FIGURE 2


power status and identified the common factors behind these transformations: a culture of learning, political support, a clear threat and passionate advocates. We then dissected the situations that caused the powers to move away from innova- tion, stagnate and eventually shrink in power and influence.


Te period of peace between World War I and World War II clearly illustrates the dichotomy of the status quo versus inno- vation. Before World War II, Germany was a defeated power, stripped of the materiel and financial and political ability necessary to raise an army. Despite these constraints, it was also the only nation that combined the commonly available technologies of radio, radar and mecha- nization to revolutionize land warfare.


In the early interwar years, the learning culture of the German army drove its mil- itary innovation. It honestly and openly analyzed the factors that contributed to its defeat in World War I, conducted small-scale operations to test various doctrine and equipment, and empowered advocates to explore emerging opportu- nities. As World War II drew closer, the Germans’ earlier innovations coalesced with a clear threat and increased politi- cal support, resulting in a redefinition of land warfare.


Compared with Germany, the rest of the world’s interwar innovation fell short. France is the most direct contrast. A victor in World War I, France should have had all the pieces necessary for innovation. As World War II loomed, France had a clear enemy and political support. However, it distinctly lacked a learning culture and failed to acknowledge the changing environment. France suppressed criti- cism of its performance in World War I and built a strategy on fixed assumptions related to static defense. Additionally, it


9 8


Human nature, with its capacity for denial, especially if people are already busy or stressed


A ‘kill-the-messenger- of-bad-news, low candor, low confrontation culture’


7


Sources of COMPLACENCY


Too much happy talk from senior


management 1


The absence of a major and visible crisis


2


Too many visible resources


3 Low overall performance standards


Lack of sufficient performance feedback from external sources


6 Internal


measurement systems that focus on the wrong performance standards


Organizational structures that focus employees on narrow


functional goals 5 SUPPORTING THE STATUS QUO


Dr. John P. Kotter, chairman of Kotter International, a management consulting firm, and an international leader in managing change, cautions that in any major change effort, “Never underestimate the magnitude of the forces that reinforce complacency and that help maintain the status quo.” (SOURCE: CGSC Department of Command and Leadership)


4


marginalized would-be advocates and, as such, became mired in the status quo. France’s obstinate refusal to adapt led to its resounding military defeat and subse- quent occupation by Nazi forces.


Nazi Germany’s rise to power was short- lived, however. As much as innovation defined its conquest of Western Europe, adherence to the status quo contributed to its


failure in Russia. Te tactic of


blitzkrieg, which worked so well in the West, failed to achieve the same effects


against the Soviets. Te vast distances of the Russian countryside negated the Germans’ advantage and denied them an early decisive battle. Unwilling to aban- don their proven tactic, the Germans vainly attempted to outflank the displac- ing Soviets until their supply lines could no longer support extended operations. Had the Germans critically evaluated the continued use of blitzkrieg, they likely would have modified their


tactics and potentially changed the course of the war.


ASC.ARMY.MIL


133


COMMENTARY


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