ARMY AL&T


abilities, training design, system safety, health hazards, and survivability.


Understanding Resource Constraints


Another key challenge in using a knowledge-based approach to support an affordable force modernization strategy is knowing what the Army’s resource constraints are and how to work within them.


Specific priorities must be established within and across force modernization strategies, for both operational and resource targets, to help make trades and find redundancies. Every capability we put into the force must have a clear cost/benefit associated with it. Cost and benefit must drive the decisions.


Strategic planning and programming guidance from senior leadership and staff should reflect the dollar and manpower constraints early in the development process.


As part of a knowledge-based approach, these procedures hold great potential for the Army. Program managers will know more before they contract. They will know more about costs, thereby driving down costs; they will know more about performance, thereby driving down risks; and vehicles are produced sooner, perhaps within a 4- to 5-year window by increasing knowledge at Milestone A that is now required at Milestone B.


But, at the end of the day, speed mat- ters—speed in terms of responding to the current fight, synchronizing all ele- ments of DOTMLPF for simultaneous delivery, and adapting the force overall.


The Army is at war; 8.5- to 11-year production cycles are too long. The threat changes, technologies change, and political leadership changes.


Although the Rapid Equipping Force fielding timelines for existing


18 APRIL –JUNE 2011


off-the-shelf equipment such as the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle and Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar averaged 1 to 2 years, the development and fielding of the M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle took 17 years, and our Patriot Air Defense Artillery system, 21 years. The Army has continuously lagged behind the civilian sector regarding new equipment acquisitions when compared with recent industry achievements of a 5.8- year average for commercial aircraft, 2-year average for automobiles, or 1.5- year average for commercial spacecraft.


The Army can do better, and must motivate and incentivize the workforce to deliver warfighter outcomes for the Soldier, and not just to achieve process gates. At the same time, we need to clearly understand the risks we are mitigating and those we are accepting as we make the necessary trades to sustain an affordable force modernization strategy.


Knowledge is power, and knowledge earlier is more power. A knowledge-based approach accelerates development and reduces the time required to produce and field solutions.


Conclusion The Army is improving and creating a more viable and responsive acquisi- tion program.


Embracing a knowledge-based approach to acquisition accelerates development and reduces the time required to produce. By using a multidisciplinary team upfront, the process incorporates more knowledge earlier, thus allowing for high-fidelity modeling or virtual prototyping and performance and cost trade decisions to help drive down costs and risks.


The realities of conflict compel the Army to become mentally and physically adaptable, able to outthink, outwit, and outperform adversaries.


The character of conflict also places more demands on research, development, and procurement. These include the ability to integrate new and innovative commercial technologies without burdening the receiving unit.


The Army must learn from industry and adopt more effective best practices. A knowledge-based approach to acquisition is a way to increase effectiveness and move toward more affordable force modernization.


LTG MICHAEL A. VANE is the Deputy Commanding General, Futures, and Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center at TRADOC. He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.S. in joint command, control, and commu- nications from the Naval Postgraduate School. Vane is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. He commanded the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command, and the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Center and Fort Bliss, TX.


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