DOWNRANGE COR
THE COR MUS T HAVE
A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONTRACT, ACT AS AN EXPERT IN CROSS-CULTURAL BUSINESS, UNDERSTAND REGIONAL ENTERPRISE PRACTICES, AND EXERCISE EXTREME PATIENCE IN CONTRACT SURVEILLANCE.
and that the contractor is paid. The best way for a COR to deal with these types of problems is twofold: First, the COR must document all problems and solutions; second, the COR should actively engage and train the Afghan contractor when solving problems.
This requires a great deal of patience on the part of the COR; however, it allows the contractor to solve similar problems in the future.
Another COR responsibility is signing the DD Form 250, Material Inspection and Receiving Report, the document that accepts the products or services of the Afghan contractor on behalf of the U.S. government. A contractor cannot be paid unless the DD250 is signed, meaning that the COR is now also a source of payment, at least from the contractor’s perspective.
Afghans do not always understand the role of the Defense Finance and Account- ing Service (DFAS) and rely on the COR to ensure that they are paid properly and on time. Unfortunately, after the DD250 is signed and submitted to DFAS, it takes 30 to 45 days for the payment to reach the contractor’s bank. This presents a major issue to contractors, as they often do not pay their employees until they are paid themselves; as a result, they make repeated inquiries to the COR about when they can expect payment.
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This again highlights the necessity of a partnership among the COR, contrac- tor, and KO; together, they can help the Afghans plan for payments and allow the contractor’s business to run smoothly.
CHAIN-OF-COMMAND: ISSUES OF AUTHORITY One of the biggest challenges that new or inexperienced CORs face downrange is bal- ancing their authority as a COR appointed by a KO with the interests of their chain of command in a project or service.
All too often, there have been unauthor- ized commitments on contracts because ranking officers directed a contractor to do something that is not in the contract without the COR’s knowledge, or tried to supersede the COR’s authority. This is a particular issue with enlisted CORs on high-visibility contracts.
CORs therefore must “train” their chain of command in proper conduct when dealing with the contractors. Many high- ranking officers do not like the fact that the COR is authorized to interact with the contractor on contractual issues while they are not.
CORs must master the skill of respectfully ensuring that their authority is not con- fused with rank when dealing with people in their chain of command. To prevent confusion, leadership should attend the
theater briefing that the COR receives from a Regional Contracting Center (RCC) before being appointed. Thus, the officers can learn about the RCC’s expectations and how to be involved in a contract without overstepping their roles.
Navigating the legalistic world of DOD contracts is difficult enough for CORs. However, when they become CORs in a contingency area of operation, they have a vital impact on the local economy, coun- terinsurgency operations, and regional relations. Though they probably hold one of the most underappreciated jobs in Afghanistan, CORs are also among the most important people for mission success.
A professional partnership of the COR, contractor, and KO will allow even the most inexperienced CORs to complete their missions successfully and become seasoned CORs by the time they return from deployment.
CPT MARK E. BALLANTYNE, a mem- ber of the Connecticut Army National Guard’s 1943rd Contingency Contracting Team, serves as a KO at the Bagram RCC under CENTCOM Contracting Command and as the RCC’s primary COR trainer. He holds a B.A. in marketing from East- ern University and an M.B.A. from Johns Hopkins University. Ballantyne is Level II certified in contracting.
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