what they need to build. Traditionally, Afghan firms adhere to a different meth- odology and less stringent quality and safety standards than U.S. companies.
DISCUSSING DEVELOPMENTS
Bagram RCC KOs MAJ Joel Dingle (center) and CPT Mark E. Ballantyne (right) and a coalition interpreter discuss the development of an Afghan National Army Combat Outpost in Kapisia Province, Afghanistan, with the President of Attayee Group, an Afghan firm contracted for the job. (Photo by SSG Eric Bailey, Bagram RCC.)
Afghans and developing their businesses to be sustainable enterprises while meeting DOD contracting requirements.
This means that KOs contract with less experienced or new Afghan firms, of which there are many.
The program has been very effective in creating jobs and moving money into the Afghan economy. The idea is that the more Afghans who are employed, the less incentive there will be for the gen- eral population to look to the Taliban for monetary support.
The indirect result of the Afghan First policy on CORs is a fundamental and inadvertent increase in their responsibili- ties and sphere of influence. In addition to being the eyes and ears of the contract- ing officer, the COR becomes the face of the U.S. government to the Afghan con- tractor. KOs downrange simply have too much work to keep up with monitoring all of their contracts and seldom have the time to visit a project or job site.
Essentially, the COR becomes the only link between the contractor and the KO. Therefore, the COR must have a full understanding of the contract, act as an expert in cross-cultural business, understand regional enterprise prac- tices, and exercise extreme patience in contract surveillance.
This is particularly true in construction contracts. Most solicitations given to Afghans for bidding are written in Eng- lish. Most of the contractors have the expertise to complete the projects, but may not have the language skills to inter- pret the contracts.
It has become common practice for Afghan contractors to hire a third- party business that understands DOD requirements to develop a proposal on their behalf.
A contractor may end up with a proposal that meets the technical criteria at the lowest price, but the Afghan employees do not understand the requirements beyond
The COR is expected to enforce qual- ity and safety standards outlined in the Statement of Work or Performance Work Statement, and to exercise patience in guiding the contractor to adhere to stan- dards. However, the lack of construction experience of many of the inexperienced and extra-duty CORs presents a dilemma. To resolve this, the COR must partner with the KO to assess areas in which they are weak, such as knowledge of plumb- ing, electricity, or structural integrity. The COR and KO can then create a plan of action for the appropriate engineers, safety inspectors, or tradesmen to accom- pany the COR on an inspection.
A successful contract requires that a COR have this reachback through the KO to coordinate with the appropriate personnel. This not only contributes to the safety of all the Afghan employees on-site, but also ensures a good prod- uct while developing the Afghan firm’s knowledge and business capacity for future contracts.
THE CONTRACTOR’S PROBLEM SOLVER In addition to becoming an expert in cross-cultural business, a COR also becomes the problem solver for the con- tractor. An Afghan contractor, unlike an American defense contractor, does not know how to navigate many of the poten- tial issues when dealing with DOD.
For example, a COR may have to ensure that the Afghan contractor has proper access to project sites and is properly insured; that the contractor’s employees are treated well; that all pertinent issues are brought to the attention of the KO;
A S C . A RMY.MI L 117
CONTRACTING
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