BEEN THERE, DONE THAT


FIGURE 1


Tere is a longstanding and continuing trend of acquisition programs failing to achieve acquisition program baseline (APB) goals; that is to say, program man- agers often fail to meet important cost, schedule and performance aspects of the plans they agreed on with their superiors. Te Government Accountability Office (GAO), formerly the General Accounting Office, has documented this trend thor- oughly in multiple reports.


Given that defense acquisition is and will remain multifaceted, imperfect and evolving, must its future be completely and irremediably bleak? I suppose the an- swer to this question depends on whom you ask. Our government watchdog or- ganizations, particularly GAO, can point to many examples of management mis- takes. If you look at the three metrics of every program—cost, schedule and per- formance—you will see that over several decades, many acquisition programs have missed or will miss achieving APB goals in one or all three of these metrics.


Put another way, lots of defense programs cost more than they should, arrive late or don’t do what they’re supposed to. GAO detailed this situation in its 2015 and 2016 annual reports “Defense Acquisi- tions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs,” which rate specific programs on the attainment of “product knowledge” and describe program status in terms of cost, schedule, performance and risk.


Sometimes PMs sign up for cost or sched- ule goals that are unachievable; in Octo- ber 2015, GAO characterized this as a systemic problem in which the acquisi- tion process is “in equilibrium,” mean- ing that new programs are initiated with slender chances of completion on sched- ule and within cost. In many programs, technologies have not been ready to sup- port mature, production-ready systems,


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THE TIME WASN’T RIGHT


One key lesson learned from big programs that have run into difficulty: Major technology development needs to happen before any system designed around it goes into production. These four programs were hampered by still-developing technologies that were nevertheless built into the program’s design; when those technologies did not pan out as expected, the programs suffered. (SOURCE: Michael W. Boudreau, Col., USA (Ret.))


leading to schedule concurrency—for example, simultaneously redesigning, retesting and manufacturing—which of- ten brings delays, cost increases and then more delays. It is easy to paint a dismal picture of defense acquisition.


THE BLEAK From my perspective, the elephant in the room is DOD’s propensity to launch


“mega” programs that are beyond its ability to manage successfully. Te de- partment’s really large programs, such


Army AL&T Magazine


January-March 2017


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