BUILDING CAPACITY To build technical capacity, responsible Afghan firms are awarded strategically important contracts, such as this concrete pad project on the Bagram Airfield.
I
t is well-known that technical train- ing, joint ventures, and the creation of new businesses promote econom- ic development. Not as well-known
are the impacts that battlefield com- manders and contracting officers have on the economic landscape. Economic improvements result from the proper use of “money as a weapon system” (MAAWS) in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.
In the COIN plan, the economic vari- able should minimize damage to existing economic systems and act as a catalyst for expansion of the host nation’s economy. Job training, joint ventures, and creation of new businesses frustrate an insurgen- cy’s recruitment efforts and decrease its influence on the local population.
Maximizing the influence of the economic variable requires long-term goals and tac- tical patience. The economic variable, similar to governance and security lines of effort, requires a great deal of training and time to develop. Afghan business prac- tices are challenged in several areas, such as ethics, technical capability, and links to criminal patronage networks. Command- ers must consider all of these factors when planning which efforts will promote full economic stability.
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has provided four objec- tives to measure economic success in quantifiable terms: vendor vetting (buy- ing from better people), elimination of barriers, contractor education, and employment rates. Within these objec- tives, the emphasis is on synchronizing the contracting mission with the com- mander’s operational plan through proper oversight.
The intent is to prevent the infusion of large quantities of international funds that fuel corruption, finance insurgent organi- zations, strengthen criminal patronage networks, and undermine ISAF’s cam- paign objectives. Specifically:
• Through vendor vetting, Regional Con- tracting Centers (RCCs) are mandated to do business with “better people.” Vetting must occur through intelligence analysis and is supported by quantifi- able data from the Joint Contingency Contracting System.
• By eliminating barriers to entry, Afghans are encouraged to start new businesses and broaden market oppor- tunities. This can be measured by the number of new businesses opening and expansion of competition in the region.
• Contractor education, through cor- rective actions in the contracting process, such as issuing cure notices, can improve performance and ideally produce better vendors.
• Employment is the largest indicator of success, as measured by the number of jobs that COIN contracting produces.
These four objectives synchronize efforts by stakeholders in the warfighter and contingency contracting communities, enabling ISAF to nest the Afghan First (Sec- tion 886) program in COIN operations.
KEYS TO EMPOWERMENT Warfighters at all levels must employ MAAWS to influence the economic variable. As GEN David H. Petraeus, Commander, ISAF and U.S. Forces Afghanistan, stated, “Money is my most important ammunition in this war.”
Steven Metz, author of the article New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understand- ing 21st Century Insurgency (http://www.
carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/ Articles/07winter/metz.pdf ), stresses the importance of the economic variable and its inclusion in the overall COIN plan: “Economic assistance and job training are as important to counterinsurgency as
A S C . A RMY.MI L 109
CONTRACTING
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