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BALANCING ACT


tide of skepticism from senior executives, Iacocca and his team innovated. With constrained resources for development, Ford’s “Fairlane Committee” worked through more than 18 designs. Ultimately, it was the competition amongst Ford’s design teams that produced a great outcome. Ford’s final design was a proper balance between the performance, weight (approximately 2,500 pounds) and cost (approximately $2,500). In 1964, Ford built a car that far exceeded even their own expectations—the Mustang— selling over 400,000 in the first year, and over a million in the first 18 months. Tis was proof of an optimized design that was ideally suited for the market.


FORD PHENOMENON


The Ford Mustang is a great example of a product that surpassed expectations. Sales exceeded 400,000 in the first year of pro- duction and 1,000,000 in the first 18 months. (Image by Getty Images)


TRUST IS CRITICAL TO SUCCESS For the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft, the Army is build- ing both relationships and trust while getting multiple bites at the “requirements apple,” and counting on a much more rapid development path, proving technologies early with designs that strike a balance between performance and cost. With the goal of enabling life-cycle affordability, the project office has delib- erately integrated the modular open systems approach into its requirements and sustainment strategies. Tat modular approach is the Army’s emerging set of common standards and interfaces for aircraft electronics allows for rapid, cost-effective upgrades and tailored mission systems, which ultimately drives long-term cost savings.


capability maturation and allows for early development of virtual aircraft prototypes, focusing on maintaining program momen- tum with appropriate acquisition rigor.


With mid-tier acquisition, the focus is on balancing speed with rigor: Requirements authorities and acquisition oversight are pushed down, and funding is provided for deliberate increments of capability through rapid prototyping. Ongoing technology risk reduction will continue by capitalizing on data from the flying demonstrators, test stands and wind tunnel models. Ultimately, virtual prototypes will further reduce risk to the program and set a strong foundation for future program success.


Comparatively, the automobile industry has many examples of programs and innovations that have either been successful or failed. A similar thought process of revamping traditional meth- ods came out of Ford Motor Company in the 1960s. Looking to develop a new sports car, Lee Iacocca faced multiple dilem- mas, at the heart of which was one of the biggest losses in Ford history with the development of the Edsel. Driving against the


18 Army AL&T Magazine Summer 2022


Over the past two years, the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft Project Office, along with the Program Executive Office for Avia- tion, has invited industry, government partners and academia to the architecture-collaboration working group that helped to define the framework included in the Future Vertical Lift archi- tecture framework. Tat architecture framework defines the objectives and requirements that the contractor shall uphold to execute a modular approach and deliver a product and capability that meets the new aircraft’s modular approach objectives. Te architecture framework will improve the government’s ability to use appropriate data rights by enabling competitive, contin- uous upgrade and delivery of threat-based capability through faster fielding of innovation by using common processes, tools and standards.


Leading change always presents many challenges, even in commercial industry. Lee Iacocca finally convinced Henry Ford II that a paradigm shift at Ford Motor Company would be the answer. Tere was no sports car in Ford’s portfolio. Tere were no plans to build one. Te company tried to buy Ferrari, but that attempt failed. It also led to a series of history-making deci- sions. Ford’s innovation and willingness to change its business


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