COMMENTARY


integrator for the Future Combat Systems program. Despite warn- ings from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in a 2004 report titled “Defense Acquisitions: Te Army’s Future Combat Systems’ Features, Risks, and Alternatives,” which warned of immature technologies and lack of adequate fund- ing, the Army marched forward. Te Future Combat Systems program was canceled in 2009 primarily for being unaffordable, overly ambitious from a technology maturity standpoint (integra- tion of too many critical technologies with low maturity), overly complex from a program management standpoint (the system- of-systems approach), and for failing to reflect current emerging threat requirements from conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.


Future Combat Systems can be studied with a behavioral acquisi- tion lens. Te Army did not appreciate the effects of the planning fallacy bias, and the result was a gap between plans and outcomes. Te Army built an unrealistic “insider view” of a program, with detailed plans for implementation, to gain program-of-record approval. Tese detailed plans enhanced the Army’s perception of control over the program and confidence in its success that were unwarranted when the full context of the program was considered.


Te effects of the planning fallacy are not unique to the Infan- try Carrier Vehicle effort within Future Combat Systems or


to Army acquisition programs in general. A 2015 GAO report titled “Defense Acquisitions: Joint Action Needed by DOD and Congress to Improve Outcomes,” highlighted that program managers (PMs) are incentivized to develop acquisition strate- gies focused on program approval at the milestone review but not acquisition strategies that could later be executed and deliver capabilities.


It is ironic that the planning fallacy has roots in what are perceived to be good management practices. Program planning efforts tend to reinforce idealized perceptions of control, resulting in PMs typically thinking they have more control over outcomes than they have in reality. Te planning fallacy creates biased expecta- tions that will impact the cost, schedule and performance baseline over the course of most programs.


Future Combat Systems was also hampered by overoptimism bias—the tendency to see the world through “rose-colored glasses” or expect positive outcomes even when not justified. Te Army’s “can do” mentality, combined with the general observation that the program management field generally rewards optimistic indi- viduals, led to a Future Combat Systems Infantry Carrier Vehicle program plan that was overly optimistic. In this case, the Army underestimated the technical maturity level of the critical technol- ogies, the complexity of the development effort and the difficulty


ROLLING ALONG


A U.S. Army Stryker infantry carrier vehicle rolls off a C-17 cargo plane in India Feb. 1, 2021. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Joseph Tolliver, 1-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team)


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