BEEN THERE, DONE THAT
threads, comprise activities that PMs must manage to ensure the thorough planning and careful monitoring of manufacturing. Te threads and sub-threads are:
• Technology and industrial base. • Design. • Cost and funding. • Materials. • Process capability and control. • Quality management. • Manufacturing workforce, including engineering and production.
• Facilities. • Manufacturing management.
Knowledge Management. Since 1998, GAO has emphasized the importance of a shared understanding of critical knowledge by the PM, the intermediate acquisition chain of command and the acquisition authority at selected program decision reviews (such as milestone B) before allowing a developmental acquisi- tion program to proceed to its next step. In 1998, three knowl- edge points began to take shape and have since become more detailed and useful, as shown in GAO’s 2015 “Defense Acquisi- tions” annual report. Tey are:
• Knowledge Point 1: Technologies, time, funding and other resources match customer needs. Decision to invest in prod- uct development.
• Knowledge Point 2: Design is stable and performs as
expected. Decision to start building and testing production- representative prototypes.
• Knowledge Point 3: Production meets cost, schedule and quality targets. Decision to produce first units for customer.
Te shared knowledge is likely to improve risk reduction at the three points and increase confidence in decision reviews to con- sider advancing an acquisition program to its next developmen- tal phase. (See Figure 4, Page 143)
GAO is right about program knowledge point management. Te definitions are clear, and the specific review points align easily to milestone B, the critical design review and milestone C. Although the terminology of knowledge point management and GAO’s specific recommendations have not carried over com- pletely into DODI 5000.02, its companion document, DOD Directive 5000.01, is consistent with GAO’s intent, as in the following extract:
E1.1.14. Knowledge-Based Acquisition. PMs shall provide knowledge about key aspects of a system at key points in the acquisition process. PMs shall reduce tech- nology risk, demonstrate technologies in a relevant environ- ment, and identify technology alternatives, prior to program initiation. Tey shall reduce integration risk and demonstrate product design prior to the design readiness review. Tey shall reduce manufacturing risk and demonstrate producibility pri- or to full-rate production.
Te OSD policy guidance is clear, but not as specific as GAO recommends; in retrospect, acquisition leaders have a track re- cord of too readily ignoring a lack of “program knowledge” and forging ahead optimistically, hoping that missing knowledge will somehow materialize when necessary. Ignoring knowledge points appears misguided, however; the defense acquisition landscape is littered with programs that did not have sufficient
“knowledge” to support success at the next acquisition step but were authorized to move forward anyway.
Beyond poor test results, the outcomes have been program cost growth, schedule delays, warfighting systems that only margin- ally perform their missions, unexpectedly high maintenance and retrofit costs, unachievable readiness goals and even systems that have been produced but cannot be deployed because they are unsuitable or ineffective. GAO has described some of these problems in its ongoing study of high-risk programs.
In my opinion, the expectation within the acquisition commu- nity is that PMs typically push their programs forward unless their leadership tells them to halt. Terefore, if a program is not ready to move to the next developmental phase, the mile- stone decision authority has to be tough and disciplined, not approving advancement of the program to the next acquisition phase until it meets its knowledge requirements, to ensure a reasonable likelihood of success.
From my perspective, the elephant in the room is DOD’s propensity to launch “mega” programs that are beyond its ability to manage successfully.
144 Army AL&T Magazine January-March 2017
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56 |
Page 57 |
Page 58 |
Page 59 |
Page 60 |
Page 61 |
Page 62 |
Page 63 |
Page 64 |
Page 65 |
Page 66 |
Page 67 |
Page 68 |
Page 69 |
Page 70 |
Page 71 |
Page 72 |
Page 73 |
Page 74 |
Page 75 |
Page 76 |
Page 77 |
Page 78 |
Page 79 |
Page 80 |
Page 81 |
Page 82 |
Page 83 |
Page 84 |
Page 85 |
Page 86 |
Page 87 |
Page 88 |
Page 89 |
Page 90 |
Page 91 |
Page 92 |
Page 93 |
Page 94 |
Page 95 |
Page 96 |
Page 97 |
Page 98 |
Page 99 |
Page 100 |
Page 101 |
Page 102 |
Page 103 |
Page 104 |
Page 105 |
Page 106 |
Page 107 |
Page 108 |
Page 109 |
Page 110 |
Page 111 |
Page 112 |
Page 113 |
Page 114 |
Page 115 |
Page 116 |
Page 117 |
Page 118 |
Page 119 |
Page 120 |
Page 121 |
Page 122 |
Page 123 |
Page 124 |
Page 125 |
Page 126 |
Page 127 |
Page 128 |
Page 129 |
Page 130 |
Page 131 |
Page 132 |
Page 133 |
Page 134 |
Page 135 |
Page 136 |
Page 137 |
Page 138 |
Page 139 |
Page 140 |
Page 141 |
Page 142 |
Page 143 |
Page 144 |
Page 145 |
Page 146 |
Page 147 |
Page 148 |
Page 149 |
Page 150 |
Page 151 |
Page 152 |
Page 153 |
Page 154 |
Page 155 |
Page 156 |
Page 157 |
Page 158 |
Page 159 |
Page 160 |
Page 161 |
Page 162 |
Page 163 |
Page 164 |
Page 165 |
Page 166 |
Page 167 |
Page 168 |
Page 169 |
Page 170 |
Page 171 |
Page 172 |
Page 173 |
Page 174 |
Page 175 |
Page 176
