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ARMY AL&T


that have been modified and rapidly applied to the Current Force, and will provide breakthrough capabilities for the Future Force.


The desired outcome of managing the acquisition polarity is our ability to effectively equip our forces now, as well as in the future. To manage this polarity, we need to identify warning signals, or trip wires, to alert us when we move too far toward either of the poles, or neglect its opposite. Perhaps we can see such a warning in the challenges we faced with FCS integration; much of the under- lying FCS technology has significant merit, but we encountered challenges with systems integration. In an era of “little a” acquisition that is dominated by COTS technology, we have allowed some atrophy in systems engineering expertise. Additional warning signs of “Big A” atrophy may include dimin- ished organic research, development, and engineering (RD&E) capabilities; incomplete or ineffective transition of programs of record; inability to suc- cessfully transition future, emerging technologies; and challenges with long- term planning and portfolio integration.


Future of Acquisition Until we have instantaneous fielding capability comparable to that in “The Matrix,” acquisition must be responsive to operational changes and continue to develop long-term, systemic solu- tions, particularly in military-specific technologies such as armor, propul- sion, ballistics, and lethality. As conflict persists and the acquisition community escalates its usage of rapid equipping to meet emerging requirements, we must be careful not to neglect the deliber- ate process that produces so many of the off-the-shelf technologies that rapid acquisition relies on. If the appropriate investments in research and develop- ment (R&D) are not made today, 20 years from now the military-specific products needed to meet urgent war- fighter requirements will be at risk. Of course, certain technologies, such


POSI T IVE RESUL TS POSI T IVE RESUL TS


• Meet tomorrow’s requirements • Develop new technology • Extensive RD&E


• Addressing IWNs • Streamlined processes


• Rapid deployment of COTS products


DE L IBERAT E RAPID


• Cannot meet IWNs • Rigid processes • Expensive investments


NEGAT IVE RESUL TS


• Neglect long-term planning


• Reduce investments in future technologies • Loss of organic RD&E


NEGAT IVE RESUL TS


We must actively manage the polarity between deliberate and rapid acquisition to maximize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of this co-dependency.


as communications equipment and outdoor gear, will always be readily available in the commercial marketplace for fielding. However, advanced, “hard- to-touch” technology without civilian applications, such as body armor, vehicle armor, advanced explosives, and armor-piercing ammunition, will not.


Like Neo’s immediate assembly of combat kits, the advanced SoS that miraculously come together at the last minute on the battlefields we face would not exist were it not for decades of planning, R&D, and testing— products of our enduring, deliberate development processes. When view- ing this process up close, it is clear that these systems are not miracles at all but the products of a complex, methodi- cal, and deliberate acquisition process. Because we cannot predict the next operational environment, we must posture ourselves to rapidly respond both now and in the future. We must actively manage the polarity between


deliberate and rapid acquisition to max- imize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of this co-dependency. And, we must also remember that tomorrow’s Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle-like success depends on technology investments today.


COL JEFFREY J. MOCKENSTURM is the Project Manager Defense Comm- unications and Army Transmission Systems. He holds a B.S. in computer science engineering from the University of Toledo College of Engineering and an M.S. in systems management from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Mockensturm is a graduate of the U.S. Army Ordnance Basic and Advanced Officer’s Courses, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officer’s Course, and the U.S. Army War College Fellowship at the University of Texas- Austin. He is Level III certified in program management.


JULY –SEPTEMBER 2010 77


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