to exclude sources due to supply chain risk to a national security system or information technology item. The use of this authority by the head of a covered agency—for example, by the Secretary of the Army—must be based on a joint recommendation by the USD(AT&L) and the DOD Chief Information Officer, resulting from an intelligence-based risk assessment by the USD for Intelligence.
The USD(AT&L) must certify in writing, among other things, that use of this authority is “necessary to protect national security by reduc- ing supply chain risk.” The Secretary of the Army cannot delegate this authority below the Army Acquisition Executive. Of note, no action taken under this authority shall be subject to review in a bid protest before the Government Accountability Office or in any federal court.
The Senate Armed Services Committee recommended this provision follow- ing submittal by DOD of a report to Congress on December 22, 2009, as required by Section 254 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009. The Commit- tee Report on the 2011 NDAA states,
“The report found an increasing risk that systems and networks critical to DOD could be exploited through the introduction of counterfeit or mali- cious code and other defects introduced by suppliers of systems or components. The committee concludes that the Sec- retary [of Defense] should have the authority needed to address this risk.”
• Section 935, Reports on Department of Defense Progress in Defending the Department and the Defense Industrial Base from Cyber Events. This provision expresses congressional interest in and
THERE IS A RECOGNITION THAT FURTHER DOD GUIDANCE IS NEEDED TO ENSURE THAT PMS AND CONTRACTING OFFICERS
HAVE THE TOOLS THEY NEED TO UNDERSTAND AND IMPLEMENT THIS POLICY.
concern about the threat to defense contractors’ networks. This section requires an annual report from the Sec- retary of Defense on DOD’s progress in defending the Department and defense contractors’ networks from cyber events.
One of the requirements of this pro- vision is that the report include a description of the nature and scope of significant cyber events against the DIB during the preceding year, includ- ing the impact of such events on DOD generally and on operational capabili- ties; and, for any such event that has been investigated by or on behalf of the DOD Damage Assessment Manage- ment Office, a synopsis of each damage assessment report, with emphasis on actions needing remediation.
These assessments are done through the work of the DOD and the services’ damage assessment efforts within the DIB CS/IA Program, supported by subject-matter experts (SMEs) from affected acquisition program offices, and will be reported to Congress in classified form.
WHAT PEOS AND PMS SHOULD DO DOD is maturing its capability to under- stand and mitigate the risk of losing of weapon system data. In the digitized, networked world, large quantities of pro- gram data reside on unclassified networks, and managing the risk to this information
is something that acquisition PMs must incorporate into their activities, draw- ing from the multilayered approach that DOD is developing.
PEOs, PMs, and other Army SMEs can draw from this maturing capability to enhance the security of their programs. For example, they should:
• Develop their program protection plans as early as possible in the acquisition cycle and maintain close collaboration with Army headquarters components that can facilitate this process, including conducting supply chain risk manage- ment assessments.
• Continually remind contractors’ proj- ect engineers with whom the PM team engages and shares digitized information about the importance of information assurance.
• Work with their contracting officer to use local contract clauses that reinforce the importance of protecting the most critical data held on contractors’ unclas- sified networks.
• Support requests to provide SMEs to execute the damage assessment process pursuant to DODI 5205.13.
PETER M. VELZ is Director, Acquisi- tion Program Protection Policy in the Office of the ASAALT. He holds a B.B.A. in economics from Temple University and an M.A. in economics from the Univer- sity of Connecticut.
A S C . A RMY.MI L 63
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56 |
Page 57 |
Page 58 |
Page 59 |
Page 60 |
Page 61 |
Page 62 |
Page 63 |
Page 64 |
Page 65 |
Page 66 |
Page 67 |
Page 68 |
Page 69 |
Page 70 |
Page 71 |
Page 72 |
Page 73 |
Page 74 |
Page 75 |
Page 76 |
Page 77 |
Page 78 |
Page 79 |
Page 80 |
Page 81 |
Page 82 |
Page 83 |
Page 84 |
Page 85 |
Page 86 |
Page 87 |
Page 88 |
Page 89 |
Page 90 |
Page 91 |
Page 92 |
Page 93 |
Page 94 |
Page 95 |
Page 96 |
Page 97 |
Page 98 |
Page 99 |
Page 100 |
Page 101 |
Page 102 |
Page 103 |
Page 104 |
Page 105 |
Page 106 |
Page 107 |
Page 108 |
Page 109 |
Page 110 |
Page 111 |
Page 112 |
Page 113 |
Page 114 |
Page 115 |
Page 116 |
Page 117 |
Page 118 |
Page 119 |
Page 120 |
Page 121 |
Page 122 |
Page 123 |
Page 124 |
Page 125 |
Page 126 |
Page 127 |
Page 128 |
Page 129 |
Page 130 |
Page 131 |
Page 132 |
Page 133 |
Page 134 |
Page 135 |
Page 136
