EMERGING TECHNOLOGY AND MODERNIZING THE ARMY
BETTER SAFE THAN SORRY
Ensuring software safety risks are identified and eliminated or mitigated early in development will ensure fielding timelines can be met. (Photo by Markus Spiske, Pexels)
safety risks identified late in government developmental testing can limit Soldier involvement in operational test events and result in use restrictions when the software update is fielded. Te DoDI 5000.87 requires system safety assessments, safety critical risk assessment and mitigations and safety critical implications as part of the test strategy. Military Standard-(MIL-STD) 882E, DOD Standard Practice System Safety, describes the method to iden- tify and eliminate or mitigate software safety hazards and defines risk in terms of probability and severity. Software that can cause a hazard is considered safety-significant software.
DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY, SAFETY, OPERATIONS Integrating software safety engineering processes into DevSec- Ops, or DevSecSafOps, is proposed to reduce programmatic risk for software development while meeting MIL-STD-882E safety objectives (Figure 2). DevSecSafOps draws parallels with DevSecOps by automating and integrating software safety testing during software development. To create the biggest benefit for the program manager, MIL-STD-882E processes must be applied to the initial software configuration to establish a baseline. Safety is evaluated in the DevSecSafOps process when software changes implement new functionality; functionality is modified, removed or disabled; or corrections to software defects are implemented.
Once the scope of a planned software release is defined, the devel- oper’s software safety engineer addresses the following questions as derived from MIL-STD-882E:
• Are new hazards introduced by the software changes?
• Are new hazard causes introduced by the software changes?
• Are new hazard mitigations introduced by the software changes?
• Are new mitigation verifications required by the soft- ware changes?
• Has the Hazard Tracking System (HTS) been updated appropriately?
• Have Software Control Categories (SCC), Software Crit- icality Index (SwCI) and Level of Rigor (LOR) tasks been assigned for newly developed or modified software?
• Is there evidence that LOR tasks have been performed?
• Are new safety-significant test cases added to the soft- ware (SW) test suite?
• Are new software problems discovered in the software update in the Software Problem Reports (SPR)? If so, do they have safety impacts?
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