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at the GS-7 level were promoted to the GS-12 level with limited experience, and they were required to handle some of our most complex contracts. Within the course of five years with the Army, a new employee could expect to be promoted to a GS-1102-13 in a team leader and contracting officer role, because of personnel shortages.


the


WARTIME CONTRACTING Hiring and training new staff solved the staffing problem while creating another: With too few seasoned contracting offi- cers to lead and mentor new hires, the quality of contracts began to decline. Newly awarded contracts were often simply copied and pasted from one that had been awarded previously. Addi- tionally,


the operations tempo sharply


increased as the Army entered the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As major defense contractors came to the table to negotiate contracts for complex, critical requirements in support of these wars, the government team often consisted of inexperienced, risk-averse personnel. Tis resulted in frustration among our industry partners as contracting officers became slow to communicate, adding to the time it took to get things done.


Contract vehicles have become hugely more complex over the last 30 years, from my perspective. When I began my contracting career, we awarded mainly lowest-price, technically acceptable (LPTA), firm-fixed-price contracts. Tere were very few negotiated contracts or cost- type contracts awarded under Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 15. In fact, contracting officers had to request permission to use a “best value” negotia- tion, because it was a rare contract type and not well understood. Under FAR Part 15, the government can pay more for better quality, using trade-offs with other criteria when evaluating proposals. (Later,


best value became the contract vehicle of choice for a number of years, in spite of its complexity.)


But once again, the rules changed, requiring contracting officers to request special permission if they were not plan- ning to negotiate their contracts. As the years passed, the best-value approach came under criticism. Trends indicated that most best-value source selections resulted in awards to the lowest offeror in the competitive range. Terefore, it did not make sense to spend the time and resources required to award contracts using this approach. Again, I saw the pendulum swing back, and the preferred method of contracting again became LPTA. Tis did not please industry or the requirements community, and they pushed to return to the FAR Part 15 trade-off process.


OVERSIGHT AND REORGANIZATION Te Gansler Commission, chaired by former Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Dr. Jacques S. Gansler, issued its report on Oct. 31, 2007. Te report indicated that contracting needed greater oversight. Contracting could no longer be per- formed in small offices at every command and location, the report stated, but should be consolidated and aligned under the leadership of general officers. Te Army established the contracting 51C military occupational specialty, formed new con- tracting agencies and gave general officers throughout the Army responsibility for overseeing contracting.


In the years that followed, the Army


formed and reorganized many commands, establishing the U.S. Army Contract- ing Agency and U.S. Army Contracting Command (ACC). MG Camille M. Nich- ols became the first general to command


the ACC. Subordinate commands for expeditionary contracting and mission and installation contracting—the U.S. Army Expeditionary Contracting Com- mand, and the U.S. Army Mission and Installation Contracting Command, respectively—followed. However, orga- nizing and reorganizing contracting over the years, while a strategically correct approach, resulted in more instability and confusion among the workforce, cus- tomers and industry.


Tings are improving, but we continue to struggle with this instability and the question of how best to organize the Army’s contracting operations. Con- tracting in support of the major weapon systems at the program executive offices and life-cycle management commands has been consolidated at ACC contract- ing centers. Now, instead of multiple heads of contracting activity (HCAs) in ACC, the single HCA for ACC has been consolidated at the four-star level, with GEN Dennis L. Via, AMC command- ing general, serving as the first HCA for all of AMC, including ACC. Te Army is currently conducting a transformation study to determine how best to organize the contracting function.


CLIMATE OF CONCERN With the growth in the contracting workload and the proliferation of orga- nizations handling it came a massive increase in regulation, policy and guid- ance over the last three decades. It is difficult to follow all the rules when so many different offices and sources are issuing new directives, and difficult for a contract specialist or contracting officer to ensure everything has been incorpo- rated into the contract.


Te number of audit agencies and audits in contracting has also exponentially increased over the years. Between FY06


ASC.ARMY.MIL 113


COMMENTARY


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