FIGURE 2
Nine Technology Readiness Levels (as listed in the Assistant Secretary of Defense
[Research & Engineering] TRA Guidance, April 2011)
TRL 1: Basic principles observed and reported. TRL 2: Technology concept and/or application formulated.
TRL 3: Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of concept.
TRL 4: Component and/or breadboard validation in a laboratory environment.
TRL 5: Component and/or breadboard validation in a relevant environment.
TRL 6: System or subsystem model or prototype demonstrated in a relevant environment.
TRL 7: System prototype demonstrated in an opera- tional environment.
TRL 8: Actual system completed and qualified through test and demonstration. [This is the end of true system development.]
TRL 9: Actual system proven through successful mis- sion operations.
IS IT REALLY READY?
Instead of a subjective discussion of whether a technology is “ready,” which could mean anything, TRLs originally developed by NASA allow acquisition professionals to talk about whether a technology has met a given milestone. DOD uses nine TRLs to describe a system’s developmental progress. (SOURCE: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering)
as the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS), the multiservice, multinational F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program and the Navy’s Gerald R. Ford–class aircraft carrier, each reflect enormous system complexity—multiple variants, multiple new technolo- gies and large amounts of associated software—that continues to bedevil acquisition managers. Tese three programs are very different from one another, but each suffers (or suffered, in the case of FCS, which was terminated in 2009) from unmanage- able complexity.
Tis is no criticism of the management teams that guided these very important programs. Rather, it’s a criticism of leadership decisions to enter into mega-programs that risk valuable funds and, because of their complexity, are unlikely to succeed on schedule and within cost. Te challenges of system complex- ity include immature technology, both hardware and software, which may be most intractable in mega-programs but affects programs of all sizes throughout the military services.
Te timing of maturing technology may not meet the develop- ment schedule of the warfighting system; the PM needs to ac- knowledge this with risk management plans in place should the maturing technology not be ready to meet the timetable of the emerging warfighting system. (See Figure 1.) Tat is, there need to be “plan B” alternatives and off-ramps for incorporating less risky hardware technology solutions in the event that the pre- ferred technology stumbles, so as not to interrupt the comple- tion schedule for the emerging system. GAO presented this rec- ommendation, while not a new idea, to Congress in its October 2015 study “Defense Acquisitions: Joint Action Needed by DoD and Congress to Improve Outcomes.”
At present, the paths to improved outcomes for hardware versus software appear to lead in different directions. Technology de- velopment leading to advanced hardware solutions needs to be accomplished in the technology base before being handed over for incorporation into the emerging warfighting system. On the other hand, software must be developed or adapted uniquely for a warfighting system, using highly disciplined systems engineer- ing processes.
Tis suggests to me that software development supporting a new system will normally require major up-front effort, with
PMs typically push their programs forward unless their leadership tells them to halt. Therefore, if a program is not ready to move to the next developmental phase, the milestone decision authority has to be tough and disciplined.
ASC.ARMY.MIL 141
COMMENTARY
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