T
he launch of combat operations in Afghanistan on Oct. 7, 2001, not only signaled the start of Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF), but also marked the beginning of a period in which the U.S. military has continually adapted to the challenges of an era characterized by persistent conflict.
Like many DoD organizations, Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) has experienced radical transformation based on lessons learned while supporting the ongoing overseas contingency operation.
SDDC, the successor to Military Traf- fic Management Command (MTMC), is the Army Service Component Com- mand of U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and a major subor- dinate command to U.S. Army Materiel Command. Whenever and wherever Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, and Coast Guardsmen are deployed, SDDC is involved in planning and executing the surface delivery of their equipment and supplies. SDDC partners with the commercial transportation industry as the coordinating link between DoD sur- face transportation requirements and the capability that industry provides.
A BUMPY LANDSCAPE To fully grasp the change SDDC has seen, it’s important to understand what SDDC looked like at the turn of the 21st century.
In the past 25 years, a political land- scape that was dominated by two global
HEADING HOME FROM IRAQ
The first truck of a large convoy carrying military tactical vehicles pulls out of the staging area on Contingency Operating Base Adder, Oct. 25, 2011, as the U.S. military presence in Iraq was drawing down. In comparison with Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, redeployment from Operation Iraqi Freedom has been very forgiving from a logistics standpoint. Because cargo moved via regularly programmed convoys to Kuwait, there was no real impact if planning was inaccurate. Redeployment cargo might be delayed, but eventually the cargo found its way onto a vessel home. (U.S. Army photo by SPC Anthony Zane.)
superpowers has evolved into an argu- ably more delicate arrangement that is as unpredictable as it is complex.
The U.S. military has radically transformed along this bumpy and unpredictable path, from a forward-based approach with vast echeloned formations to a modular, brigade-centric structure that is home- based and deploys in smaller packages.
Military logistics similarly has transformed, adapting to the new way we fight while incorporating the new way we do business and the technology that drives it all.
OEF and the buildup for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) further changed SDDC. Most notably, increasing U.S. military oper- ations in Southwest Asia meant a greatly expanded surface transportation workload.
Before this point in the command’s his- tory, its predecessor, MTMC, focused solely on the strategic aspect of transpor- tation, moving international unit cargo from seaport to seaport—commonly referred to as “port-to-port” operations.
Traditionally, international cargo traffic moved between seaports that maintained a permanent MTMC presence, and move- ment from those ports was coordinated by units stationed there. Similarly, mili- tary equipment returning from Europe would sail into an East Coast port, a local MTMC stevedore contractor would download the vessel, and unit traf- fic managers would coordinate onward movement with tendered carriers.
Port selection was determined largely by where MTMC had a presence and where contracts were in place to load or unload a vessel. This approach, while adequate in a static environment with a known threat, was not sufficient to support the modern force.
NEW WAYS OF THINKING Resupply challenges via surface transpor- tation became evident during the initial stages of OEF. As the U.S. footprint in Afghanistan grew, traditional military logistics units, storage sites, and supply lines were not an option.
Without a static military port structure, MTMC began to rely on commercial carriers with networks moving through established, albeit primitive, lines of communication (LOCs). Small-scale movement began through Pakistan and along the Northern Distribution Network routes used today. While there were many issues with throughput and reception, the small force and the access it had to abun- dant airlift overshadowed surface problems that would later prove significant.
Additionally, large-scale activity in the buildup and initial phase of OIF forced new ways of thinking; the inadequacy of distribution methods and gaps in force structure were evident. As the U.S. foot- print in Iraq increased, so did contracted and commercial support to those forces.
While unit cargo flowing into Iraq was moved primarily on Military Sealift Com- mand (MSC) naval or chartered vessels to the military port at Ash Shuaiba, Kuwait,
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LOGISTICS
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