T
o address these complex challenges and enhance the likelihood that acquisition program managers (PMs)
can deliver systems to the warfighter that function as intended, DOD is conducting pilot programs to develop new risk miti- gation strategies, concepts, and processes.
Congressional interest in and support for these efforts gained significant traction in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011. Within the Army, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASAALT) is coordinat- ing these policy efforts as they mature. They increasingly will become a standard part of acquisition program risk manage- ment, taking into account a variety of factors, such as cost, threat, criticality of particular components to a system’s func- tionality, and technological lead relative to potential adversaries.
POLICY UNDERPINNINGS It is DOD policy that the Department, its contractors, and its subcontractors will provide adequate security to safeguard DOD information on their unclassified information systems from unauthorized access and disclosure. The integrity of weapon systems increasingly depends on managing the risk of losing the most sen- sitive unclassified program information to cyber attacks on contractors’ unclassi- fied networks by our adversaries. DOD Instruction (DODI) 5205.13, Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Security/ Information Assurance (CS/IA) Activities, dated Jan. 29, 2010, establishes the pol- icy framework for DOD’s main effort to work with DIB partners within a pilot program to mitigate that risk.
This instruction directs the heads of DOD components to, among other things, “Based on USD(AT&L) [Undersecretary
DOD NETWORK
Mission-critical functionality of DOD’s systems and networks extensively leverages commercial, globally interconnected, globally sourced information and communications technologies. (U.S. Army photo.)
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics] policy guidance, develop procedures and conduct cyber intrusion damage assessments in support of DIB CS/IA activities to determine the overall impact of the exfiltration or modification of data on current and future weapons programs, scientific and research projects, and warfighting capabilities stemming from unauthorized intrusions into DIB unclassified information systems.”
More specific policy directing the inclusion of language in contracts and agreements requiring protection of DOD information held by contractors is found in Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-027, Security of Unclassified DoD Infor- mation on Non-DoD Information Systems. Some examples of information assurance practices that should be addressed in con- tracts include:
• Do not process DOD information on public computers or on computers that do not have access controls.
• Protect information by at least one physical or electronic barrier (e.g., locked container or room, login and password) when not under direct indi- vidual control.
• Encrypt all information that has been identified as controlled unclassified information (CUI) when it is stored on mobile computing devices or remov- able storage media, using the best available encryption technology.
• Limit information transfer to these sub- contractors or teaming partners who have a need to know and a commitment to at least the same level of protection.
There is a recognition that further DOD guidance is needed to ensure that PMs and contracting officers have the tools they need to understand and implement this policy, including specific contract clauses, compliance assessment, and what is chargeable by the contractor.
Some of these issues are being addressed in the development of Defense Federal
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