THE P(I)LOT TO KILL JCIDS
other will be for ACAT II and below, is based on the second AIRC alternative process and uses the SORRD model.
Te I-CDD model will merge and shrink the ICD and CDD with an “initial CDD” (I-CDD), the equivalent of the A-CDD that AFC uses. Also at the heart of the pilot is a mindset that one size doesn’t fit all. Te AIRC report says, “Te current process does not distinguish between the different sizes of the requirements or priority of efforts. For example, the process for approving a new Air Force fighter jet is the same as approv- ing a jungle boot. Senior military commanders might consider that each size requirement document (Acquisition Category, or ACAT, I-IV) should not have the same approval process.” (See related article, “Te Jungle Boot” in the April-June 2017 issue of Army AL&T magazine.)
Te new pilot documents, SORRD or I-CDD, would exist in a portal, and those who need to comment can do so, but the time has to be limited. “You’ve got some set number of days,” Schlomer said. Reviews would happen concurrently, not consecutively. “If you’re the J-2, you get to see the document the same time the J-3 does, that J-5 does, all that, but you’ve got four days to check it out and make decisions, or check it, [or] make any write-ups that you think you need. Four days, that’s it. Absence of concur- rence is concurrence.”
Tere would still be the standard JCIDS process, he said. “If you want to go through a lengthy process to get an aircraft carrier or a huge multi-fighter-type deal? Fine. All right. Tere’s approximately 81 of them [ACAT I programs] that exist in the country. But for the smaller programs like sensors and radios and all the other stuff like boots, all that?” Tere is no need for that kind of complexity or high-level approval. “Streamline the approval process down to a one-star or somebody equivalent,” he continued. “Just keep the documents simple. Keep the valida- tion process at an appropriate level and let the services be joint. If they’re developing something, they should be responsible for making it joint.”
CONCLUSION Te JCIDS process came about because of critical interoperabil- ity issues that arose in Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. “DOD established JCIDS in 2003 to provide an integrated process to identify new capabilities from a joint perspective based on the national military strategy,” according to the GAO report. But if JCIDS was intended primarily to assure interoperabil- ity from that joint perspective, it has become too much more, accumulating layers upon layers of process barnacles over nearly
16 Army AL&T Magazine Spring 2023
two decades—requirements for requirements for requirements. Tat’s not only because accumulating layers of process barna- cles is what government programs tend to do, but also because of one of the more fascinating conundrums of DOD: People in the Pentagon who are trained for combat can also be astonish- ingly risk-averse and seem to prefer getting shot at than having to explain to DOD’s 538-member board of directors (Congress) why a program, in fulfilling a requirement, procured a $14,000 toilet seat or went over budget or didn't interoperate with other programs. Being a good steward of taxpayer money is stressful.
Key to today’s modernization efforts is speed. JCIDS makes that very difficult to accomplish. Te one-size-fits-all JCIDS process is onerous. Speed, however, is also associated with risk. Speed- ing capability-requirements generation in DOD may increase programmatic risk, but that’s not the only dimension for risk and maybe not even the most important one. Te risk inher- ent in going slow when peer threats blaze along could very well outweigh programmatic risk.
For years, Schlomer has been trying to point out to anyone who would listen that the JCIDS is a very real problem. He is set to retire in September, he said. If, between now and then, he can help DOD halve or quarter the time it takes to get through the requirement-validation process, he will have had an outsized impact on DOD’s modernization efforts.
For more information on the AIRC report, go to
https://acqirc.org.
For more information about how a program could be part of the pilot, contact Don Schlomer at
donald.schlomer@
socom.mil.
STEVE STARK is formerly the senior editor of Army AL&T. He retired from service as an Army civilian at the end of February. He holds an M.A. in creative writing from Hollins University and a B.A. in English from George Mason University. As Stephen Stark, he is an award-winning novelist and best-selling ghostwriter.
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