search.noResults

search.searching

dataCollection.invalidEmail
note.createNoteMessage

search.noResults

search.searching

orderForm.title

orderForm.productCode
orderForm.description
orderForm.quantity
orderForm.itemPrice
orderForm.price
orderForm.totalPrice
orderForm.deliveryDetails.billingAddress
orderForm.deliveryDetails.deliveryAddress
orderForm.noItems
ARMY AL&T


Today’s Soldiers face fast-changing and dynamic threats every bit as dangerous as those in “The Matrix.” The question isn’t whether the Army’s acquisition capability should be comparable to that depicted in the movie—it is fiction, after all. But should the Army consider “The Matrix” as a futuristic vision for speed in equipping the force? How rapid can acquisition reasonably get? Better yet, lacking an operator to dial up an arsenal, where do we get materiel to rapidly equip our force in the future?


Evolving Acquisition As it turns out, a majority of our best modernization ideas start with Soldiers in the field. Soldiers let us know what the issues are, and we often find “rapid” acquisition solutions among commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and military-off-the-shelf (MOTS) products. Much of the underlying technology is derived from traditional, deliberate Army acquisition programs as part of the venerable, yet often maligned, DoD 5000 process. This process addresses the full acquisition life cycle—requirements development, technology maturation, engineering development, system integration, test- ing, and, ultimately, fielding—thereby providing a stable and long-term approach that supports development of emerging technologies and their appli- cation to our most demanding military requirements. Simply put, rapid solu- tions that come “off the shelf” require a proactive, forward-thinking means of getting “on the shelf” in the first place. As acquisition professionals, we have to concern ourselves not just with pulling solutions off the shelves, but in stocking the shelves, too.


Getting Soldiers the right materiel immediately is essential in today’s modern battlefield. Here, SGT Tim Failor, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, wears the Land Warrior system as he conducts operations in Sulah ad Dihn province, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo by CPT Richard Ybarra.)


Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III recently explained to the World Affairs Council that, “DOD is doing more to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan while still preparing for future conflicts. Past strategy did not pay enough attention to current conflicts, and DOD has changed the balance toward fighting today’s wars.” However, he explained, “The military must be ready to face these challenges and still maintain the capabilities to take on peer competitors. … Changing the way the acquisition process works is an important part of funding the capa- bilities to handle future threats.”


Acquisition in Today’s Warfare Our Soldiers are engaged in the most unpredictable environment in his- tory. The attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, ushered in an era of persistent con- flict defined by a sustained terrorism threat here at home, as well as asym- metric wars and counterinsurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Improvised


Equipping our Soldiers for the wars of today and tomorrow requires that we view and manage deliberate and rapid acquisition as co-dependent solutions.


explosive devices and indirect threats have replaced conventional warfare on the battlefield. While an adaptable enemy is availing itself of the latest COTS technologies, we in the acquisi- tion community struggle with how to best maintain Soldiers’ decisive edge. We know that getting Soldiers the right materiel immediately is essential. Whether it’s the combat ensemble cho- sen by Neo and Trinity in “The Matrix” or Small Arms Protective Inserts (plates incorporated into our Individual Body Armor) that have saved countless lives in our current fight, speed is often the key to both saving lives and achieving mission success.


But in an era of persistent conflict, the Army’s acquisition processes are increas- ingly focused on meeting immediate warfighter needs (IWNs) as opposed to longer term, deliberate acquisition solutions. The predominant “Big A” acquisition model used to equip our forces for pre-Sept. 11, Cold War-era warfare tends to be insufficiently agile for emergent and dynamic require- ments. When research, development, testing, and fielding are conducted in the methodical and deliberate man- ner intrinsic to “Big A,” equipment often does not reach the warfighter for decades, if at all. Given the current


JULY –SEPTEMBER 2010 75


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52  |  Page 53  |  Page 54  |  Page 55  |  Page 56  |  Page 57  |  Page 58  |  Page 59  |  Page 60  |  Page 61  |  Page 62  |  Page 63  |  Page 64  |  Page 65  |  Page 66  |  Page 67  |  Page 68  |  Page 69  |  Page 70  |  Page 71  |  Page 72  |  Page 73  |  Page 74  |  Page 75  |  Page 76  |  Page 77  |  Page 78  |  Page 79  |  Page 80  |  Page 81  |  Page 82  |  Page 83  |  Page 84  |  Page 85  |  Page 86  |  Page 87  |  Page 88  |  Page 89  |  Page 90  |  Page 91  |  Page 92  |  Page 93  |  Page 94  |  Page 95  |  Page 96