search.noResults

search.searching

dataCollection.invalidEmail
note.createNoteMessage

search.noResults

search.searching

orderForm.title

orderForm.productCode
orderForm.description
orderForm.quantity
orderForm.itemPrice
orderForm.price
orderForm.totalPrice
orderForm.deliveryDetails.billingAddress
orderForm.deliveryDetails.deliveryAddress
orderForm.noItems
HISTORY IS FULL OF EXAMPLES


OF HOW THE CAREFUL FUSION OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES WITH IMPROVED DOCTRINE HAS MITIGATED THE FOG AND FRICTION OF WAR


AND PROVIDED A MILITARY ADVANTAGE.


lia. Despite nearly perfect situational awareness at the U.S. command post, when a Black Hawk helicopter was shot down, the fog and friction of a high- intensity conflict began to take hold. The leaders in the command post could see in real time the locations of the downed aircraft, the converging armed mobs, and the friendly forces. But as they attempted to direct Soldiers to the downed helicopter, they could not relay the exact timing of the upcoming turn, causing the convoy to miss the turn and continue down the wrong road under heavy hostile fire.


T


Seeing no other option, the Soldiers in the convoy were forced to turn around and drive back through the heavy fire. With barricades being built, the enemy converging, and casualties mounting, the convoy returned to base. Other Soldiers on the ground struggled to get to the downed aircraft. They arrived, but not quickly enough and without sufficient force to effectively evacuate the aircrews before becoming isolated and taking heavy casualties.


Nearly 20 years after the conflict por- trayed in “Black Hawk Down,” it is easy to see how far we have come in developing


he motion picture “Black Hawk Down” depicts a real- life scenario from October 1993 in Mogadishu, Soma-


networked, platform-level, digital, com- mand and control/situational awareness (C2/SA) capabilities. If the vehicles in that conflict had been equipped with Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below/Blue Force Tracking (FBCB2/ BFT), they would have seen their location on a satellite image background, as well as the locations of all other friendly forces, including the downed helicopter. As sur- veillance aircraft located enemy forces and barricades, icons and graphics could have been created to display their exact locations on all of the FBCB2 systems in the vehicles. With this information, the convoy commander could have used his own enhanced understanding of the situ- ation to take the initiative and direct the convoy directly to the downed aircraft and back to base.


As it was, despite the SA at the higher ech- elons, the Soldiers on the ground were not empowered to take the initiative, result- ing in confusion and casualties.


FOG AND FRICTION IN ACQUISITION The fog and friction of war as described by Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian soldier and German military theorist (1780-1831), is inherent to battle. Fog and friction also wreak havoc on those fighting to provide enhanced capabilities to the warfighter. U.S. forces can look for ways to mitigate their effects.


A recent report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD Policies and Procedures for the Acquisition of Infor- mation Technology explains that “the deliberate process through which weapon systems and information technology [IT] are acquired does not match the speed at which new IT capabilities are being introduced in today’s information age.” In short, the Army is not fielding advanced IT capabilities as quickly as they become available to industry. This should worry those in the acquisition community, because the country or organization that can field advanced IT capabilities fastest could gain a significant military advantage.


From the Prussians leveraging early rail- roads in the Austro-Prussian War to the Germans equipping tanks with radios during World War II, history is full of examples of how the careful fusion of emerging technologies with improved doctrine has mitigated the fog and friction of war and provided a military advantage.


Recent lessons learned from the use of networked, platform-level digital C2/ SA systems in training and combat have also demonstrated that their incorpora- tion into U.S. forces and doctrine will provide a tremendous advantage. Both FBCB2 and the prototype Nett Warrior battle command system have been used in combat and have been widely praised for the capabilities they provide to Soldiers.


A S C . A RMY.MI L 19


ACQUISITION


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52  |  Page 53  |  Page 54  |  Page 55  |  Page 56  |  Page 57  |  Page 58  |  Page 59  |  Page 60  |  Page 61  |  Page 62  |  Page 63  |  Page 64  |  Page 65  |  Page 66  |  Page 67  |  Page 68  |  Page 69  |  Page 70  |  Page 71  |  Page 72  |  Page 73  |  Page 74  |  Page 75  |  Page 76  |  Page 77  |  Page 78  |  Page 79  |  Page 80  |  Page 81  |  Page 82  |  Page 83  |  Page 84  |  Page 85  |  Page 86  |  Page 87  |  Page 88  |  Page 89  |  Page 90  |  Page 91  |  Page 92  |  Page 93  |  Page 94  |  Page 95  |  Page 96  |  Page 97  |  Page 98  |  Page 99  |  Page 100  |  Page 101  |  Page 102  |  Page 103  |  Page 104  |  Page 105  |  Page 106  |  Page 107  |  Page 108  |  Page 109  |  Page 110  |  Page 111  |  Page 112  |  Page 113  |  Page 114  |  Page 115  |  Page 116  |  Page 117  |  Page 118  |  Page 119  |  Page 120  |  Page 121  |  Page 122  |  Page 123  |  Page 124  |  Page 125  |  Page 126  |  Page 127  |  Page 128  |  Page 129  |  Page 130  |  Page 131  |  Page 132  |  Page 133  |  Page 134  |  Page 135  |  Page 136