DETER AND DEFEAT


HYPOTHESIZE, SIMULATE, ASSESS


U.S. Special Forces Soldiers conduct a downed-pilot simulation during AWA 17.1. As gaps in U.S. manpower, tactics and technology became apparent, Army leadership ramped up troop levels and training. But the service still faces capability shortfalls in several areas, including short-range air defense, long-range precision fires and electronic warfare. (U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Alexander Holmes, 55th Combat Camera)


outcomes—and in the process, help focus resources on our most critical gaps and promising opportunities.


For example, in the event of a crisis in Europe, knowing how a certain elec- tronic warfare technology could boost U.S. ground troops’ chances of survival against robust Russian artillery strikes would strongly argue for fully resourc- ing and even accelerating that program. Knowing how specific armored vehicle upgrades could protect commanders’ maneuver options in a European scenario would inform resource trades,


such as


how to scope and stagger those improve- ments for maximum impact.


To link outcomes to programs and vice versa, the Army and RAND team devised the SRP methodology, which breaks down strategy into operational tasks (e.g., command, strike, defeat, protect, sus- tain); then into critical capabilities (e.g., suppressing enemy air defense, managing electronic signatures). Within each capa- bility, it identifies gaps and their severity: Could we lose a battle or campaign, suf- fer casualties, be functionally impaired? Ten, to see what would close the gaps, an assessment of programs is produced that


22 Army AL&T Magazine January-March 2017


factors in performance, cost and risk, as well as current and future investments.


Tis framework is at the heart of an ongo- ing RAND study, “Prioritizing Army Programs,” which is currently delivering initial analysis to inform the program objective memorandum (POM) for FY19 through FY23. Initially organized by the- ater scenarios (such as a Russian invasion of the Baltics or a North Korean WMD threat), the analysis also incorporates informed assumptions on adversaries’ force posture and capabilities; the roles of U.S. services and allied partners; treaty obligations; posture and policy con- straints; and other key variables in order to predict likely options and outcomes.


After receiving initial results in late 2016, the study team will add more scenarios, programs, capability gaps and analytic depth to inform POM decisions and longer-term strategic planning. Although we expect to have most of the results in hand by August, once the SRP analyti- cal framework is fully established we can continue to refresh the data and under- take the right kinds of analyses to reflect new operational, fiscal and programmatic developments. Te intent is not a static


study but a “living” framework and way of thinking that the Army can lever- age for years to come. Te Army Rapid Capabilities Office, which reports directly to the secretary and chief of staff of the Army to expedite the fielding of critical combat capabilities, can also take advan- tage of the framework as it prioritizes opportunities to accelerate systems based on emerging threats and critical capabil- ity gaps.


CONCLUSION For the first time in decades, the Army faces peer adversaries whose capabilities rival our own—and in some areas, simply exceed our capacity. We are well aware that we must make hard choices to close critical capability gaps in order to deter— and, if necessary, to win—the wars of the future. Given budget constraints, we must do this while balancing current readiness and end strength.


To protect our Soldiers and U.S. interests around the globe, it is our responsibility to make sure we apply our limited resources toward those areas where we have the most to lose—and therefore the most to gain. Tat’s why all of our Armywide pri- oritization efforts are so important. Tey


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