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WHO IS THE CUSTOMER?


MORE ADVENTURES IN DEVELOPMENT Te Army canceled the FCS program in 2009 and embarked on the Ground Combat Vehicle program to replace the Bradley. I was one of the first prod- uct managers for the Ground Combat Vehicle effort, specifically charged to work with the requirements commu- nity to ensure the requirements for the newly envisioned Bradley replacement were technically achievable and afford- able. At the time, Fort Benning served as the home of the infantry, and Fort Knox, Kentucky, served as the home of armor. Te resources that had supported the over- sight and management of the development of a family of eight FCS manned ground vehicles were now applied to the devel- opment of the Ground Combat Vehicle. Te Army designated Fort Knox as the lead in the defining its requirements. Te program pushed for a materiel develop- ment decision and Milestone A in 2010 to begin awarding technical-maturation and risk-reduction contracts to industry. Te same two industry partners that were teamed together in the FCS engineering, manufacturing and development phase for manned ground vehicles now competed against each other in a technical-matu- ration and risk-reduction phase for the Ground Combat Vehicle.


Again, not clearly defining the customer plagued a Bradley-replacement acquisition effort. Te Army put the Armor School in charge of the Ground Combat Vehicle requirements. Based on the requirements, the program office, the interested industry competitors and engineers at the research, development and engineering center at


contracts based on schedule pressure and to protect the planned and programmed resources of the old FCS manned ground vehicle program.


WHO IS THE CUSTOMER?


This simple answer—the warfighter—fails to recognize the program manager’s balancing of a program’s cost, schedule and performance, and fails to acknowledge the complex acquisition environment.


Who was the customer of the materiel- development decision or Milestone A review for the Ground Combat Vehi- cle program? Four years later, the Army canceled the Ground Combat Vehicle program because the vehicle was going to be too big and heavy and had excessive requirements. Te effort was not focused on the mechanized infantryman—it was focused on other Army priorities.


the Tank and Automotive Command, all agreed that the Ground Combat Vehicle would weigh between 50 and 70 tons— nearing the weight of the 72-ton M1A2 Abrams tank and almost twice as heavy as the 30-ton Bradley or previously planned 30-ton Infantry Carrier Vehicle.


NEVERTHELESS, THE ARMY PERSISTED Te new vehicle had force protection, survivability and lethality requirements for a mechanized infantry vehicle written by non-infantrymen. In subsequent reviews with the Headquarters Department of the Army staff (including the vice chief of staff of the Army), the potential weight of the Ground Combat Vehicle and excessive requirements were highlighted. However, the Army pushed ahead and awarded two


In recent years, after several failed attempts at initiating the Next Generation Combat Vehicle, the Army is trying again—this time calling the Bradley replacement the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle. I have doubts, however, that the Army has solved the problem of defining the customer.


Does a mechanized infantry vehicle really need to be operated remotely? What’s the benefit of driving it remotely? What are the tactics, techniques and procedures to fire the main gun remotely, and when, on the battlefield, would that ever occur?


Te vehicle crew is unprotected while outside the vehicle and firing the main gun. Tat’s a very inefficient lethality system because the parts of the vehi- cle used to protect the crew and protect the troops being transported are unnec- essary for that mission. So, in the end, the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehi- cle won’t be an optimized troop transport carrier or an optimized lethality system.


The collective group of hundreds of the most experienced acquisition professionals and researchers struggled to agree on a definition of the customer.


138 Army AL&T Magazine Winter 2021


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