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ARMY AL&T


As conflict persists and the acquisition community escalates its usage of rapid equipping to meet emerging requirements, we must be careful not to neglect the deliberate process that produces so many of the off-the-shelf technologies that rapid acquisition relies on.


operations tempo, we have shifted to more “little a” rapid acquisition, field- ing larger quantities of COTS and MOTS technologies and seeking more agile acquisition strategies.


So why not simply make “Big A” acquisition more like “little a” acquisi- tion, i.e., make the deliberate processes leaner and faster? This has been tried, and acquisition reform initiatives continuously focus on improving the responsiveness of deliberate acquisition; much remains that can and is being done to improve deliberate processes (many Lean Six Sigma initiatives focus on speeding up “Big A”). But these efforts to speed up deliberate processes tend to ignore fundamental differences between rapid and deliberate acquisi- tion. Deliberate acquisition attempts to develop and produce a capability that does not yet exist—something that’s never been done before and often with


less-than-fully-mature technologies. Rapid acquisition essentially harvests mature capabilities that already exist, figuratively “sitting on the shelf.”


Acquisition as a Polarity While very different in approach, it would be a mistake to treat these meth- odologies as “either-or”—independent, opposing, or unrelated. Equipping our Soldiers for the wars of today and tomorrow requires that we view and manage deliberate and rapid acquisition as co-dependent solutions. We can do this by viewing acquisition as a polar- ity. A polarity is defined as a chronic issue or problem that does not have a single right answer but rather two, co- dependent solutions. A polarity occurs when there is more than one correct solution to improving an ongoing situation. Unlike problems, polarities need to be managed, not solved. The potential positive synergy that can be


attained between two poles is depicted on the polarity map by upward spiral- ing arrows coming from the two poles (see Figure on Page 77). Sustained, over-focus on one pole or fighting between the poles feeds a vicious cycle, represented by the arrows pointing down. Each solution represents one of a polarity’s two poles.


Polarity Management, a model taught by internationally renowned organiza- tional expert and thought leader Dr. Barry Johnson, first recognizes and then manages polarities so that the interde- pendence between the two solutions is exploited to produce consistently posi- tive results. Good leadership empowers both poles and seeks to maximize their respective upsides; poor leadership places too much focus on one pole to the neglect of the other, exacerbating the problem.


If the appropriate investments in R&D are not made today, 20 years from now the military-specific products needed to meet urgent warfighter requirements will be at risk. Here, a 2nd Infantry Division Soldier prepares to deploy the Raven to assess atmospherics in Falahat, Iraq, Feb. 12, 2010. (U.S. Army photo by SPC Venessa Hernandez.)


76 JULY –SEPTEMBER 2010


Using this framework, we can better understand the two interdependent poles: deliberate acquisition (Big A) and rapid acquisition (little a) (see Figure). Over time, both types of acquisition offer solutions to meet our Soldiers’ needs. The interdepen- dence between them is exemplified by the recent rapid fielding of armor for high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles. The armor was fielded quickly because the requirement for advanced armor protection technologies had been anticipated years before and developed through a long-term cycle (ostensi- bly, “put on the shelf for future use”). By the time it was needed for rapid application, the technology was already mature. The former Future Combat Systems (FCS) program (now Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Modernization), another deliberate acquisition, also demonstrates the symbiotic relation- ship between the two poles. Although FCS has not succeeded as an integrated system-of-systems (SoS), the underlying engineering and development cultivated through long-term, deliberate processes have produced technology spin outs


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