Rapid Equipping Force (REF) by approving it as an enduring need and including the REF in its base budget requests.
Option 2—Consider this surge requirement for
flame- resistant uniforms as a concept similar to Army pre- positioned stocks (APS), whereby the Army would approve the requirement to store sets of flame-resistant uniforms as contingency stocks. Te APS is a multifunctional set of equipment for a BCT or more, stored at a forward location in preparation for conflict in that region. Similar to APS opera- tions, in times of need, the flame-resistant uniforms would be taken out of storage and fielded to deploying BCTs. Te Army already has implemented this concept successfully, albeit on a smaller scale, for units of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, that are supporting the Global Reaction Force. Te Marine Corps implements a similar storage concept for flame-resistant uniforms to support deploying Marines.
Te U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, the Army Capa- bilities Integration Center and the Program Executive Office for Soldier proposed a similar concept called deployer equipment bundles (DEBs). A validated cost-benefit analysis performed on the concept in 2014 concluded that the benefits of having flame- resistant uniforms stored for future contingencies outweighed the costs. Basically, it is less expensive for the Army to store and eventually field the uniforms than it is to field flame-resistant uniforms and then sustain them for Soldiers.
Again, the barrier to acceptance and implementation is an Army culture that’s reluctant to consider change, as well as the lack of
a system to properly prioritize funding across program evalu- ation groups (PEGs), which are responsible for DA program and budget funding. A DEB-like concept for flame-resistant uniforms would call for a base budget requirement, but the Army can’t work through its own bureaucracy to determine if the equipping, sustaining, training or manning program evalu- ation groups should cover the bill. Essentially, no single PEG will champion the concept because they fear they will be forced to pay the entire bill. Additionally, the Army is reluctant to fund the procurement and storage of flame-resistant uniforms with base budget funding without a requirements document approved by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)—a fundamentally ridiculous situation, given that the Army has been buying and fielding flame-resistant uni- forms to Soldiers for a decade with OCO funding and no need for JCIDS approval.
To get a capability production document validated and approved just for the sake of securing funding would take years. Tis cum- bersome approach is an example of the fundamental disconnects between the JCIDS, the acquisition system and the planning, programming, budgeting and execution processes—the same disconnects that are the root cause of most acquisition program failures.
The risk of deploying Soldiers to combat without flame-resistant uniforms is too great to allow concerns of affordability and resistance by the bureaucracy to outweigh the benefits to Soldier readiness.
Option 3—Supported by both Congress and industry, this option calls for the Army to consider changing the Soldier’s initial issue and subsequent clothing bag authorization from non-flame-resistant uniforms to flame-resistant uniforms. At a minimum, the Army could consider authorizing and issu- ing a mix of non-flame-resistant and flame-resistant uniforms for all Soldiers. Tis option would allow Soldiers to train in flame-resistant uniforms, giving them the same force protection benefits during garrison operations and training exercises that they get in combat. Te uniforms then would be available for deployments, immediately and visibly increasing readiness.
Te primary barrier to implementation of this option is afford- ability. Te current cost of a set of ACU blouse and trousers runs about $90, while specialized and flame-resistant uniforms are significantly more expensive. Te ECWCS costs $800, the set of FRACUs runs about $175 and the FREE about $2,300. Tere- fore, this option would increase the costs for initial issue and the clothing replacement allowance for Soldiers. Additionally, these bills would be absorbed by the manning and sustaining PEGs from already overextended personnel as well as operating and support accounts.
ASC.ARMY.MIL
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COMMENTARY
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