THE FALLACY OF COMPROMISE


Restricting competition based on the national security exception to full and open competition, permissible under CICA and implemented at Federal Acquisition Regu- lation (FAR) 6.302-6 “National Security,” applies when disclosure of the govern- ment’s needs would compromise the national security. In addition, the statu- tory exception requires agencies to request offers from as many potential sources as is practicable.


Protection of classified information is a responsibility that dominates all Army employees, both military and civilian. Yet promoting full and open competition and limiting competition to protect classified information can be problematic.


Of particular concern to acquisition officials is the disclosure of classified information to commercial sources. Tat disclosure must be properly authorized to satisfy the government’s requirements when classified information is fundamen- tal to contract performance. Acquisition officials must articulate the government’s needs without ambiguity to solicit offers from as many potential sources as is prac- ticable and, at the same time, protect


our nation’s secrets from unauthorized disclosure.


When soliciting offers for the govern- ment’s procurement needs, competition may be restricted, according to FAR 6.302-6, to one or a limited number of sources when the disclosure of the agency’s needs would compromise the national secu- rity unless the agency is permitted to limit the number of sources from which it solicits bids or proposals.


Tere are several questions that the acqui- sition professional needs answers to: What constitutes a compromise of national security when soliciting the govern- ment’s procurement needs? What security requirements would be violated if disclo- sure of the government’s needs would compromise national security? What information is “classified” for purposes of soliciting bids or proposals? And, since the national security exception requires agencies to request offers from as many potential sources as is practicable, should disclosure of the government’s classified procurement requirements be released to any potential offeror that possesses a clear- ance level equivalent to the information being disclosed?


Competition may be limited only to the extent necessary to satisfy the needs of the agency or as authorized by law.


110 Army AL&T Magazine Winter 2021


1. What constitutes a compromise of national security when soliciting the government’s procurement needs? (It's worth remembering that if it’s not classified, there is no compromise. Acquisition docu- ments often claim information is classified without providing supporting evidence. Te decision cited below emphasizes that point.)


We've established that a compromise of national security occurs when the nation’s classified information is knowingly, will- fully or negligently disclosed.


When soliciting offers for the govern- ment’s procurement needs, the contracting


officer must determine whether prospec- tive offerors will require access to classified information. Information cannot be clas- sified simply to restrict competition. Te information, then, first must be classified in order for a compromise of national secu- rity to occur.


It is a fallacy to assume that the govern- ment’s needs should be classified merely because it appears that releasing it would compromise national security.


In 1986 the Marshals Service initiated a procurement to obtain equipment capa- ble of detecting weapons and explosives to be placed in federal buildings and courthouses throughout the U.S. Te contracting officer for that procurement executed a justification and approval for other-than full-and-open competition under the national security exception because he believed that disclosure of the government’s needs in that procure- ment would threaten national security. Te contracting officer then issued the unclassified solicitation to a limited number of firms. A protest to the then- General Accounting Office (GAO, now the Government Accountability Office) soon followed


In B-224258, Feb. 4, 1987, 66 COMP. GEN. 228, GAO found that the contract- ing officer unnecessarily relied on the national security exception because the solicitation included the required perfor- mance capabilities as well as the salient characteristics of the detection equip- ment that was being procured. Te GAO concluded that the disclosure of the procurement to other firms would not have compromised the national security.


It is a violation of procurement regula- tions to restrict competition based on the national security exception when the infor- mation necessary for contract performance


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