ARMY AL&T


Priority Mission #1— Maintaining Customer Confidence in the Tactical Fight


Science advisors are a small cog in the great materiel developer community of our Nation’s military. This com- munity includes unsung heroes both downrange and stateside. Examples include Force Modernization Officers, Rapid Equipping Force Soldiers, Con- tracting Officers (51C), or Program Management Soldiers (51A). The team also includes counterparts at the Army and joint staff levels, who work tire- lessly to mitigate the disruptive effects of emerging needs on budgets and long-term warfighting power.


In my opinion, many 51S officers serve in roles close to the tactical fight. They have formal acquisition education and, thus, bear the moral responsibility to facilitate near-term, immediate technology support in a manner that ensures agile, yet responsible, life-cycle support. Maintaining operational avail- ability of new technologies that a unit has wrapped its tactics around is a serious responsibility.


A great officer professional develop- ment discussion should include what I would collectively call the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Add-on Armor program as a case study. As the first military assistant project manager (PM) for this effort, I witnessed the intrin- sic value of 51S officers, such as LTC Dan Rusin, one of many volunteers operating downrange to firm up initial U.S. Army Research Laboratory proto- types in the operational environment. Because of that critical interface with the customer, the follow-on original equipment manufacturer manage- ment by the acquisition community and the U.S. Army Materiel Command was more rapidly focused. And many readers know how significant and chal- lenging that program became. The Add-on Armor effort is by no means a perfect program, but it represents a sig- nificant milestone for our relationship


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with our customer; and 51S officers played a pivotal role in this program.


Operational Role in Mitigating Enemy Fires


In 2003, the enemy thrust a technology into the war with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Consequently, the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was borne, along with multiple intelligence and materiel support efforts to counter the threat. A review of Joint Manning Documents (JMDs) may not include these additional special staffs at the forces or corps levels; thus, the effective horizontal integration of such capabilities provided 51S officers a chance to excel at the operational level. In


Analysis of the SOUTHCOM response to the January 2010 Haiti earthquake disaster reveals additional potential roles for 51S offi cers in humanitarian relief operations. Here, a SOUTHCOM assessment team boards a C-130 Hercules air- craft en route to Haiti to support U.S. relief efforts. (Photo by TSgt Santita Mitchell, SOUTHCOM Public Affairs.)


2004, RDECOM leaders made a deci- sion to embed a senior acquisition officer on the warfighting staff in Iraq to facilitate horizontal materiel integra- tion, such as prioritized IED solutions.


In addition to 51S officers assigned to Field Assistance S&T (FAST) teams working at the division level and below, RDECOM provides another endur- ing commitment via the Science, Technology, and Acquisition Corps Advisor (STACA) officer to advise senior staffs in Iraq and Afghanistan. These experienced colonels organize the materiel developer response to miti- gate enemy fires. Furthermore, these officers integrate rigor to the difficult process of vetting and merging urgent operational needs with long-term ser- vice component goals. I believe the value of these positions should merit consideration as additions to JMDs. Moreover, a highly integrated joint staff can effectively leverage the 51S officer to lead “materiel red-teaming cells” by more closely combining intelligence products and coalition versus enemy trends with planned technical materiel solution integrations. The goal: vector


the enemy in directions the combatant commander desires.


Enabling Strategic Influence for Hybrid Wars in a Flat World


The reality of a connected world means a natural disaster in one hemisphere can coalesce into a strategic jihad message in another hemisphere by non-state actors. The geographic structure of COCOMs is well suited to address and respond to these threats as our national command authority deems appropriate. DOD assets often take the initial lead until other responses crystallize. In this scenario, 51S officers provide a criti- cal link from the COCOM staff back to service programs of record (PORs) and provide insight on potential emerg- ing needs that senior commanders will expect Soldiers to bring to the rescue. The 51S is challenged in thoughtfully connecting Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements to approved Army capabilities and materiel solutions appropriate for a POR.


The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) response to the January 2010 Haiti earthquake disaster is a rel- evant case study. The SOUTHCOM


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