By Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Introduction
As we move toward the 21st century, our Army will be called on to respond to crises in a world that is increasingly unpredictable. We will be called on to respond to crises which demand capabilities that could not have been anticipated a few years ago. But whatever the mission, the nation will expect us to succeed, to “win.”
A we face the 21st century, this complex global political matrix is juxtaposed with a revolution in information technology that is changing our ideas about how to organize and how to fight. The power of the micro-processor, having its genesis in visionary Army research and development programs, is only now beginning to be understood and harnessed. The power of information can give us great advantage in gaining a seamless common view of the battlefield. Using digital communications and information processing, we can act more quickly and more synchronously.
Digital Technology: The Foundation
We have been proactively adapting, changing, and responding to this changing environment since the end of the Cold War. Our objective has been to develop a versatile Army capable of delivering victory anywhere and under any circumstance, wherever the nation sends us. To do that has required a change in our thinking, our doctrine. No longer do we have a forward based force oriented on a global threat. Instead we have trained our sights on force projection, split based operations, and operations other than war. This new doctrine has been codified and disseminated to the force in the Army’s foundation document, FM 100-5, Army Operations. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, looks beyond FM I00-5, even further into the future.
But doctrine alone does not suffice in a world exploding with new technologies. Digitization of information; converting it to zeros and ones, then manipulating, transferring, and displaying it provides probably the greatest technological leap forward on the battlefield since the introduction of the internal combustion engine. Digitization—harnessing the power of information-will enable us to realize the vision of TRADOC Pam 525-5, to create a force for the future, a force leveraging unique American strengths.
Because digital technology continues to, literally, explode in its potential, we must develop a plan for incorporating it in such a way as to allow growth of the system without losing what has been gained. It is critical, therefore, to define carefully our strategic approach, to the task of digitization. We have identified six points which must outline our attack on development and acquisition.
1. Create development and procurement processes that accommodate new and maturing technologies rather than focusing on an end item defined years earlier.
In essence, we must create a dynamic process where the requirement, especially for information components, is allowed to evolve throughout the acquisition process. We must define requirement in the context of capability rather than specification. As the acquisition process proceeds, we must continue to look for opportunities to insert even newer technology, which enhances the basic system. This means that the materiel developers must interact with the TRADOC Battle Labs continuously. Finally, we must tie technology development and doctrine development more closely together to enable us to see into the future.
2. Develop all Open technical architecture for digitization, using industry standards whenever possible.
With the Defense Department R&D budget only about I percent of the total U.S. industry expenditures, we must avoid closed architecture and proprietary systems. This will allow growth based on “their nickel” and let us leverage our scarce R&D dollars by spending them on truly unique requirement. By initially defining the types of technology necessary for a capability, three categories can be defined: that which is readily available, that which is under commercial development, and that which is too unique or advanced to warrant commercial efforts. Our R&D funding should reflect this reality by avoiding duplication and concentrating on unique military applications. In this way we can optimize technology transfer between the commercial and defense sectors.
3. Bring legacy systems into alignment with the open architecture.
In the future, we must develop systems which can be enhanced and upgraded, and which allow systems growth. We must align all product improvements with those standards. In the past, we have leapt forward to new, more advanced systems across the whole battlefield. But today, many “legacy” systems remain which must be capable of working with more advanced systems. In the past we have product improved (PIP) legacy systems, but generally only to achieve marginal improvements. Concentrating on the information components of legacy systems, we must strive to achieve PIPs which will enable these legacy systems to be compatible with more advanced systems, to leap ahead on information capability. Only by making such improvements can we achieve a seamless open architecture on the battlefield.
4. Encourage industry to use Army standards wherever we are out in front.
In those cases where Army R&D has moved ahead of industry standards, we must encourage industry to adopt the Army’s approach and standards. The strength of our labs is such that we will continue to lead in many areas of information technology. By ensuring that the Army is represented on the various standards committees, we can ensure that we are developing processes and protocols in such a way that our developments can be handed off to industry for further development as our standards are accepted. Our scientists and engineers are greater thinkers, and our strength is on the cutting edge.
5. Focus on capabilities rather than on equipment.
In digitizing the battlefield, we cannot afford to first digitize each of our analog processes and then refine their uses. We must look for ways to collapse multiple communication and information systems into a single, more flexible digital version, or to eliminate systems which are no longer needed. Our focus must be on the information, not on the means of communication or manipulation. Legacy systems will bear the load of moving us into the near future but will require modifications to provide digital connectivity. We must do this with an eye on true networking, reduction of individual systems, and innovative digitization. To do so will require coordination between program and elimination of some older system; but we must open to this range of options if we are going to gain the power available in digitizing.
6. Take a holistic approach to the problem.
We must bring our field systems into alignment with our garrison systems. We have long said that we fight as we train, and train as we fight; now we must apply that concept to the information battlefield. Both tactical and administrative information system must be developed to be seamless. We must enable commanders to See into a reporting system which is congruent from top to bottom and which is sufficiently transparent so that commanders have only what they need, in a form they can use, when they need it. Doctrine will help us define standard methods of determining the ‘windows” for each commander into that “battlefield information highway.” We must not limit our future commanders by shallow thinking about emerging technology. When the repeating rifle was introduced, it was discouraged by some because it would encourage soldiers to fire too many bullets. We must not constrain the potential of the information age with similar thinking.
SEVEN OBJECTIVE CAPABILITIES:
Lethality
Survivability
Sustainability
Versatility
Deployability
Optempo
Joint and Combined C2
Force XXI: The Plan
Force XXI is our vision to synthesize technology, doctrine, and organization into an Army which can fight and win the nation’s wars into the 21st century. Like digitization, which enables Force XXI, it is both a process and a series of concrete, achievable objectives. And it is a concept which encompasses the whole Army, both the operational forces and the sustaining base. That is, we must grow into one Army seamlessly connecting TOE units to the TDA Army including our civilian and contractor component—one force, from foxhole to factory.
It is not possible to know exactly what that force will look like but by establishing prototype forces, first at brigade, then division, and finally corps, we will create a structure to allow us, through experimentation and evaluation, to create the force through a process of discovery learning and continuous change, a force to operate on the digitized battlefields of the 21st century. Concepts are being developed and equipment selected to form the first digitized force: Brigade 96. Breaking the industrial age paradigm of serial processing, Division 97 will follow shortly thereafter; while we will still be learning at brigade, we can begin to learn at division. Lessons from each will be woven into the way each are then built. This parallel development and continuous change will continue as we develop the corps and other echelons above divisional unit—all the way throughout the force. This is parallel or information age processing. Quick introduction of several organizations will cause us to break down the stovepipe information structures and encourage seamless integration.
A series of mini-experiments and evaluations will examine the effectiveness of various combinations of doctrine, organization and technology to enhance the seven objective capabilities shown in the accompanying list. The after action review process, carefully instituted and documented, will provide the insight to support change. What went right, what went wrong, why, and how can we improve? It is impossible to predict all the new difficulties and opportunities. But we are a learning organization and, by leveraging live, constructive, and virtual simulation, this process will enable us to achieve streamlined, interactive development that will be much more effective than more sequential, conventional processes.
In April 1994, the Army kicked off this process in an Advanced Warfighting Experiment at the National Training Center, combining a complex set of advanced technology demonstrations and advanced concept technology demonstrations. Over 144 systems were connected digitally. Digital communications undergirded the command and control and logistics efforts throughout the task force. Although the many prototype systems and immature training development fell short of expectations in some respects, overall the experiment was a tremendous success, demonstrating significant improvements in lethality and survivability; more accurate, more responsive intelligence; smoother hand off to joint systems; and faster sensor- to-shooter timelines. This experiment confirmed our direction.
A systemic approach to experimentation has been developed to accommodate what we are learning. Using an initial baseline established with today’s force, Operational Test and Evaluation Command and TRADOC will evaluate successive experiments and establish a “rolling baseline” as a basis for continuous improvements and change. This dynamic approach will enable us to build a force optimized for tomorrow—not for yesterday.
Leading Into the Future
Most armies would be content to sit on their laurels following victories like the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War. Instead, we recognized the changing political environment and the difficulties we must face as a power projection Army. We also recognized the power of the revolution in information technology that is enabling us to transform the best Army in me world today into the best Army in the world tomorrow. Digitization technologies provide me means, the leverage, by which we can achieve that vision.
GEN GORDON R. SULLIVAN is chief of staff of the Army. He received a B.A. in history from Norwich University in 1959 and was commissioned in the armor through ROTC. He also has an M.A. in political science from the University of New Hampshire and is a graduate of the Army War College. He served two lows in Vietnam, in 1962-63 as an advisor with the Vietnamese 21st Infantry Division and as a MACV intelligence officer, and in 1969-70 with I Field Force Headquarters.
In celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC), Access is publishing articles that highlight milestones throughout the history of the AAC. Each article marks a moment in acquisition excellence.
This article was published in Army RD&A magazine, November-December 1994.
