processes, which can cause significant and even decisive program inefficiencies for reasons wholly unrelated to a program but


instead tied to political or policy imperatives.


Industry’s own incentives, particularly as they pertain to the need to demonstrate a return on shareholder investment, form another boundary condition, as do the audit and oversight structures whereby Congress and DOD’s inspectors general (IGs) tend to measure program effective- ness; many helpful and even essential authorities are one congressional hear- ing or IG report away from termination, fair or not. And of course, the media and outside groups amplify every significant program misfire, creating an imperative for broad corrective action whether the specific misfire was an isolated incident or indicative of a trend.


Tese boundary conditions are big- ger than the defense acquisition system; they are integral elements of our politi- cal system, and the impacts they create


A DESIGN THAT NEEDS WORK


The defense acquisition system is alive and functioning, as the exhibit hall floor of the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) 2014 Annual Meeting and Exhibition demonstrated. But it could function better, the author says. (Photo courtesy of AUSA)


I have encountered individuals serving their country in good faith, reacting to the incentives and pressures of their roles and, frankly, acting as any of us would if we found ourselves in similar circumstances.


are a feature of the system, not a bug. According to the 51st Federalist Paper, the framers deliberately decided that “the defect [in our government] must be sup- plied,” so that “Ambition [is] made to counteract ambition.” With individual prerogatives in our society and govern- ment thus deliberately set at odds, it is no surprise that a complex and challenging process like major weapon system acqui- sition is less efficient than we would like it to be, and sometimes it is a complete surprise that the process functions at all.


For that reason, my meeting of nontra- ditional suppliers is not unique. If you dropped in on a similar meeting of any other group involved in the acquisition


process,


they might


similarly ask why


nontraditional suppliers or any other group (besides them) acts in ways that thwart good acquisition outcomes.


Yet the last decade of war demonstrates that pressures do exist that are more pow- erful than these boundary conditions and the equilibrium in the acquisition system that they create. Te loss of American lives to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq powerfully disrupted the acquisition system and led to the creation of the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), an entity exclusively devoted to protect- ing troops from the IED threat. Te need to meet operational requirements led then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr.


ASC.ARMY.MIL


141


COMMENTARY


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