created a permanent arsenal system, it also anchored the government’s role in directly controlling critical segments of its military’s arms supply, a concept that still exists.


EXPANDING BASE Te late 18th and 19th centuries saw an expansion to 26 arsenals by 1861 and a capability growth from primarily arms repair and refurbishment to specialized manufacturing. Te Army led America’s transition to industrialization during this period, and arsenals became reposi- tories of specialized and perishable skills critical to manufacturing war supplies. Although the government dominated the domestic arms manufacturing land- scape, the Army also used the private sector for design innovation and surge production. By the mid-1800s, however, private industry began to compete in manufacturing sectors once monopo- lized by the Army.


As the Industrial Revolution continued to gain momentum in the United States and manufacturing capabilities migrated from the public to the private domain, policymakers


began to question the


utility and necessity of publicly owned factories. In that spirit


and because


the nation’s expansion diminished the relevance of some facilities, the Army Appropriations Act of 1854 authorized the secretary of war, at his discretion, to abolish any unnecessary arsenals. Under this authority, the War Department con- solidated down to 18 arsenals by 1883. Despite the reduction,


the system as a


whole remained intact to foster continu- ity of supply and competition with the private sector.


Concerned with an overreliance on pub- lic industry, BG William Crozier, Army chief of ordnance from 1901 to 1918, questioned the wisdom of a robust public


BROTHERS IN ARMAMENTS


Employees work at a machine press at the Gadsden Ordnance Plant in Alabama, in 1942. The plant, which opened in 1941 and closed in 1958, manufactured high-explosive, 105 mm M1 shells. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. National Archives)


industrial


base. He


believed


govern-


ment manufacturing was a disincentive to private capital investment in critical industries, resulting in a national indus- trial base unable to meet wartime surge requirements. Despite his concerns, reli- ance on arsenals continued at the expense of fostering flexible civil capacity that could shift to military production.


In hindsight, it’s no surprise that the United States


private industry


found both public ill-prepared


for the and


massive World War I mobilization. Poor public-private coordination and ram- pant inefficiencies plagued the industrial ramp-up and delayed or prevented criti- cal manufacturing output. In the end, European suppliers provided the vast share of ordnance used by the American Expeditionary Force.


Following the armistice, Congress and the War Department took actions to bet- ter guarantee industrial surge capability. In its Defense Act of 1920, Congress


ASC.ARMY.MIL 145


COMMENTARY


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