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TRANSFORMATIONAL JOURNEY


the commercial distribution pipeline was filled with sustainment stocks and resup- ply, most of it in standard commercial shipping containers.


As our military established itself in Iraq, the ports, prime-vendor warehouse activi- ties, and military supply activities were quickly overburdened. No specific com- mand was charged with organizing the overall distribution effort and with syn- chronizing strategic, operational, and tactical moves.


Consequently, strategically directed sus- tainment cargo often entered the pipeline without a logic that considered reception or storage capacities. The theater trans- portation structure could not keep pace with the requirement.


CHALLENGES OF OEF At the same time, focus on the larger effort in Iraq overshadowed what was happening in Afghanistan; the role of SDDC and the powerful commercial capabilities that the command brought to bear in Afghanistan were increasing in importance and transi- tioning from traditional mission sets.


TAKING PORT OPERATIONS TO THE FIELD


The Mobile Port Operations Center is a vehicle- mounted operation center designed to support the Military Surface Deployment and Distribu- tion Command’s (SDDC) initial communication systems requirements for more austere second- ary port missions OCONUS, during small-scale, short-duration contingencies, exercises, or troop deployments. (U.S. Army photo.)


The military units engaged in OEF were accustomed to traditional deployment and distribution methods, whereby delib- erate movements to and from seaports of embarkation and debarkation—known as SPOEs and SPODs—were the norm. For example, a unit was called forward to a port to meet “their” ship carrying equipment; when that ship arrived at the SPOD, “their personnel” met the vessel and ensured that the equipment moved to its final destination.


In OEF, exclusive air movements were cost- and lift-prohibitive, yet no dedi- cated SPOD existed—like Shuaiba, for instance. The only non-air option was commercial deliveries direct to their des- tination through SPODs without a U.S. military presence.


Initial vessel moves began as transload operations, in which a dedicated MSC vessel was loaded at the SPOE and moved to an intermediate transfer port, such as Salalah in Oman, or Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates. At these ports, SDDC personnel on the ground worked with carriers that accepted and configured the cargo for container and flat-rack movement. Cargo shipments were booked by SDDC and taken by carriers on smaller vessels into Karachi, Pakistan, with ultimate delivery via truck to their final destinations in Afghanistan. SDDC units located with the supported forces provided unit shipment data and coordinated across SDDC to get the most accurate picture.


Furthermore, sustainment cargo was shipped commercially from origin, mov- ing in containers through Karachi and into the combined/joint operational area (CJOA). As forward operating bases (FOBs) in that CJOA increased, so did the amount of sustainment required, and with primitive reception capability


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at many locations, cargo congestion at the Pakistani ports became another seri- ous issue.


The only movement control structure in place was a movement control battalion (MCB) stationed at Bagram Airfield, with the primary responsibility for military movements inside Afghanistan. However, without a presence in Karachi, and with multiple carriers, subcontracted truckers, and a challenging Afghan road network, the logjam grew.


SDDC worked directly with the MCB, the Joint Task Force headquarters, and the commercial carriers to reduce the backlog.


Because a military presence in Karachi was impossible, SDDC hired a third- party logistics company to serve as the command’s eyes and ears there, validating carrier on-hand reports and communi- cating adjustments in priority. The strict call-forward policy was rescinded, and free-flow movements of cargo began again.


SDDC linked this information with information from its forward nodes in Afghanistan, as well as with strategic booking and vessel information, to create a complete picture of inbound distribu- tion. This “information picture” was, and remains, critical to military decision mak- ers, and SDDC’s role in building that picture became a core mission, far dif- ferent from the hands-on, port-to-port missions of the past.


REDEPLOYMENT ISSUES Redeployment from OEF via surface LOCs was also radically different from the past and was not what units had grown accustomed to in OIF.


OIF was very forgiving. Because cargo moved via regularly programmed convoys to Kuwait, there was no real impact if


Army AL&T Magazine


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