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SHIP SHAPE


created a compelling need for enhanced border security, holistically compris- ing land, maritime and air components. Te Tunisian government has chosen to leverage its security cooperation relation- ship with the United States effectively to strengthen naval capacity and coun- ter the heightened threats the country faces—exemplifying one of the overarch- ing purposes of U.S. security cooperation efforts, to “develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.”


A CONFLUENCE OF EVENTS Te catalyst for the dramatic recent growth in the Tunisian navy’s FMS program was two separate but virtually identical cases. In 2009, the Tunisian government received $7 million in foreign military financing from the U.S. for enhance- ment of maritime security, as well as $7.5 million to complement Tunisian foreign military financing through the Build- ing Partnership Capacity program. Tese two cases led to the delivery of 10 25-foot Response boats (nearly identical to the U.S. Coast Guard’s Response Boat-Small) and five 44-foot Response boats (similar to the Coast Guard’s Response Boat-Medium), along with a robust package of spare parts, training and support.


Tis large, singular injection of vessels into the Tunisian fleet amounted to a wholesale recapitalization of its existing territorial water patrol capability. Te new vessels replaced the Tunisian National Navy’s aging small boats (smaller than 65 feet), which up to that point had been used for patrolling, search and rescue and interdiction.


Te first 15 Response boats were delivered in 2011 as the country was still adjusting to the new realities brought about by the Jasmine Revolution. In a twist of irony, the instability caused by the revolution proved to be extremely fortunate for the Tuni- sian navy’s FMS program. Te ousting of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali estab- lished several conditions that impacted the United States’ FMS relationship with Tunisia.


Te first of these conditions was that the Tunisian military remained apolitical during the revolution. Tis deference to the will of the people instead of the orders of the long-standing president engendered a profound respect for the professionalism, competence and judgment of the military as an institution. Tis enabled the United States to continue its security assistance programs, provided added justification


for investing U.S. funds, and ensured that the Tunisian military was well-positioned to justify future internal funding within Tunisia’s nascent democracy.


Second, the removal of the Ben Ali regime allowed for re-energized engagement with the United States. Te final years of the regime were marked by a visible shift away from engagement with the United States, which by 2010-11 was impeding bilateral military efforts. Ali’s departure allowed for a reset in what had been for years a harmo- nious bilateral relationship.


Te last major condition was a sequence of events set in motion by the revolution that dramatically increased the need for enhanced maritime security. One imme- diate result of the turmoil was a huge increase in the number of migrants taking to small vessels and attempting to cross the Mediterranean. Tis included Tunisian nationals looking for greater opportunity in Europe as well as other African nation- als using Tunisia as a transit point.


With the nearest Italian islands roughly 45 miles away, Tunisian coastal waters became a key transit zone for refugees willing to risk their lives to reach Europe. Many of the vessels used for this journey


PLOT POINTS


U.S. Coast Guard Boatswain’s Mate 1st Class Daniel Sylvester, center, provides training to Algerian sailors aboard the Tuni- sian Navy’s MNT Khaireddine in early May during Phoenix Express. Sponsored by U.S. Africa Command and facilitated by U.S. Naval Forces Europe – Africa and the U.S. 6th Fleet, the exercise is designed to improve regional cooperation and oper- ational capabilities and enhance safety and security in the Mediterranean. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Ryan U. Kledzik).


32


Army AL&T Magazine


October-December 2018


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