COMMENTARY
Decision theory has proposed rational methodologies for making trade-offs by confronting them systematically, typically through some version of cost-benefit analysis. But the models based on rationality bump up against the realities of the complex defense acquisition environment.
Typically, rational, reason-based models make conflicting choices easier to evaluate. By constructing reasons, individuals turn diffi- cult-to-reconcile characteristics of options into a problem that is more comprehensible.
Furthermore, it is likely that reason-based choice may be even more difficult when groups are making decisions, reflecting the fact that programs involve numerous stakeholders and significant resources, and that decisions have to be justified and approved by oversight groups.
Terefore, while individuals typically choose using rational models, groups may prefer reasons based on social, organiza- tional or political dynamics.
Te Future Combat Systems operational requirements document approved by the Army Requirements Oversight Council and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council was 475 pages long and contained hundreds of key performance parameters, key system attributes, and additional performance attributes, leading to thousands of design specifications for the Infantry Carrier Vehi- cle. Te vehicle simply had too many requirements placed on it, making the trade-offs of performance, cost and schedule beyond the cognitive capability of individual PMs and Army leaders and too difficult for the Army from an organizational perspective. Basically, all the requirements were treated as important—too difficult to trade off.
After cancellation of Future Combat Systems in 2009, the Army embarked on the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program (see Figure 3, page 92) to replace the Bradley. All resources that had been supporting the oversight and management of the develop- ment of a family of FCS-manned ground vehicles (including the Infantry Carrier Vehicle) were now applied to the development of the Ground Combat Vehicle. Tis program achieved a materiel- development decision in 2010 and milestone A in 2011 to award technical maturation and risk reduction contracts to industry.
Te same two industry partners that were teamed together in the Future Combat Systems Infantry Carrier Vehicle program now competed against each other in a technical maturation and risk reduction phase for the Ground Combat Vehicle. Te program
MOVING OUT
Idaho Army National Guard Staff Sgt. Daniel Bistriceanu checks his communications equipment before moving out to fuel up a Bradley Fighting Vehicle. The Army has been trying to replace the Bradley since the early 2000s because of its size, weight and power constraints. (Photo by Thomas Alvarez, Idaho Army National Guard)
had an aggressive schedule to get to milestone C within six years of milestone A—influenced by planning fallacy and overopti- mism bias like the Infantry Carrier Vehicle program. Te Army began the Ground Combat Vehicle program and awarded firm fixed price-type research and development contracts to BAE Systems and General Dynamics for designs and prototypes. Te new vehicle’s requirements called for a heavy reliance on mature commercial technologies. In an example of recency bias, Better Buying Power initiatives strongly encouraged the use of firm fixed-price research and development contracts despite the lack of appropriateness based on the level of system integration complexity and risk.
Te Ground Combat Vehicle requirements included a mixture from the Bradley, the Future Combat Systems Infantry Carrier Vehicle, the recently fielded Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, and the M1A2 Abrams tank. Based on the GCV require- ments, the program office, industry competitors and the research, development and engineering center at the U.S. Army Tank- automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) determined that the GCV would weigh between 50 and 70 tons—near- ing the weight of the 72-ton M1A2 Abrams tank and almost twice as heavy as the Bradley or the planned 30-ton Infantry Carrier Vehicle. Te GCV had force protection, survivability and
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