Chechnya, the West Bank, and Gaza, the immediate solution was to provide water in small bottles.
While examining maintenance efforts, we found that in most cases, regular and preventive maintenance procedures were frequently. Most militaries adopted tai- lored maintenance procedures, like special squads of mechanics in Afghanistan and Bosnia, or allocated equipment for local use only, or adapted new mean times to repair-based procedures.
evacuation was changed dramatically. The conventional MEDEVAC procedures close-to-combat medic coverage because of the dispersion of combat forces, usually within urban areas. Dispersed medics and forward surgical troops within the com- as fast as they could and perform fast land and air evacuations straight to hospitals— a procedure called “scoop and run.”
Tactical transportation and distribution was a problem in most cases because of personnel surrounding bases and routes and disguising themselves as civilians. In some cases, transportation platforms were lacking. To address those issues, militaries used armored vehicles to supply combat forces and relied heavily on local subcon- tractors to perform ad hoc missions.
COMMON CHARACTERISTICS nine common logistics principles:
Reduction of buffers—During conventional warfare, the logistics
formations differ at the strategic, opera- tional, and tactical levels; each level has its own clear responsibilities. However, the logistics formations in asymmetri- cal conflicts became more modular and very much tailor-made. As a result, logistics buffers between levels are usu- ally reduced.
Continuous learning—Unlike con- ventional conflicts, most asymmetrical conflicts take years to end. It took three weeks to crush the Iraqi army in 2003, but the ensuing operations in Iraq con- tinued for eight years. Because of the longevity of asymmetrical conflicts, there is time to learn lessons (which insurgents do as well) and adopt new tactics regularly.
Spectrum of logistics solutions— The changing intensity of LICs requires militaries to use a wide range of supply, medical, maintenance, and transporta- tion solutions to sustain combat forces. This flexibility is needed at all times.
“Just in case” philosophy—Unlike conventional conflicts, in which resources are scarce and are managed to meet urgent needs, LICs are likely to require many more resources, such as provisions, equipment, and medics, to meet the demands of unforeseen mis- sions that arise from LICs and the need to have those resources nearby.
Logistics in hostile environments— In conventional conflicts, logistics troops usually operate one step behind the combat forces. During LICs, logis- tics forces often operate in a hostile environment and need to protect them- selves from enemy attacks.
Detailed data management—The mass of forces and operations in conven- tional conflicts does not allow logistics commanders to control their resources in detail. During LICs, logistics com- manders need to, and can, manage their operations with greater precision. Commanders in LICs tend to manage their supply levels in absolute numbers as opposed to required percentages, as is common in conventional wars; have specific data on casualties; and know the exact location of each convoy.
Small headquarters—Deployment of combat forces often takes prior- ity over deployment of logistics forces. As a result, in some LICs, small logis- tics headquarters are deployed quickly to provide urgently needed support. Therefore, in some cases, logistics head- quarters have a short time for buildup and begin operations with a shortage of personnel. Personnel often are pro- vided largely by reserve forces.
High tempo—The tempo of opera- tions in LICs usually does not tolerate
MOST ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICTS WERE NONLINEAR AND DID NOT FEATURE ANY REAL
FRONT FORCES CAUGHT IN LINES. WERE THE
LOGISTICS TYPICALLY LINE
OF
FIRE AND SOMETIMES WERE TARGETED BY THE ENEMY.
ASC.ARMY.MIL 53
LOGISTICS
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