T
lhe DoD aviation force is unbal- anced and becoming more so. Our fighter aircraft, the best in the world, are being replaced by
sixth-generation capabilities. However, we are still flying third-generation verti- cal lift platforms designed nearly 50 years ago during the Vietnam War era.
The heavy demand on vertical lift assets in the current military
engagements,
compounded at times of extensive humanitarian assistance or disaster relief, leads to the question: Is it time to invest in improving our vertical lift technology? This question has been raised several times within DoD. Now Congress has asked the question and has expressed concern about the state of rotorcraft technology.
DoD has undertaken a major Joint effort to define a new fleet of vertical lift air- craft for 2025 and beyond. This is not the first time the department has undertaken such a task, but this effort, in particular,
represents
an opportunity for The need for vertical
success. lift has been sol-
idly demonstrated in both peacetime and wartime activities. However, the aircraft of today were designed for a much dif- ferent environment than we can expect to face, and their capabilities are not entirely up to all of the tasks they are called upon to do.
VERTICAL LIFT IMPROVEMENT In early 2008, the Congressional Rotor- craft Caucus wrote a letter to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) voicing concern about the lack of a strategic plan for improving the state of vertical lift aircraft and the related U.S. indus- trial base. On May 21 of that year, the SecDef directed the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Joint Staff to begin supporting analysis efforts, specifically by leading development of a capabilities-based assessment (CBA) that would outline a Joint approach to the
Modified JMR Performance Ranges Figure 1
Modified JMR Performance Ranges (Aug 11 JMR WG) Light
Med-L Speed
Combat Radius Payload (Int)
>170-300+ kts 424 km
2.5k+ lbs 6 Med-H
>170-300+ kts 424 km
5k lbs 13
Payload (Ext) 2.5k+ lbs Up to 12.5k lbs Up to 23k lbs Passengers
18-24 DESIRED PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTES
One platform cannot address all of the identified capability gaps in the Joint Force’s ability to perform current and projected vertical lift tasks, from heavy cargo transport to light reconnaissance and attack missions. Figure 1 shows desired attributes for each of four weight classes of vertical lift platforms, grouped by payload capability—light, medium, and heavy lift variants, plus an ultra- class category designed for a new fleet of super-heavy lift aircraft. (SOURCE: PEO Aviation.)
Heavy Ultra
170-300+ kts 300+ kts 462 km ~462 km
Up to 20k lbs 20-30k lbs ~40-72k lbs 30k lbs 33-52
~40-72k lbs ~100-120
future development of vertical lift aircraft for all the military services.
This effort was subsequently called for in Section 255 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (online at http://
www.dod.gov/dodgc/olc/docs/2009 NDAA_PL110-417.pdf). The SecDef and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were directed to submit a report to the congressional defense committees that would:
1. identify critical technologies and a technology road map.
2. include a detailed science and tech- nology (S&T) plan and identify the resources required to implement the plan.
3. include a strategic plan. 4. detail a plan to establish a Joint Ver- tical Lift Aircraft/Rotorcraft Office based on lessons learned from the Joint Advanced Strike Technology Office.
IDENTIFYING GAPS To conduct the CBA, a Future Vertical Lift (FVL) Capabilities Working Group, S&T Working Group, and a Strategic Plan Working Group were tasked. The FVL working groups were Joint, includ- ing representatives from all the military services, the Joint Staff, the U.S. Trans- portation
Operations
Command, U.S. Command, U.S.
Special Coast
Guard, and NASA. The working groups developed the three major parts of the DoD Strategic Plan for Future Vertical Lift Aircraft in parallel.
The CBA identified 55 capability gaps in documented service missions. A set of required platform attributes emerged during the solutions analysis of
those
gaps, which led to the conclusion that materiel solutions were required to miti- gate most of them.
ASC.ARMY.MIL 35
ACQUISITION
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