BEWARE THE RUSH TO FAILURE
and constrain empowerment. As outlined in “DOD Directive 5000.01, Te Defense Acquisition System,” PMs need the flexi- bility to tailor acquisition strategies appropriately depending on urgency of need, technology maturity and availability of resources and funding. An important element of the acquisition strategy is the contracting approach—the selection of the proper contract process and type.
In 2010, the Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives resulted from the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, which attempted to reduce total ownership cost and cycle time, focus- ing decision-making early in the design phase and encouraging early testing and evaluation. Te BBP themes were well thought out, ranging from gaining greater efficiencies to maximizing competition, to reducing non-value-added oversight (red tape), to cutting costs. At the program level, however, these new initia- tives turned into mandates. For example, BBP 1.0 emphasized the use of fixed-price contracts over cost-reimbursement contracts for development efforts. At the time, a blanket application of this guidance over all development efforts led to contract types that were inappropriate for the risk in some programs.
For example, after the cancellation of the Army’s Future Combat Systems in 2009, the Army began the Ground Combat Vehicle program and awarded firm-fixed-price research and development
(R&D) contracts to BAE Systems Inc. and General Dynamics Corp. for designs and prototypes. Te new vehicle’s requirements called for a heavy reliance on mature technologies. Firm require- ments, commercial technologies and BBP pressure all equated to firm-fixed-price R&D contracts.
However, the government underestimated the difficulty of inte- grating the components to achieve the desired requirements. Te result was the program’s cancellation in 2014 after spend- ing nearly $1.2 billion for designs, with no prototypes delivered and no capability fielded to warfighters. Te inappropriate choice of contract type for the program contributed to higher-than- necessary program risk. In retrospect, a cost-reimbursement contract would have been more appropriate to advance the state of the technology, but the pressure to act in accordance with the BBP initiative was too intense to overcome.
Program managers felt similar pressure to use fixed-price R&D contracts for the Army’s Soldier Protection System. Te system consisted of five coordinated efforts to update Soldiers’ equip- ment, including helmets, ballistic vests, hard armor plates, combat eyewear and an integrated Soldier sensor system. It was the first time the Army attempted to coordinate the improvements in protective equipment so that the systems would be fully inte- grated—resulting in a modular, scalable, mission-tailorable
A word about Future Combat Systems
For the past decade, acquisition experts have referred to the Future Combat Systems program as an example of everything wrong with defense acquisition—a canceled program that wasted billions of dollars and resulted in no delivery of capability to warfighters. The Future Combat Systems program tried to integrate too many immature technologies using a system-of-systems approach to transform the way Army brigades would fight.
Few pundits mention that the program started as a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency effort contracted through an other transaction authority (OTA) with Boeing Co. and its industry teammate, Science Appli- cations International Corp. The OTA incentivized Boeing to get the Army to an approved milestone B, to start the formal program of record and system development and demonstration phase as quickly as possible. The Army had planned funding streams, and funds were at risk (schedule-driven).
82 Army AL&T Magazine Spring 2019
Boeing and the Army achieved that milestone B in 2003. The OTA also enabled Boeing to become the lead system integrator for the Army’s Future Combat Systems program of record. Despite repeated warnings from the Govern- ment Accountability Office of immature technologies and lack of adequate funding, the Army marched forward until 2009, when the secretary of defense canceled the program because of affordability concerns, immature technologies and requirements not reflecting the current threats faced by Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The OTA did its job—it sped up a slow, unresponsive, bureaucratic contracting process in a rush to get a program of record and an approved program into engi- neering and manufacturing development. But it was a rush to failure and resulted in no capability delivered to the warfighter.
—ROBERT F. MORTLOCK
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