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ARMY AL&T


ANASOC


When supplying partner nations through FMS, the best possible equipment may not always be the best possible solution.


by Benjamin Posil P


roviding the best (i.e., most capable) equipment is not always the most successful foreign military sales (FMS) solution. In many cases the opti- mal solution means providing a less capable piece of equipment that better aligns with the recipient’s ability to implement, maintain and


sustain it with minimal external support. An examination of the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command’s (ANASOC) radio network highlights how ineffectual capacity-building efforts can be when they do not reflect a thorough understanding of a partner’s capabilities. Ultimately, the U.S. security cooperation program is more powerful in building military capacity when FMS deliverables are synchronized with a partner’s organic capabilities.


In few places is the influence of the FMS program more profoundly felt than Afghanistan, where virtually all defense-related procurements are underwritten by the U.S. government. Te impact is magnified within ANASOC, the Afghan National Army’s most capable combat force. Despite having only 14,000 troops (roughly 5 percent of total ANA forces), ANASOC is credited with conduct- ing nearly 85 percent of ongoing combat operations throughout Afghanistan. As a result, the U.S. government has spent a disproportionate amount of fund- ing to equip ANASOC with kit similar to that used by U.S. special operations units. Unlike with many other partners, the funding made available by the U.S. government to develop ANASOC and the larger Afghan National Army has been momentous in scale.


What is no different for Afghanistan than for other countries with militaries on the lower end of the capability spectrum, however, is that simply buying more capabil- ity does not mean the partner will use it the same way that U.S. forces do. As is the case with Harris radios for ANASOC, a partner’s capacity will not be enhanced


RADIO


https://asc.ar my.mil


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