UNSTOPPABLE PLANS


simple notion: Te side that makes quicker decisions will be more likely to prevail.


Te implications of this doctrine, however, are anything but simple. It led to a sophis- ticated and complex theory for how militaries should organize themselves to make the best decisions about what infor- mation they need, when they need it, where it needs to be sent and who is qual- ified to receive it and act on it.


VIRTUAL VIGILANCE


Currently, decision dominance in action includes providing augmented reality information directly into the heads-up display of a warfighter, enabling the warfighter to know where they are in relation to a target immediately. (Photo by Edric Thompson, U.S. Army C5ISR Center)


enforcement. Before these tools, if you missed a milestone, you might not find out until you had driven 10 minutes in the wrong direction. You would have to stop, pull over and make a new plan. If there were an accident or construction, you wouldn’t know and would find your- self stopped dead in traffic. If you were competing in a challenge such as “Te Amazing Race,” having a navigation capa- bility currently found on our smart phones would give you a significant advantage over your competition using paper maps.


In the U.S. military, there is another word for the same concept: decision dominance. Decision superiority is not new. It’s a


88 Army AL&T Magazine Summer 2022


HISTORY OF DECISION DOMINANCE As an idea, decision dominance has been around since before the Roman Empire. Decision dominance generates superior decision-making through increased under- standing of one’s enemy and environment. It also represents using military capabilities as part of a holistic approach to shaping the opposition. Currently, decision dominance in action includes providing augmented reality information directly into the heads- up display of a warfighter, allowing the warfighter to know where they are in rela- tion to a target immediately. Te sensors that inform augmented reality capabili- ties improve a Soldier’s ability to discern a friend from an adversary at safe distances. Tis real-time situational understanding of the battlespace allows the warfighter to make quicker, well-formed decisions faster than an adversary.


With advances in technology and the exponential increase in data, the defini- tion of decision dominance has evolved to include the ability to make decisions at every level of a military operation. For example, it is not enough for a Washing- ton, D.C.-based commander to know what troops on the ground need, they must also have all the information they need to respond within seconds or minutes.


In the mid-20th century, Air Force Col. John Boyd developed a famous


Decision dominance is about making the enemy decide to quit before they even start fighting you.


decision-making process known as the OODA loop to help fighter jet pilots make prompt and accurate decisions. OODA stands for observation, orienta- tion, decision and action. See Figure 1. It is a continuous cycle of information gath- ering and decision-making that must be executed quickly with minimal friction or confusion to achieve success. Te side that is able to have the fastest possible time between their OODA loop decision cycles will generate significant advantages for itself in achieving dominance over their adversaries. Tis begs the question: How can the decision loop cycle be reduced and optimized?


Weeks before the 2003 Iraq War, former U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Merrick E. Krause wrote one of the first articles on deci- sion dominance for Defense Horizons, a National Defense University publication. Titled “Decision Dominance: Exploiting Transformational Asymmetries,” the arti- cle explained that decision dominance was increasingly significant because the nature of war was changing in the 21st century.


“Decision dominance is now possible by exploiting technology and innova- tion to achieve long-term success through affordable and precise effects-based plan- ning. Tis concept is a departure from the traditional Napoleonic war-fighting philosophies of attrition or annihilation,” Krause wrote.


Early last year, Gen. James McConville, the Army chief of staff, published a report


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