform*

Author: **Ms. Sherrie R. Moore** is a contract specialist at the PEO for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation.

Abstract: Improving the Contracting Officer Representative (COR) inspection criteria and inspection will help the Army become a leader of reliable and consistent past performance assessments if strict compliance to standardized inspection criteria is followed for every inspection, including supplies and services; a standard software program is created that can be loaded onto tablets and given to CORs to help conduct inspections; and the software uses simple, quantifiable metrics to avoid subjective judgments and introduce consistency Armywide.

Category: Future Operations

Winner: *Managing Stability Operations with Program Managers – A New Role for Army Acquisition*

Author: **LTC Adrian Marsh** is the product manager for Ground Soldier Systems, responsible for the Army's Nett Warrior program under PEO Soldier's PM Soldier Warrior.

Abstract: Stability operations have many parallels to complex acquisition programs, including Congressional funding, multi-year endeavors, leveraging contractor expertise and synchronizing discrete projects to achieve a compounding effect. Additionally, most of the partner agencies involved in stability operations understand program management since

they often rely on contracted efforts as the program execution wing of their in-theater initiatives. Despite these commonalities, the Army does not doctrinally apply program management rigor to the stability operations problem set. The Army's Acquisition Corps, by nature of its core program management competencies, has the requisite skills to enable more effective management of future stability operations and can easily integrate with interagency partners. The branch should embrace the function, establish doctrine and deploy program managers to supplement military commands addressing these complex global operations.

Honorable Mention: *Enduring Rapid Capabilities*

Author: **Mr. Patrick McKinney** is a program integrator for rapid counter-improvised explosive device (IED) programs at the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO).

Abstract: In the 21st century, DOD established rapid acquisition entities and processes to answer urgent warfighter requirements and counter battlefield threats from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. With the current constrained fiscal environment, JIEDDO and other rapid acquisition entities must work with DOD and the armed services to determine how to maintain these critical rapid capabilities to ensure that the right ones endure to support the warfighter in future conflicts. This cooperation will reduce future risk and preserve valuable resources across DOD.

Category: Innovation

Winner: *Innovation in Army Acquisition*

Author: **Mr. Ernest Keen** is an aerospace engineer for the Aeroflightdynamics Directorate at the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center.

Abstract: The challenges of introducing complex systems into an uncertain financial and physical environment present limited opportunities for technology insertion in acquisition and promote risk aversion and atrophy of technical skill sets. The author advocates adoption of paradigms that encourage technology insertion via short iterative cycles focused on technical learning with elevated risk tolerance.

Honorable Mention (Tie): *Look for Clarity in Regulations*

Author: **Mr. David B. Cook** is an industrial engineer within the Program Evaluation Division of the Lower Tier Project Office at the PEO for Missiles and Space.

Abstract: Current Army regulatory language tends to exhibit a one-dimensional aspect independent of consideration of the users—the PM and PEO personnel responsible for implementing policy to manage weapon systems acquisition activities. Achieving some part of a solution requires that the Army regulation-writing community seek to significantly increase the involvement of project office personnel in providing suggestions as to policy accuracy, intent and direction in meeting overall objectives.

Honorable Mention (Tie): *Software Capabilities – A Modular Approach*

Author: **Mr. Herbert Cottrell Jr.** is a logistics management specialist matrixed to the Readiness Management Division at the PEO for Command, Control and Communications – Tactical.

Abstract: The author presents a case for documenting software-only capabilities using the standard force documentation processes.

Category: Lessons Learned

Winner: *Maintaining and Developing the Contingency Contracting Force through Contracting-Driven Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Missions*

Author: **Maj. Garrett Bruening,** United States Air Force (USAF), is an acquisition attorney within the Air Force Materiel Command's Air Force Life Cycle Management Center Fighter-Bomber Directorate.

Abstract: The author recommends expanding the humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) mission set to include contingency contracting professionals executing contracting activities in support of HCA objectives. Doing so could significantly combat

the potential loss of contingency contracting skills gained during more than a decade of contingency operations. HCA missions share many characteristics with contingency contracting operations.

Honorable Mention: *A Week of Rowing on Ivy Creek and Eleven Years of Working in Army Acquisition*

Author: **Ms. Chenxi Dong-O'Malley** is a member of the Competitive Development Group/Army Acquisition Fellowship program of the U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center. She is currently Force Projection and Sustainment Portfolio manager at the U.S. Army Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering Center.

Abstract: This essay illustrates the concept of high-performance teaming through leadership training with rowing as the model of the training. Fourteen strangers with no rowing experience come together to compete in a regatta and, by the end of the week, demonstrate team synchronization and the strength of high-performance teaming. Included in this work are the eight secrets of inspirational leadership.

Major General Harold J. "Harry" Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing Distinguished Judges

The Hon. Claude M. Bolton Jr., Defense Acquisition University executive in residence and former assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology (ASA(ALT))

Dr. Leonard Braverman, senior scientist, RAND Corp. and former director, Institutional Army Transformation Commission

Professor John T. Dillard, academic area chair for acquisition, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School

MG David A. Fastabend (USA, Ret.), former director of strategy, plans and policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7

Professor Raymond D. Jones, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School

Ms. Mary Miller, deputy assistant secretary of the Army for research and technology

MG Roger A. Nadeau (USA, Ret.), senior vice president, American Business Development Group and former commanding general (CG), U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command

Mr. Kris Osborn, reporter, Military.com

Mr. Rickey Smith, deputy chief of staff, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command G-9

LTG Richard G. Trefry (USA, Ret.), Association of the United States Army (AUSA) senior fellow and former Army inspector general

GEN Louis C. Wagner (USA, Ret.), AUSA senior fellow and former CG, U.S. Army Materiel Command

LTG Joseph L. Yakovac (USA, Ret.), senior counselor, The Cohen Group and former ASA(ALT) military deputy and director, Army Acquisition Corps

Category: Acquisition Reform/ Better Buying Power

WINNER

The Contract Closeout Management Tool (C2MT): Achieving BBP by Enabling Rapid Contract Closeout

COL Linda R. Herbert

Ms. Veronica Alexander

Dr. Christina M. Bates

We have been a nation at war for more than a decade. As such, over the past ten years alone, the Department of Defense (DOD) obligated in excess of three trillion dollars in contracting for goods and services. At any given time, there can be more than 500,000 overage contracts awaiting closure. Once performance on the contract is completed, contracts must be closed within a specified time, or they are considered "overage." Some of these contracts are left over from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, while still others are the result of on-going contracting actions. As such, the DOD currently faces a substantial backlog of overage contracts requiring closeout. In the wake of its transition from wartime contracting, the Army acquisition community has continued to implement Better Buying Power (BPP) initiatives by developing innovative business tools that enable efficiencies, reduce redundancies, and save money while continuing to provide the very best support, and weapons systems to our Soldiers. One area that is clearly ripe for harvesting greater efficiencies is the closeout of overage contracts. A recent innovation and significant process improvement implemented by the Army enables a more efficient automated closeout of overage contracts through the use of an automated management tool. This unique tool, referred to as the Contract Closeout Management Tool (C2MT), was developed as a result of the Contract Closeout Task Force's (C2TF) mission to closeout overage contracts. This article addresses overage contract closeout, and discusses the innovative use of C2MT to improve the closeout process by reducing opportunities for error and overall process cycle times. These resulting improvements have the real potential to save DOD, and in turn the taxpayer, billions of dollars.

Awash in Contracts

DOD awards thousands of contracts every year to support military forces worldwide. A recent General Accountability Office (GAO) report (GAO-13-131) stated that the DOD obligated more than three trillion dollars during the past ten years on contracts. Once performance on the contract is completed, the contract must be closed in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) list of criteria necessary for closeout. While the overall closeout objectives are clear, the contract closure and auditing process can be arduous and time consuming, thus resulting in a significant backlog of contracts awaiting closeout.

Within the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement) (DASA(P)), the Expeditionary Contracting Support (ECS) directorate provided direct support to CENTCOM-Joint Theatre Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC). The ECS directorate is responsible for operational contracting policies across the full-spectrum of declared and nondeclared contingency operations. It is also responsible for providing strategic oversight for operational contracting worldwide, to include contract closeout.

In 2012, the ECS directorate was called on to oversee contract closeouts of Army overage contracts. At the same time, the offices of the ASA(AL&T) and the ASA(FM&C) were assessing the status of Army overage contracts. The Army estimated there was a backlog of approximately 377,160 overage contracts requiring closeout, with an estimated value in unliquidated obligations (ULO) in excess of one billion dollars. This situation posed a significant risk to the Army. Simultaneously, the ASA(FM&C) was also concerned about the implementation of a new automated system - the General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS - - the Army's solution in response to the National Defense Appropriation Act (NDAA) of 2010 requirement for DOD to prepare auditable financial statements no later than (NLT) September 30, 2017). Consequently, with the advent of GFEBS, the ASA(FM&C) intend-

ed to eliminate the backlog of contracts in the legacy system by the end of fiscal year 2014. As such, the DASA(P), ECS Directorate suggested the reconstitution of the C2TF in January 2013.

Everything Requires a Contract.
Soldiers from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) are equipped with Rifleman Radios during training at Fort Campbell, Ky., in March 2014. This contract will require closeout when all performance is completed.
(U.S. Army photo, PEO C3T, http://peoc3t.army.mil/c3t/#)

Hit the Ground Running

The C2TF's mission is to closeout all overage contracts, with priority given to those contracts with ULOs, no later than 30 September 2014. Recognizing that it would be difficult to close *all* overage contacts by the end of fiscal year 2014, the C2TF's goal is to closeout "legacy" overage contracts, while continuing to track the closure of new, overage contracts.

To accomplish this significant and time sensitive mission, the C2TF planned four distinct phases: Concept Planning, Proof of Concept, Execution, and Process Validation. Each phase had clearly outlined exit criteria, with deliverables and established updates presented to both the ASA(AL&T) and the ASA(FM&C). To save funding for the Army, closeout priorities were also established for all buying commands.

Closeout Process

Contracts may be identified for closeout through the use of the Army Contracting Business Intelligence System (ACBIS). Once identified, the contracts are prepared for closeout via a multi-step process as shown in Figure 1 (below). Once the process is completed, the contract is officially closed and any excess funds are de-obligated and returned for use by the Army. Timely de-obligation of the funding is essential because if funds are canceled, they cannot be used for other needed goods and services.

The C2MT: Improving the Contract Closeout Process

To reach its aggressive closeout goals, the C2TF set out to improve the existing process by removing excess, manual steps and implementing automation, where appropriate, to accelerate contract closeout. The Deputy Director, C2TF - Ms. Veronica Alexander – spearheaded the development and implementation of an automated scripting tool, referred to as the Contract Closeout Management Tool (C2MT), to enable a more efficient process that could mass closeout overage contracts. Partnering closely with the Army Business Center for Acquisition Systems, the scripting process was improved and a prototype C2MT tool was developed, enabling rapid and accurate identification of contracts as "closed" within the given contract writing system. The script also enables the automatic closure of contracts within specified paraameters. The original



Figure 1: Generic DOD Contract Closeout Process
Source: GAO report 13-131

scripting process involved several manual steps prior to running a script. Using the new tool, however, the new process eliminates manual steps, thereby significantly reducing cycle time and opportunities for error.

By implementing a pilot, improved scripting process, the C2TF achieved a successful mass automated closeout of 118,000 contracts, resulting in a savings to the Army of more than $111 million dollars. Following this successful pilot demonstration, the Army fully developed the C2MT tool and implemented it broadly as a best practice. Recognizing that this tool could potentially save billions for DOD, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)), Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) modified the DOD regulation allowing for a greater use of this tool. And, in December 2013, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) was modified to allow for a greater population of contracts to be closed electronically, using the new tool. Due to the resounding success of the C2MT, it is now broadly available for all agencies to use effective 1 September 2014.

Preserving Funds; Supporting the Soldier

As of early September 2014, the C2TF has closed approximately 75% of the 377,160 legacy overage Army contracts. The C2TF stakeholders - which include the ASA(FM&C), the ASA(AL&T) DASA(P), Army Contracting Command (and subordinate commands), PEO STRI, National Guard Bureau, INSCOM, MEDCOM, and USACE - have all teamed together to work toward the Army goal of budget auditability by the end of September 2014. The impact to the Army cannot be overstated.

The Army is currently the only DOD agency with the C2MT capability. In addition to enabling the Army to preserve hundreds of millions of dollars in de-obligated funding, the C2MT has also resulted in an estimated cost avoidance of $200 dollars per contract file (once a contract is electronically closed, the contracting office does not have to manually handle the file, and funding can be spent on other Army priorities). When applied across the hundreds of thousands of overage contracts within the Army, the total cost avoidance to the Army is in the billions of dollars range. This funding may then be reinvested in providing the very best support and capabilities to our most important and valued resource—our Soldiers.

COL Linda R. Herbert served as the Director, Contract Closeout Task Force (C2TF), Director, Expeditionary Contracting Support (ECS) Directorate, DASA(P), and as the Deputy Commander for Operations, C-JTSCC, Baghdad, Iraq. She holds four master's degrees to include Acquisition Material Management from the Naval Postgraduate School, and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College. She is Level III certified in contracting and program management.

Ms. Veronica Alexander served as the Deputy Director, Contract Closeout Task Force (C2TF), Deputy Director, Expeditionary Contracting Support Directorate, DASA(P). She holds a B.A. from Southern University, Baton Rouge, LA, and a master's degree from Clark Atlanta University, Atlanta, GA. She is Level III certified in contracting and manufacturing career field.

Dr. Christina M. Bates is a Lean Six Sigma Master Black Belt. Bates holds a B.A. in communication and sociology from Boston College; a MS in mass communication from Boston University; a JD from Boston University; and a PhD in communications from Arizona State University.

HONORABLE MENTION

Contracting Officer Representative's Inspection Reform

By Sherrie R. Moore
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15 September 2014

Abstract

The goal of this initiative is to propose a structured approach to improve Contracting Officer Representative's (COR) consensual inspection criteria and inspection methods Army wide. Setting standards of

inspection criteria and methods has been the subject of long-standing debate. As the government is responsible for ensuring that acquired services and supplies conform to the quality and performance requirements of the contract, contract surveillance is key to ensuring contractor's perform in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract. With this in mind, should the acquisition community be obligated to provide detailed accurate past performance evaluations? Should past performance evaluations be standardized? What is the impact if past performance evaluations are not standardized? In 2011, recognizing the pressing need for practical past performance guidance, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) sampled past performance assessments from the top ten agencies who obligated about 94 percent of the $550 billion spent on federal contracts during FY 2009. Another investigation conducted in April 2009 by the Government Accountability Office published the following report (GAO-09-374) Federal Contractors: Better Performance Information Needed to Support Agency Contract Award Decisions. Both reports determined that past performance evaluations lacked sufficient information to support their ratings. Most contracting officials agreed that for past performance to be meaningful in contract award decisions it must be documented, relevant, and reliable.

Contracting Officer Representative's Inspection Reform

The government utilizes the Contract Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) to report, collect and manage contractor's performance records, both negative and positive. Once the data is input into the CPARS system, this data is then uploaded automatically to the Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS) database which is linked to the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS). In accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Contracting Officer's are required to check FAPIIS to ensure that the government does business with vendors who are responsible and capable of performing the work. In order for source selection officials to have greater confidence in the reliability of past performance ratings, it is imperative that: 1) contractor performance evaluations are recorded, 2) ratings are recorded for all performance areas, 3) the ratings are supported with a detailed narrative, and 4) the rating factors correlate with those reported in CPARS.

CPARS can effectively communicate contractor strengths and weaknesses; however, according to the report submitted by OFPP only four percent of the assessments sampled were found to have a rating where the narrative was sufficient enough to support it. A structured and unbiased approach to past performance inspection and evaluation criteria will ensure that the monthly inspection reports are appropriately documented to sufficiently validate the ratings provided and will also guarantee that the performance evaluation factors correlate directly with CPARS. Acquisitions that place an emphasis on past performance tend to encourage companies to perform better. Without accurate past performance information the Government may have to rely heavily on contractor submitted technical and cost factors that do not provide insight on possible future performance challenges.

CPARS has the following basic evaluation areas: 1) Quality of Product or Service – overall performance and customer service, 2) Schedule – submission of contract deliverables, 3) Cost Control – change order costs and business systems, 4) Business Relations – partnership with the Government, responsiveness to Government inquiries, oversight of subcontractors and resolution of contract deficiencies, 5) Management of Key Personnel, 6) Utilization of Small Business, and 7) other areas as needed. Even though CPARS is a uniform repository that creates a standardized contractor past performance report, it loses its effectiveness when agencies fail to report on evaluation factors or when evaluation factors contain limited narrative to support their rating. Therefore, it is imperative that steps are taken to reform and standardize past performance inspections Army wide.

There are many challenges contributing to the low number and quality of contractor past performance assessments. Some of those challenges are staff shortages, evolving requirements, training, maintaining monthly reports and the burden of preparing and entering past performance assessments into CPARS. If the COR's monthly inspection criteria did not include one or more of the base evaluation factors in CPARS (Quality, Schedule, Cost Control, etc.) then

recreating the narrative a year later is either impossible or not reliable. This may be one very important reason why many past performance reports contain ratings without a narrative.

The Army can become a leader of reliable and consistent past performance assessments if strict compliance to standardized inspection criteria are to be followed for every inspection to include supplies and services. The standardized inspection criteria is the basic CPARS evaluation rating factors – Quality, Schedule, Cost Control, Business Relations, Management and Small Business. In addition to requiring strict compliance, all inspections should require a narrative when the rating is found to be other than "Satisfactory." If a narrative is not provided, the rating should be rejected. When the Army adopts this philosophy, all Army past performance evaluations will become relative and meaningful to facilitate CPARS primary objective – to provide consistent, standardized contractor performance assessments used as an aid in awarding contracts to contractors who consistently provide quality, on-time products and services that adhere to contractual requirements.

One step further –create a standard software program that can be loaded onto tablets and given to the COR's to help them conduct their inspections. The software program will assist in the standardization of all Army COR inspection criteria as the basic criteria will not be allowed to be altered. Additionally, the software program would demand a narrative to follow any rating above or below "Satisfactory." This software program will ensure that contractor past performance assessments are standardized and fully support the rating that is assigned. The narrative can be entered at the time of the inspection using the tablets keyboard. The software program can be written to utilize quantifiable and simple metrics to avoid subjective judgments and introduce consistency Army wide.

There are many more reasons and benefits that can be realized by introducing a Standardized Software Program and Inspection Tablet to the Army's acquisition community, such as:

The ability to schedule random inspections a month or more in advance. These random inspections can then be approved by the COR's supervisor and/or Contracting Officer. The COR's Supervisor will have real-time access to the COR's inspection schedules via their desktop.

The tablet can help keep the COR on track when multiple inspections are scheduled, or when the COR is responsible for multiple contractors. Due to the tablet being a mobile device, the COR will have the ability to take it with them on TDY assignment or to document unprecedented contractor performance.

The tablet is capable of taking pictures. Pictures can be worth a thousand words when trying to describe a contractor's performance when it either exceeded or did not meet contract requirements. Eventually, it may be possible to upload pictures into CPARS to assist the narratives in supporting performance ratings. Pictures may also assist other agencies in making determinations of contractor capabilities or limitations.

The inspection results only need to be input into the tablet once. The software program can be used to run monthly or yearly reports. These reports can save time when used to input the narratives into the CPARS.

The COR can provide the inspection results immediately to the contractor. The tablet is also capable of accepting contractor signatures showing that the contractor has been briefed, and whether questions or comments were made. Disagreements with the contractor over the performance assessment can be quickly and immediately resolved.

Subjective or biased performance ratings can be eliminated as the software program can be used to determine the performance rating based on a mathematical model. For example, a mathematical model can be used to evaluate each factor (Quality, Schedule, Cost Control, etc) based upon their corresponding ratings (Excellent, Very Good, Satisfactory, Marginal or Unsatisfactory). The ratings are then compared to the total number of inspections conducted over the past year. The mathematical model will provide the COR with a recommended rating; such as Quality = Excellent, Schedule = Satisfactory, etc. and the corresponding narratives to ease the burden of submitting the yearly performance assessment into CPARS. Using a mathematical model to recommend ratings removes the subjective and/or biased personal opinion factor that can hinder perceptions and affect judgment.

In conclusion, an analysis of the COR's inspection process reveals several challenges facing acquisition professionals and the need for reform. Even though these challenges are massive, the Army can become a leader of reliable and consistent past performance assessments by breaking barriers and forming policies and procedures that standardize inspection and acceptance methods Army wide.

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Author Biography

Sherrie R. Moore
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Mrs. Moore currently serves as a Contract Specialist at the PEO STRI Contracting Center in Orlando, Florida. Mrs. Moore is assigned to work on the Bradley Gunnery Training System.

Mrs. Moore began her career in acquisition as a Contract Specialist working at the Anniston Army Depot, Anniston Alabama. Transitioning from the Army to the Department of Homeland Security, Mrs. Moore became a warranted Contracting Officer overseeing several service contracts at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

Mrs. Moore earned a Masters of Business Administration degree from Saint Ambrose University, Davenport Iowa in 2000. Mrs. Moore continued her education and received a Master's of Science in Information Technology Management in 2003.

Mrs. Moore is certified as a Level III Acquisition Professional through FAI as of 21 April 2011 and certified as a Level III Acquisition Professional through DAU as of 26 June 2014. Mrs. Moore has over 8 years of contracting experience with over 12 years of Federal Service. Mrs. Moore is a member of the U.S. Army Acquisition Corps as of 27 June 2014.

Category: Future Operations

WINNER

Managing Stability Operations with Program Managers – A New Role for Army Acquisition

By LTC Adrian Marsh

September 15, 2014

"There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things."
- Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527)

Stability operations have dominated US military interventions in the two major conflicts since September 11th, 2001 and will likely govern history's determination of success or failure of each campaign. This realization led the Department of Defense (DoD) to define stability operations as "a core U.S. military mission, equal in importance to combat operations," and to direct the military to prepare to lead their activities (civilian security and control, restoring or providing essential services, repairing critical infrastructure and providing humanitarian assistance) until successfully transitioned to a partner agency and/or foreign government.[1]

As a military planner embedded in US Embassies Kabul and Baghdad, I saw first-hand the difficulties associated with managing these tasks in an interagency environment under an ever-changing array of security, policy and host nation variables. The experience also demonstrated that program management functions are directly applicable to the stability problem set. Sharing this observation, the Special Investigator General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) dedicated an entire report entitled "Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management," citing the need for agencies to "institutionalize program management systems, procedures, policies and initiatives" learned through the Iraq reconstruction experience.

Despite a growing body of work by SIGIR, its Afghanistan counterpart SIGAR and others citing the

importance of program management in stability operations, there is little to no discussion on which element within the DoD, and more specifically in the US Army, should be used to enable a comprehensive program management approach to organize and execute these efforts.

Within the US Army, the Corps of Engineers and Civil Affairs branches both play vital roles in a stability environment. Engineers manage construction projects and do so in a programmatic fashion, leveraging project management tools and functions. Civil Affairs provides cultural and civil sector (finance, health, city planning, etc) expertise while also managing projects to bolster the local economy, legitimize government and improve the quality of life. However, no branch holds as a core competency, the application of program management processes to assist in the coordination and management of cross functional and interagency programs.

The US Army Acquisition Corps is the best suited, given its core competencies, to augment the current commonly deployed mix of forces to provide the needed expertise to bear on this complex problem-set. Although a formidable task, program management capacity must be part of the deployed force structure to truly achieve the DoD's vision of "integrated civilian and military efforts" for stability operations.[3]

A Program View of Stability Operations:

Achieving systemic progress in a stability environment has many parallels with those found in developing and acquiring military systems; both are multi-year endeavors, requiring sustained and monitored progress to achieve desired effects. Additionally, both leverage the private sector workforce through the use of congressionally appropriated funds while being responsive to the oversight scrutiny that comes with their usage. The similarities are so great that major components of stability operations are often referred to as a "program" (i.e. rule of law, police development, and economic programs) and rightly so considering programs are defined as "a group of related projects managed in a coordinated way to obtain benefits not available from managing them individually."[4] Gaining the collective benefit of infrastructure and capacity building programs, managed across interagency actors, is needed to realize the Army doctrinal vision of achieving a "whole-of-government approach" in a stability operation.[5]

Despite often being described as a "program," stability operations are seldom managed as such or holistically across interagency lines. SIGIR found "in Iraq, capacity- development programs were not adequately integrated" and summarized the management as "a succession of diverse, largely improvised entities [which] ultimately managed more than $60 billion in US appropriations and billions more in Iraqi funds to execute more than 90,000 contract actions."[6]

Why Acquisition Program Managers?

Acquisition program managers possess both an array of managerial tools and a unique understanding of governmental processes that make them well suited to assist in stability efforts. Program schedules, trade studies, an understanding of congressional appropriations, and government contracting are all necessary in both materiel acquisition programs as well as in stability operations.

The tools used by the Army's program managers are universally accepted in the private sector as well as among interagency development partners. Program schedules, arguably one of the most valuable, establish task links allowing the time-phasing of events. They enable common program visualization which is particularly important when coordinating parallel or mutually supportive efforts. SIGIR concluded that "most reconstruction projects depend on other projects and must be properly sequenced" citing numerous cases where programs failed due to de-synchronization.[7] This typically occurs at the intersection of infrastructure and capacity building projects (i.e. when a network of medical clinics are built without the requisite training program to adequately staff them) or on the macro level when major programs capacity effects are poorly coordinated (i.e. a ministerial finance program that fails to account for the funding of security sector salaries).

Integrated stability program schedules can be used to manage across functional and interagency boundaries to accurately capture key interdependencies. Schedules coupled with other acquisition functions, such as cost benefit analysis, enable informed and timely decision making, both vital considering "stability missions…face narrow windows of opportunity to produce results."[8] Acquisition professionals understand these functions and can adapt them to enable a shared program visualization allowing for informed prioritization of resources among interagency partners.

Acquisition program managers are also expert in the justification and application of appropriated funds, and can apply this expertise when developing comprehensive management plans with partner agencies. Understanding congressional appropriations, agency funding authorities and the budget submission process is necessary to truly achieve a "whole-of-government" approach to stability programs. The funding process is so important that General Petraeus referred to money as "my most important ammunition."[9] Understanding how various appropriated funds can be leveraged creates interagency program options which directly translate to operational impacts in a stability effort.

Finally, to execute capacity building programs, most of which are executed by private sector partners, requires a thorough understanding of contracting. Developing well thought out contract strategies is especially necessary when synchronizing military and interagency efforts to achieve a mutually desired effect**.** Acquisition program managers understand these functions and their involvement would greatly increase the likelihood of successful interagency cooperation in these mutual endeavors.

Speaking Without Translation

Clearly, management of stability operations requires the coordinated application of all instruments of USG national power to be effective.[10] Unfortunately, SIGIR found in Iraq that "the lead agencies – DoD, State and the US Agency International Development (USAID) – sometimes coordinated but rarely integrated their operations: "stovepiping" is the apt descriptor."[11] One way to improve integration moving forward is to build on key commonalities found among these diverse agencies in a stability program.

Sister agencies approach stability operations in the same way acquisition program managers acquire systems—they leverage the private sector. Interagency partners rely on contractor expertise as the execution wing of their program initiatives, and are subject to the same Federal Regulations and oversight found in major acquisition programs. Given the similar work requirements, an Army program manager can easily work collaboratively with USAID and Department of State program managers on scheduling, funding, contracting and program considerations.

Short of the passage of a new "Goldwater-Nichols" mandating interagency cooperation, a shared functional program understanding can serve as a cooperative foundation between DoD and Interagency planners. Army acquisition program managers have the added benefit of understanding the operational planning language as well, enabling them to serve as a bridge between the military's operational command and the interagency program management wings of reconstruction.

"A lesson is not truly learned until it is incorporated."

—SIGIR final report

Integrated program management, across interagency and functional lines, is a vitally important component to gaining "unity of effort" in a stability operation. The Army's Acquisition Corps, by nature of its core competencies, has the requisite skills needed to enable more effective management of future operations. The branch should formally embrace the function and add stability program management as a skill identifier, institutionalize a training program, establish doctrine and prepare to deploy program managers to supplement military and interagency staffs addressing our US stability efforts around the globe. This initiative would further build on the significant wartime contributions of the Acquisition Corps, add a much needed component to achieving a "whole of government" approach to DoD stability efforts and create a more diverse and strategically relevant program management workforce for our Army.

Endnotes

1 *Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI), Number 3000.05, Stability Operations, (September 2009), 2*

2 *Special Investigator General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Iraq Reconstruction: Project and Program Management, (March, 2007), 17*

3 *DoD, 2*

4 *The Project Management Institute (PMI), The Standard for Program Management-Third Edition, (January 2013), 1.2*

5 *Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3.07 Stability, (August, 2012), 3*

6 *SIGIR, Learning From Iraq (March 2013) ,37*

7 *SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Project and Program Management , 77*

8 *SIGIR Applying Iraq's Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (February2010), 3*

9 *Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Money as a Weapons System Handbook (April 2009), 1*

10 *ADP 3.07, 3*

11 *SIGIR Learning from Iraq, 37*

HONORABLE MENTION

Enduring Rapid Capabilities

By Patrick McKinney

To counter emerging asymmetric enemy threats in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Congress and Department of Defense (DoD) created multiple rapid acquisition entities (such as the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), the Rapid Equipping Force (REF), and the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force) with flexible funding authorities and requirements processes to deliver solutions at the speed of war. JIEDDO spent tens of billions of dollars to deliver materiel and non-materiel solutions to defeat the improvised explosive device (IED), attack the IED network, and train American forces to operate in an IED environment. After solutions were developed and fielded, they transferred from JIEDDO to the armed services for management and funding, and the majority will not continue as enduring service programs of record (PoR) post conflict. Not all these wartime capabilities should endure, but with the current fiscal realities within the DoD and the lessons learned in combat, all partners should strive for more rapid capabilities to endure and become investments, not just purchases.

JIEDDO was established in 2006 to lead the U.S. response to IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it used its flexible and abundant funding to develop and field materiel and non-materiel solutions, helped establish counter IED (C-IED) training, and helped focus the research and development community against the IED challenge. JIEDDO and the other rapid acquisition entities respond to Urgent Operational Needs (UONs) and Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) to support Warfighters in active conflict. The DoD requires delivery of a JUON's solution within two years, and then once fielded and proven, a partner service makes a disposition decision (terminate, continue for the combat contingency, or transition to a PoR). Because of their rapidity, JUONs do not feet neatly into the traditional DoD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process that funds efforts years in advance. The Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) plans for capabilities at three to six years out, and rapid capabilities fall outside this "POM cycle."

The three "traditional" JCIDS requirements documents are the Initial Capability Document (ICD), the Capability Development Document (CDD), and the Capability Production Document (CPD). The Operational Need Statement (ONS), UON, JUON and Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON) enable the DoD to acquire urgent and rapid solutions for current and predicted contingencies, but they suffer from the challenges of misalignment with PPBE. Rapid entities have developed their own requirements (i.e.: the REF "10-Liner" and the JIEDDO Director's requirement) but these exist outside JCIDS and operational needs. JIEDDO should retain its flexible and timely requirements process, but should also start producing CDD's and CPD's for those significant capabilities that its leaders advocate to endure.

The JCIDS Manual, 19 JAN 2012, states that UON, JUON or JEON solutions do not require an ICD, CDD, or CPD, but that these documents may be required to enable sustainment and/or further development to enable "enduring use." Enclosure 13 of the Interim DoD Instruction 5000.02, 26 November 2013, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," provides guidance and a framework to manage rapid capabilities, and requires that a DoD Component conduct an assessment of a capability no later than one year after it enters the Operations and Support phase (or earlier if directed) to enable a disposition decision. If the PoR route is chosen, the Component must then determine what requirements documents are necessary to support the transition. DoD Directive 5000.71, Rapid Fulfillment of Combatant Commander Urgent Operational Needs, 24 August 2012, established the Senior Warfighter Integration Group (SIG) and directs the JIEDDO Director to provide guidance for the transition of C-IED capabilities into the traditional budget,

requirements, and acquisition process, and though JIEDDO offers recommendations, the services are the ultimate arbiter of which programs they will continue or transition.

Rapid capabilities often lack a "service requirement," or they support, supplement, or compete with established PoR's. Investments, infrastructure, bureaucracy, and entrenched interests can resist modifying or replacing a PoR and many rapid capabilities will not endure past the end of the Afghan conflict. For the sums paid, and the Warfighters saved, the DoD must address this disconnect.

To manage the disposition process, the Army created the Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT). Through the CDRT, the Army identifies "proven" rapid capabilities that are nominated for evaluation and an ultimate disposition decision. If a capability is selected as an Acquisition Program Candidate, it enters into the DoD 5000.02 acquisition system, competes for the POM, the Army enables a Full Materiel Release (FMR), and then the Army starts the combat development of a CDD or CPD.

To support the Army's CDRT process, reduce the follow on schedule for accepted PoR's, and ease the other services' disposition decisions, JIEDDO should expand its combat developer function and produce CDD's and CPD's. The JCIDS Manual recommends these documents to support the disposition decision, and if JIEDDO produced these documents earlier in the lifecycle, the partner services could accept these documents, leverage them to create service specific documents, or at a minimum, allow a more informed disposition vetting. Leaders must often make decisions with the information they have, and JIEDDO could provide better information to the services through developed requirements documents.

The urgency and need to protect lives and limbs prompted the DoD to often focus on speed versus costs, but significant challenges for enduring capabilities are their life cycle costs, their affordability, and how they fit into the PPBE process. The JCIDS requirements documents can help make the case and requirement for these capabilities, but they must still compete in a declining budget environment.

JIEDDO should start affordability analyses earlier in the lifecycle, and do a more thorough job of life cycle cost analysis. The current focus on one to two years supports combat operations, but the Congress, services, and DoD need better information to allow them to plan the future year defense program (FYDP).

DoDI 5000.02 encourages Milestone Decision Authorities (MDA's) and Program Managers (PM's) to use creative and risk managed approaches to acquisition, including more efficient or combined test and evaluation, but the testing requirements for a rapid capability often differ from those needed for a FMR or Milestone C Production decision. The urgent tests focus on safety and performance, and often do not determine reliability, availability, or maintainability (RAM), other life cycle cost drivers, the full range of performance and environmental factors.

JIEDDO should work with the services to develop test and evaluation strategies that address both the rapid and enduring test requirements in a logical sequence. Once a system is tested for performance and safety, and then fielded, the test community can conduct RAM or other necessary tests to help inform the disposition decision, or a FMR decision. MDA's, PM's, and the services should be willing to accept a balanced test strategy that meets both urgent and enduring requirements.

Before his departure, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. Ashton Carter advocated for the continuation of JIEDDO and other rapid acquisition entities to ensure the experiences and lessons learned since 2001 are not forgotten or ignored. The current gap between rapid and enduring capabilities discourages smart investments, wastes people, time, and resources, creates significant opportunity costs, allows duplication of efforts, focuses on one combatant command versus the global DoD needs, and relies on wartime funding which may not endure. Producing JCIDS requirements documents earlier, conducting affordability and cost analyses earlier, and better synching immediate and enduring testing requirements will help ensure that more rapid capabilities endure to support the future Warfighter, and make better use limited DoD personnel, dollars, and time.

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Category: Innovation

WINNER

Innovation in Army Acquisition

By Ernest B. Keen
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As a member of the Concept Design & Assessment Tech Area within the Aviation Development Directorate, I am fortunate to contribute to shaping new innovations into actionable investments in future capability. I have also seen many new efforts be born, burn brightly, and then wither in the heat of acquisition strategies built more to survive Congress than make an impact on the battlefield. As a relatively young engineer, it is a sad likelihood that I will only get to see one successful major acquisition program in my career. Furthermore, that program will face budgetary "death" many times before ever supporting the warfighter. Aside from the first order effect of failing our customer, the current atmosphere promotes atrophy of technical skillsets and risk aversion due to lack of opportunities for insertion of tech innovations. Granted that the current budgetary environment contributes to this growing issue, much has been recently made of the effect of "Joint" defense programs on slowing acquisition. (Reference: Lorell, Mark A., Kennedy, Michael, et al., *Do Joint Fighter Programs Save Money?*, RAND Corporation, 2013, Distribution Statement A – Public Release) However, it can be argued that this is a symptom rather than a root cause. Such programs may be orders of magnitude more complex than a single-service program, being executed by a workforce (and by extension an Industrial base) equipped more with process than experience. This is surely a recipe for long platform development time which is a prime indicator of platform acquisition cost. It is a fallacy that a good process will always produce a good product. Process inherently normalizes and sanitizes the product, trading risk for cost, schedule, or performance. Thus, while innovation is greatly desired in our acquisition process, we have not created an environment that cultivates it, nor long tolerates its presence without quick dividends. The following paragraphs discuss several ways this might begin to be addressed.

The first paradigm shift is to ***accept failure as an option***. This seems a counter-intuitive statement against the backdrop of failed acquisition programs. However, it is meant to illustrate the point that cultivating technical innovation requires deliberate outlets in which risk tolerance is elevated and transfer of technical learning is paramount. Defense acquisition, and in particular rotary-wing acquisition, serves as the pace-setter for vital portions of the U.S. industrial base. Leveraging commercial S&T investments will not be sufficient to realize future defense needs. As such, the risk aversion implicit in current acquisition strategies is for all practical purposes *mandated* to prime contractors, whose next missed major acquisition program could easily be their last.

There is a familiar saying "Good decisions are a result of experience, and experience is a result of bad decisions." This is not meant to convey a cavalier approach to the possible consequences of failure, but rather that there is enormous value in failure provided we are prepared to learn from it. There are currently some avenues within the Government for exercising

advanced technology development and implementation. For example, DARPA/IARPA programs deliberately search out such cutting edge problems. However, there is no infrastructure there to transition learning in those programs to lasting Government skillsets. The value of learning from previous efforts should be acutely noted by the Army acquisition community. Programs such as Comanche, Future Combat System (FCS), and Joint Heavy Lift offer many lessons that are relevant for current acquisition programs. There are costs associated with innovation failure, but they must be balanced against the very real cost of failing to innovate.

The second paradigm shift is to ***invest heavily in system modeling and simulation and the workforce to wield those tools*** for maximum effect. This area has rightfully been the subject of Army Research & Development Engineering Centers (RDECs) for some time. This investment should continue to grow and be recognized for its *fundamental* role in promoting innovation. How is the Army to see technical innovation in practice if our modeling and simulation cannot see it in theory? We must diligently and systematically invest in tools that allow us to see the breadth and depth of systems we are seeking to influence with new technologies. This is key because "many of the risks associated with an innovation stem not from the innovation itself but from the infrastructure into which it is introduced." (Reference: Merton, Robert C., "Innovation Risk: How to Make Smarter Decisions," Harvard Business Review, April 2013)

This highlights one issue with the recent assertions that "Joint" programs lack value. A system may be optimized against any set of constraints, but the domain of those constraints is limited to what we can understand and model. Thus, the aperture through which we view the problem limits the degree to which it can ever be truly "optimal." We must allow ourselves to examine how a new system can *fundamentally* change the way we operate, the way we train, and the way we provide support. Our aperture must be wide enough to bring these considerations into the design domain, and this requires modeling and simulation capabilities that are not currently integrated, or in some cases, do not currently exist.

The final paradigm shift is to ***structure management for innovation***. Recent articles by Forbes magazine have discussed the differences in management paradigms when a company truly adopts a customer-centric approach. In some older paradigms the larger needs of the customer may be diluted in favor of finding the most efficient process to provide a final product. "In the new paradigm, the role of managers is to enable self-organizing teams that are tightly focused on delighting the customer. Work is coordinated through dynamic linking with short iterative cycles and feedback from customers at the end of each cycle." (Reference: Denning, Steve, "Do We Need Evolutionary or Revolutionary Change in Management?", Forbes Magazine, November 2012) This paradigm cultivates revolutionary products from a more engaged workforce. Corresponding to the ideas presented above, management should provide dedicated avenues for innovation. They may initially be small, self-contained efforts that simply feed the existing acquisition process. However, application of this approach in large commercial enterprises has shown that improved return-on-investment and customer satisfaction will eventually dictate their widespread adoption.

In summary, the current pace of defense acquisition produces several self-reinforcing problems such as atrophy of Government technical skillsets and risk aversion. The growing complexity of defense systems and increasingly competitive budgetary environment indicate the problem will continue to worsen. Additional process rigor and oversight are not solutions. Means should be sought for inserting new technologies via short iterative cycles focused on technical learning with elevated risk tolerance. A technically sound, engaged Government workforce is needed to maintain U.S. Army dominance on the battlefield.

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HONORABLE MENTION (TIE)

Look for Clarity in Regulations

(Facilitating the Project Manager's Correct Interpretation of Regulations for Measuring and Achieving Compliance)

By David Byron Cook

Areas of Emphasis: Interagency. (Addressing solutions for navigating the current environment; Discussing the 'Way Ahead' from an acquisition perspective).

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Biographical Sketch: David B. Cook is an Industrial Engineer in the Program Evaluation Division of the Lower Tier Project Office (LTPO); Program Executive Office-Missiles and Space, located on Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, AL. Mr. Cook's primary background is that of working in Program Management directorates of the Army Project Office, beginning in 1987 with the Javelin Project Office, the Common Missile Project Office, and currently, the LTPO. Prior to these assignments, he began his Industrial Engineering career in 1983 with the Quantitative Analysis Branch of the Production & Procurement Directorate under the authority of what was then the Army Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal.

The opinions expressed herein are my own, and are not to be considered an expression, official view or endorsement by the Department to the Army.

I. Introduction.

Given the premise that Army Acquisition is operating within a new environment, the Program Executive Officer (PEO), and the Project Manager (PM) as the materiel developer, must still navigate within the regulatory and statutory framework that guides and directs management activities of materiel solution analysis, development, production, fielding, sustainment, and disposal of weapon systems. Within the ever increasing amount of information directed to the PM level, the goal and mindset of regulation writers should be to use language that conveys a clear understanding for Project Office personnel charged with implementation, and therefore, one which best facilitates the mutually desired outcome of all parties to meet the Warfighters' requirements. Achieving this goal will require some level of innovation on the part of the Army regulation writing community and allowance for application of a more critical thinking process from requirements' definition through to accurate translation by Project Office personnel into an implemented and verified action.

II. Statement of Issue.

Regulations (and statutes) tend to exemplify a strong propensity toward an institutionalized talking-down approach, rather than talking-through the process from the PM's perspective, without consideration as to how those charged with implementing guidance will translate and interpret a requirement. Regulations and policy memorandums should be void of statements that carry either no meaning, are confusing, have conflicting guidance, include terms/initiatives which have been superseded, and/or cannot be defined with respect to the PM's ability to measure, track, prove, demonstrate, and/or be held accountable for compliance, except on an equivalently vague basis. If there is not a complete understanding of the regulatory requirement, then the burden is placed upon the reader to provide an exact interpretation. Acquiring accountability from the PM is a difficult task if no meaningful metric can be defined from which compliance could be measured.

III. Discussion of Deficiencies.

The above premise—exact translation of regulatory specified direction and clarity of language to enable demonstration of compliance—is supported by more

than just anecdotal evidence. While the clarity of Army regulatory language has significantly improved in recent years, certain associated deficiencies currently exist in the AR 70-1, *"Army Acquisition Policy,"* dated 22 July 2011. Among those are, "throw-away" statements which contain a number of easily correctable logic failures and which the writer(s) substituted in place of sufficient and relevant detail.

A. These "Throw-away" Statements Include:

- **Use of vague language and direction.** That is, *",…the approach is intended to cause the developers, from the outset, to consider all elements of the product life cycle,…"?* [What groups represent the "developers"? What does "cause" and "consider" mean in terms of a definitive action to be taken by whoever the developers are?]

- **Use of phantom enforcement of "guidelines" which are essentially unverifiable** (with repetitive direction wandering around the subject and in only a three-sentence paragraph). That is, *"The MDAs must rigorously address core issues",…,"and there are certain core management issues that must be formally addressed, … ." The core management issues that MDAs must address are the following:, … ."* [There's no question as to the relevance and importance of the core management issues listed in the AR 70-1, but there is also no vehicle which provides a definitive statement as to method of "addressing", or really, validating those issues other than as may be implied by the acquisition strategy (since the method of addressing cannot conflict with current approved format, or appropriate length, for an acquisition strategy) or through a number of other program documents required for milestone decisions.]

- **The (nearly) ubiquitous, "Obey All Rules!"** That is, in reference to PM's responsibilities, *"Evaluate assigned programs for compliance with statutory and Army regulatory acquisition requirements."* [Whom does this direction serve? Or what purpose can it serve? It is as if the intention were one of expecting the PEO/PM to be able to provide, whenever demanded, an immediate credible response that proves instantaneous and comprehensive verification of compliance with all directed procedures for any program? And the phrase, "*evaluate for compliance*", is not sufficiently meaningful. Just following the entirety of guidelines specified within the AR 70-1 is a monumental task, in addition to this AR's referenced 'Required and Related' publications which include applicable statutes, regulations, policies, procedures, and standards consistent with the management of acquisition programs.]

- **The well-kept secret.** The phrase, "and so forth", is referenced four times in the current AR 70-1. [There are acceptable instances where producing an exhaustive list per subject is limited by a document's purpose and cannot be stated; however, when identifying a particular requirement to be executed by the PEO/PM where the exact procedure is not known, then the colloquial reference should be omitted. The use of "etc." is not recommended for the same reason. Why obfuscate the direction when a more direct statement could be provided?]

B. Other Logic Deficiencies:

Additionally, a number of outright assumptions are stated, as if doing so makes those factual and that an equivalent automatic outcome will result. Typically included are a lot of words with no discernible execution path coupled with the use of embedded truisms. The definition of 'Evolutionary Acquisition', using undefined terms and colloquial language, is notable among these and translating a meaning requires a certain degree of clairvoyance, as particularly evident in the last two sentences below. That is, *"Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred approach to satisfying capability requirements. The objective is to balance the requirements and available capability with resources and technologies to put operational capabilities into the hands of the user quickly. To this end, PMs will use appropriate enabling tools, including a modular open systems approach, to ensure access to the latest technologies and products. The right tools will ensure affordable and supportable modernization of fielded assets."* "Right tools?" One may question whether or not the writer(s) could explain the overall intent of these statements and the respective process

by which, 'access to technologies and products yields a capability of ensuring affordable and supportable modernization efforts'? If the conclusion is "no", then perhaps the evolutionary acquisition definition needs a revision appropriate to its respective critical nature and/or with sufficient elaboration such that a discernible and executable direction could be defined and implemented. Simplicity is not the essence of these two statements specifically referenced or the definition.

Certain other issues tend to be pervasive which include: (a) An expression of many responsibilities and duties without adequate cross-walking, and a general lack of efficient organization (not necessarily limited to the AR 70-1); (b) Incessant use of colloquial language interspersed with personal pronouns used to describe objects (events, processes, documents, and similar items). The issue is not just that a less than appropriate method of expression is used, but that the practice hinders or eliminates the possibility of making a more relevant, accurate, and concise statement, or argument; and (c) Use of outdated terminology or procedures which are presented in the context as being current but are in conflict with previous publications. Additionally, a regulation that is being updated should be globally checked to verify that all references to any outdated terminology/procedures have been removed.

IV. Addressing Solutions for Change.

It is certain that regulations of a particular quality do not (necessarily) inhibit the expertise, capability, and/or resourcefulness of competent PEO/PM personnel—those regulations simply provide an authoritative methodology/guideline for the capable professional to execute per an intended objective. The suggestion is offered that the Army should allow the PEO/PM more than a cursory involvement whenever the opportunity to review proposed updates to Army Acquisition regulations is anticipated. That timeline should be known well in advance so that the reviewers could be of more relevant assistance in providing suggestions as to accuracy, intent, and direction. Compliance with regulations, such as the AR 70-1, requires considerable effort on the part of PEO/PM to effectively manage programs; therefore, shouldn't the Army regulation writing community seek to facilitate that objective by carefully reviewing entirety of document for accurate intent and clarity?

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HONORABLE MENTION (TIE)

Software Capabilities – A Modular Approach

By Herbert Cottrell Jr.

The Army's Common Operating Environment (COE) initiative introduced an approved set of computing technologies and standards that enable secure and interoperable applications to be rapidly developed and executed across a variety of Computing Environments (Command Post, Mounted, etc). The COE, coupled with the evolution in acquisition program requirements, is changing the way the Army develops and fields capabilities.

As programs adjust, the 'materiel solutions' developed to meet new Capability Development Document/ Capability Production Document (CDD/CPD) requirements are often software-only solutions. Since the hardware solutions for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems are becoming increasingly based on commercial items, this leaves the true capability at the software level. In effect, software is becoming the "new" capability. Another way to view this change is that the "agnostic" hardware "conveys" the actual capability to the user. This approach leaves us with gaps in how we currently document software; a resourceful and innovative use of existing processes should be implemented to successfully capture these capabilities.

Issue 1 - Basis of Issue

Any Basis of Issue (BOI) for hardware is currently supported in the Army logistics system – more specifically, utilizing the Basis of Issue Plan Feeder Data

(BOIPFD) process and the follow-on actions of Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) and Line Item Number (LIN) development. These processes traditionally support tangible items of materiel. However, the current overall trend is toward generic, or agnostic, hardware capable of hosting different software. The force documentation system does not currently accommodate developing and formalizing a BOI for these less tangible, software-only capabilities. This situation leaves any distribution of software to miscellaneous and nebulous methods that are not standardized and do not have Army visibility. Requirements that drive the de-coupling of hardware and software open up possibilities along with concerns. Hardware with more power and efficient software solutions lends itself to a potential "one to many" relationship; therefore, the software needs to be documented in a methodical and coordinated method. The overriding questions are – where does it go, who gets it and how do we ensure Army visibility?

Issue 2 – Authorization and Funding

Authorizations are the way capabilities and requirements are documented on the unit's Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), utilizing the BOIP and LIN processes. Currently, no such construct is utilized to identify and authorize software-only capabilities. The result is neither Commanders nor the Department of the Army (DA) have clear visibility of software capabilities that they do with hardware. This leaves a potential second order effect of not having a "by the book" approach during Changes of Command or equipment transfers between units. These problems are growing as more capabilities are changing to software-only.

Significant unit support costs are associated with software, whether for training or organic support. Unit Operations & Maintenance funding to support software-only capabilities is not currently being captured or authorized.

From a program management standpoint, there is no method to create program funding tracking using Standard Study Numbers (SSN). In some cases, software-only programs are Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1AM Major Automated Information System (MAIS), so not having this ability is counterintuitive to standard practices.

Army procurement and distribution of software licenses could also benefit from such standardization and visibility. The cost for software licenses across the Army is a substantial investment – one that continues to grow. Adjustments to the current force documentation process could provide the mechanism to accurately track, analyze and compile the license requirements, distribution and cost. As an example, support equipment and manpower resources are documented through the BOIPFD process. Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) consumption and power requirements are calculated through this process to ensure we have adequate supply at the requisite echelons. The associated stakeholders and subject matter experts within the Army are able to assess, compile and document the requirements in the BOIP. Authorizations are a key part of responsibility. Tremendous resources are expended for software, so it should be traceable, accountable and officially authorized based on approved requirements.

Issue 3 - Force Documentation

As programs become software-only, the Operator and Maintenance man-hours are not being captured in the Direct Productive Annual Maintenance Man-hours (DPAMMH) (also known as Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC)) section of the BOIPFD, creating assumptions that could lead to a "false positive" for Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) reductions. In other words, the number of hours required to operate and maintain a system in the field will not be cataloged in the requirements documents normally associated with systems, and therefore any analysis of manpower will be short critical MOSs.

Hardware dependencies for operations of software-only capabilities are not recorded for Associated Support Items of Equipment (ASIOE), which could lead to an equipment shortfall.

Training on software intensive systems is complex and unique. Failing to document training requirements and associated costs could decrease unit readiness.

Systems morphing to software-only may also be divesting hardware, which also needs to be documented.

Modular Approach

Acquisition, in a constrained fiscal environment, needs to be more responsive and cost effective, which requires agile processes. For a process to be agile, it

must be flexible, but without losing order. A modular approach allows flexibility within current force documentation disciplines. If software and hardware are "modular," current acquisition logistics requirements and processes can be more efficient and effective. Since LINs are the "building blocks" for Army capabilities, separate LINs for both software and generic hardware would allow for a modular approach, while the BOIP process brings order and discipline.

The ability to have a modular approach with discipline is a win for cost and schedule. Stated another way, if software and agnostic hardware have LINs, a building block approach to develop a capability via integration is possible.

Integration

As the Army moves toward more common cross-program hardware systems, the ability to distribute, authorize and document software-only capabilities could be supported by modifications to the current processes. Software should be able to have its own LIN to tie the documentation together, solving many of the previously stated issues. A LIN allows for software to be treated as a "tangible item," giving it equal footing as a capability. Additionally, a LIN could provide a method to track readiness, enforce Information Assurance (IA) and update compliance and potentially track software license distribution. BOIPFD could document software to be handled as a tangible item of property that is accountable, and it does have the mechanism to document software capabilities with minor changes. Utilizing an existing, standard Army process retains integration with current logistics systems and could be a very positive solution leveraging a known process that provides discipline, standardization and overall integration.

Recommendation

The Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) process should be adapted to manage software capabilities as tangible assets. LINs, as the modular constructs for capabilities, allow flexibility in acquisition processes. This would require new thinking and basic tools to make it happen – and the return on the investment would be high. First, the Army should develop a unique software LIN construct that can be created and tracked via the standard systems. Then, the software LIN can be documented via the BOIP process – an existing process that can work for software-only with minor modifications.

Bottom line, the issue of how to track and support software-only capabilities is growing for the Army. Acting now through the modification and use of standard processes and systems will be a major step forward in seeing these issues mitigated. It will provide a platform to support the COE initiative and stage us for successful program implementation and follow-on support.

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Category: Lessons Learned

WINNER

Maintaining and Developing the Contingency Contracting Force Through Contracting-Driven Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Missions

By MAJ Garrett J. Bruening, USAF

From *Packard* to *Gansler*, from the Commission on Wartime Contracting to the investigations concerning Iraq

and Afghanistan reconstruction, report after report, finding after finding, says the same thing: a competent and professional acquisition workforce is vital to acquisition excellence. Unfortunately, the entire joint force did not achieve excellence in contingency contracting. Instead, we all learned contingency contracting the hard way. And now the longest contingency contracting learning experience draws to a close. We'll need those skills again. But absent another conflict, how can we maintain those skills? How do we develop those skills? And how do we do it inexpensively?

Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) missions accomplished through the contingency contracting force could be a great answer to these questions. HCA missions involve military personnel carrying out HCA activities in conjunction with military operations. We typically think of HCA missions as healthcare providers and engineers practicing their trade in underserved areas outside the United States. Healthcare providers treat patients in challenging conditions, like they might in a contingency environment. Engineers construct basic buildings and facilities, like they might at a forward operating base. Could HCA missions provide similar training benefits to the contingency contracting force? I think the answer is yes.

Persuasive reasons support using contracting-driven HCA missions to develop the contingency contracting force. First, HCA contracting work tracks contingency contracting work well. For example, HCA requirements can be small and under the one million dollar simplified acquisition threshold for acquisitions outside the United States. The *Gansler* report stated 86 percent of contingency contracting actions in Afghanistan were under the one million dollar simplified acquisition threshold. Thus, contracting-driven HCA work would exercise contracting skills similar to those the contingency contracting force would use in contingency contracting. Second, HCA contracting work involves many of the same marketplace challenges the contingency contracting force would experience in a contingency environment. Differences in language, culture, communication, currency, economics, politics, and more exist both in HCA and contingency contracting. Experiencing and resolving these challenges, without the life or death pressures of combat, will help the contingency contracting force prepare for contingency contracting. Finally, HCA missions present a lower risk profile, creating space for the contingency contracting force to work through and resolve any mistakes made or issues generated. A delay awarding a well digging contract or trouble in managing a school construction contract, while unfortunate, represent a materially different concern to that of a deployed warfighter not getting necessary supplies and services.

Beyond developing the contingency contracting force, contracting-driven HCA missions could develop the supporting elements of the acquisition team. Contracting-driven HCA missions will need contracting officer representatives and other inputs from a requiring activity. These personnel will gain experience in assessing needs, generating market research, translating requirements into statements of work or performance work statements, monitoring contractor performance, and much more. Contracting-driven HCA missions will also require supporting financial and legal elements. Similarly, these elements will, too, gain experience relevant to future contingency contracting missions. The more these supporting elements of the acquisition team experience the contracting-driven HCA mission's situations, challenges, and issues, the more prepared they will be to support the contingency contracting force.

Contracting-driven HCA missions could also develop the contingency contracting force's ability to work in an interagency and multinational environment. HCA missions are closely aligned with combatant commander objectives, the chief of mission for the country involved, the United States Agency for International Development, the host country, and many more. The panoply of players in the contingency environment will likely be similar. The relationships made and experiences earned during relatively low-risk and low-visibility contracting-driven HCA missions can lay the foundation for future interagency and multinational aptitude and teamwork during high-risk and high-visibility contingency contracting missions.

In a constrained budgetary environment, one could ask if we should allocate funding toward these contracting-driven HCA missions. After all, why should tax dollars be spent building roads in foreign lands when they could be spent building roads stateside – or even not be spent at all. To this, I would say

not investing in the contingency contracting force is penny-wise and pound-foolish. The Commission on Wartime Contracting found "[a]t least $31 billion, and possibly as much as $60 billion, has been lost to contract waste and fraud in America's contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan." While people may debate what the actual and final figure really is, no one can gainsay that many billions were lost. Sprinkling a few tens of millions around the globe to create real-life training environments for those we will entrust to spend many more billions later on is a sound investment by any account. And America would gain a prestige bonus to boot.

One may also question if the law defining HCA, 10 U.S.C. § 401(e), really allows contracting-driven HCA. I think the answer is yes. Contracting-driven HCA can promote the United States and host countries' security interests while providing and developing the contingency contracting force's operational readiness skills. Our contingency contracting force should train by doing, no different than how pilots fly, sailors sail, doctors heal, or engineers build. Combine our prior contingency contracting challenges with the inherent similarities between the HCA and contingency contracting and I think you have a powerful argument for training. If we start small and focus on contracting for traditional HCA activities, like basic medical care and basic infrastructure, we can build confidence in ourselves and others while developing a record of compliance.

State-side experience and Defense Acquisition University courses will only get us so far. Whether learning to ride a bike, cleaning an M4, or soliciting and awarding contracts, real experience will always be the best teacher. HCA missions represent an excellent "training range" for the contingency contracting force to maintain and develop contingency contracting skills. Contracting-driven HCA missions can help create the competent and professional acquisition workforce that achieves acquisition excellence both on and off the battlefield. And THAT'S a force multiplier for warfighters of today and tomorrow.

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HONORABLE MENTION

A Week of Rowing on Ivy Creek and Eleven Years of Working in Army Acquisition

By Ms. Chenxi Dong-O'Malley

On a hot and humid spring day in Charlottesville, Virginia, I walked down a windy dirt pathway from the University of Virginia (UVA) boathouse toward the Ivy Creek shore where two narrow row boats were docked. For the first time in my life I was going to row against another team in a "regatta" in a team of eight people whom I've only met four days ago.

I was at a leadership training course "Leading Teams for Growth and Change" at Darden Business School at UVA through Competitive Development Group Army Acquisition Fellowship in May 2014. The main teaming exercise was rowing in teams with students in the class.

On the first day, in the classroom training session, the main coach, who is the president of Team Concepts Inc., shared with everyone eight secrets of inspirational leadership and explained that rowing is all about synchronization of people on the boat to achieve the "swing." Swing is that everyone rowing in the same motion with oars in and out of the water at exact same moments, in which case a team rows as if it is one person rowing with strength of eight. The concept of swing sounds easy, however it would usually take years

of training for a team to acquire the perfect synchronization. How would we row to compete with less than one week training with a team consisting of people with broad range of heights and weights? The coach had asked us a simple question of what we are trying to get out of this experience, regardless everyone on the team should have that same goal, to win the race, to build a high-performance team, or to simply have fun. My team had discussed and made a common goal that everyone agreed upon for the week.

Before we got on the water, we practiced on the ergometer machine to warm up to simulate rowing motion, the coaches watched our rowing pace and determined the order of everyone's placement in the boat based on what he observed as everyone's strengths and weaknesses. He had put me in the stern seven, which is one of the two leading positions where rowers behind me have to follow my pace. I wasn't the tallest or the strongest person on the team. As I was puzzled, the coach explained that if he was looking for the right rowing pace for the team given everyone's physical condition. Putting the strongest and fastest rower in that position would lead a team of inexperienced rowers to chaos. It is not about the individual strength but the power of the whole team as one at a consistent pace everyone would be able to do.

After the warm up, it was time to get on the water. It took no time for us all to realize that everything anyone does on the narrow boat affected the entire team, a wiggle could throw off the balance of the boat, one stroke too fast could cause bad currents to mess up other team members' strokes and possibly lose grip of the oar when fighting the bad currents. We had to learn to trust our teammates that everyone was capable to do their parts. From the moment we stepped into the boat and pushed away from the dock, to the training time that half of the team practiced synchronization of rowing while the other half helped to balance the boat with oars at the right depth of water, and to a simple task of turning the boat around, we needed to think of ourselves as an arm or a leg of one person. We followed the cadence called by the coxswain or the individual in front to ensure the oars were in and out of water at the exact same moment. We learned to leverage each other's existing strengths and accommodate and work with each other's weaknesses and turn weaknesses into strengths. Only when all was in place, we could become the high performance team achieving the goal we originally set for ourselves.

As the week went on, both teams grew stronger and got more familiar with rowing techniques and developed greater level of understanding on individual roles of the team. There were really hard times where I almost lost my oar to the water when I caught in a bad current when another teammate threw off the boat balance or rowed out of sync. There were also the bright shining moments that the boat felt like a feather when we achieved "swing." Those moments reminded me that my team could perform well upon training and improving the cohesiveness of the team. The bright moments provided me confidence and encouragement not to give up and let down other team members. When I finally experienced the "swing" moment, it really struck me that in the world of the acquisition workforce, or anywhere else where team work is required, the easiest, most efficient process for anything to get done is when everyone on the team has common goals and can function in synchronization with collective capabilities and skills.

On the race day, which was only the fifth day since the first time we all started rowing, both teams performed like professional rowers. The boats flew skimming the surface of the water. Every single one of us tried our absolute best to establish the synchronization and togetherness of our teams. Both teams had moments when one of the team members got caught in a bad current but all quickly recovered to match up the teams. My team did not win the race at the end, but that did not matter to any of us – because we have improved from not knowing how to get in the row

boat correctly in the beginning to actually rowing as a team achieving moments of "swing," and the common goal we set for ourselves was to build a high-performance team and learn through the experiences during the week, have fun, and most of all we all learned a valuable life lesson we would not have anywhere else.

Today as I am back to my daily work in the world of technology development for our Warfighters, I often reflect on my week at Darden and see how I can apply the lessons learned and leadership/teambuilding tools to my current position to ensure that I can be an effective leader to myself and people around me. From our Warfighters fighting in combats to an Integrated Product Team in the Acquisition workforce, regardless how much experience one has or in depth an individual's knowledge is on a team, there would be no meaning to the leader of the team if team members are not committed to the mission/goal and do not want to be part of the team, and no meaning to the team if everyone works on a different path without synchronization. The eight secrets of inspirational leadership to build and lead high performance team shared by the main coach at the beginning of the training and I would like to share with everyone are

One – everyone wants to be part of something bigger than themselves

Two – everyone wants to feel valued

Three – define the performance objective

Four – ennoble the effort

Five – empower individuals within team synergy

Six – emphasize personal responsibility

Seven – celebrate the journey

Eight – positive engaged energy.

Ms. Chenxi Dong-O'Malley's academic background is in Chemical Engineering. She has been in acquisition workforce since 2003 starting in individual chemical and biological (CB) protection science and technology area at Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering Center (NSRDEC). In 2006, she worked as a systems engineer supporting individual CB protective equipment for Product Manager - Clothing and Individual Equipment under the Program Executive Office for Soldier. She was selected for the Competitive Development Group Army Acquisition Fellowship under the Army Acquisition Support Center in 2012 and has been working in different development assignment positions for the past two years. Her current position is at the Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research and Technology) office to support Soldier Portfolio and work as the liaison of NSRDEC to ASA(ALT).