RADIO ANASOC
when the selection of FMS equipment is based on what matches equivalent U.S. units instead of what aligns with the part- ner’s organic capabilities.
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP The FMS program historically has been predicated on an assumed correla- tion between delivery of capability and increased military capacity; the more capa- bility the U.S. provides to a partner, the stronger its capacity will become. Tere are numerous instances, however, where a partner’s capability limitations were not considered during FMS case develop- ment and ultimately undermined the opportunity for capacity enhancement. Specific examples range from multibillion-dollar equipment fielding programs for Afghanistan and Iraq to the deliv- ery of basic watercraft to the most impoverished African countries.
Any time there is a gap between the sustainment requirements for a new capability delivered through the FMS program and a partner nation’s
sustainment capacity,
there is increased programmatic risk. Left unaddressed, this risk leads to inefficiently utilized fund- ing and an adverse impact on U.S. security cooperation efforts. An example of a dramatic disparity between a capability provided and actual capacity generated is the tactical radio architecture established for ANASOC.
Te U.S. government has spent the last 15-plus years equipping, training and mentoring ANASOC soldiers, as it has done for numerous other Afghan institu- tions. Te vehicle for delivering nearly all new equipment for ANASOC (as well as the larger Afghan National Army) is the Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) program. Te U.S. government’s focus
46 Army AL&T Magazine Spring 2019
on Afghan security has been so important that the Afghan Security Forces Fund, a specific “pot” of BPC funding, was estab- lished for the sole purpose of enabling the Afghan government to enhance its defense capacity. In 2017 alone, Congress appro- priated over $4.2 billion for the fund.
Included in the effort to improve
ANASOC’s ability to “shoot, move and communicate” has been the investment of hundreds of millions of dollars in tacti- cal radios. While several brands of radios have been provided, the most prominent one by far is Harris.
community, Harris became the preferred radio solution for outfitting ANASOC.
If the ultimate U.S. strategic goal is enabling ANASOC’s self-reliance, the dependence on Harris field service representatives is a liability, not an asset.
TOP OF THE LINE Harris radios are a staple of the U.S. Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM) inven- tory because of their advanced capabilities in propagating voice and data over a broad range of the radio frequency spectrum. Sgt. 1st Class Nicholas Pitz, a former ANASOC mentor, summed up Harris’ reputation within the special operations community: “Harris is often considered the gold standard for radios because of the heightened level of capabilities they possess.” At least in part because of its prominent role in the special operations
A long-range high-frequency commu- nication network was established for ANASOC that enables the transmission of encrypted voice and data traffic (includ- ing photos and video) over hundreds of miles from radios easily transported in a rucksack or on a vehicle. Te U.S. govern- ment invested in hardware, training and an army of field service representatives to ensure functionality. While the capability mirrors networks used by special ops units across the globe, there is one conspicuous difference in ANASOC’s case: SOCOM units rely heavily on this network at the operational level, while ANASOC units rarely use it at all. A recent survey conducted by the ANASOC – Special Oper- ations Advisory Group staff found that at best, the Harris network has been dramatically underused when compared with its capa- bilities; at worst, it is universally ignored by ANASOC soldiers.
This is in no way a negative ref lection of Harris products. ANASOC’s network includes top-of-the-line equipment with tremendous capabilities that rival those used by elite forces world-
wide. Instead, the underuse is a byproduct of U.S. strategy that for years provided ANASOC the most capable radio equip- ment without taking into account the indisputable realities on the ground. Planners failed to realize or acknowledge that because ANASOC does not have the requisite organizational sophistication, the Harris radios would have minimal posi- tive impact on ANASOC’s operational capacity.
Te reasons for this ineffectiveness are numerous. From a technical standpoint,
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