RADIO ANASOC


of information available for most other partners. Te preponderance of evidence confirms that while the Harris radios are an incredibly capable product, they are so dramatically underused by ANASOC that the radios do little to build actual oper- ational capacity. Te time and money dedicated to their inclusion in ANASOC’s “Tashkils” (Afghan documents that are similar to the U.S. Army’s modified tables of organization and equipment and reflect a unit’s assigned manning and equipment levels) could far more effectively be used elsewhere.


CONCLUSION There are numerous reasons for ANASOC’s underuse of tactical commu- nication systems, including the lack of a forcing function, challenges with English comprehension, maintenance issues and equipment complexity. It is highly unlikely that the U.S. will be able to change this paradigm, no matter how much money it spends to do so.


Te U.S. procurement system is predicated on the concept of pursuing “best value” for the end user. While this same mandate applies to FMS cases, the “best” solution does not always correspond to the most capable product. Te analog option is a far better match for many partner nations’ capabilities than the latest digital solutions that the U.S. military uses. Te more basic solution is easier and more affordable to learn, operate, maintain and sustain than more complex alternatives. Moreover, the functionality is easier to integrate with the partner’s overall military capacity.


The same disconnect that results in hundreds of millions of wasted U.S. taxpayer dollars in Afghanistan can be equally impactful, albeit on a lesser scale, in even the smallest FMS cases. While the scope and scale of the exam- ples vary greatly, the resulting waste of


48 Army AL&T Magazine Spring 2019 YOU’RE NOT HEARING ME


Recruits refine their tactical radio programming skills at the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command School of Excellence in Kabul, Afghanistan. The radios are a remarkably capable product; however, they’re underused as a result of several factors and have done little to build operational capacity. (Photo by Master Sgt. Felix Figueroa, NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan)


taxpayer money and erosion of U.S. influ- ence with partner nations have the same effect. To most efficiently employ the FMS program—and the BPC program in particular—the U.S. needs to accurately assess what capability partner militaries can support and effectively supplement in a way that will enhance their long-term capacity development. On its face, provid- ing U.S. partners with older, and ostensibly inferior, technology may seem counterin- tuitive. But the result will be more capable and self-reliant partners and a more effec- tive security cooperation program.


For more information, contact the Mary- land National Guard Public Affairs Office at 410-576-6179.


BENJAMIN POSIL is a security cooperation professional with over 10 years’ experience in the field. He is a lieutenant colonel in the Maryland Army National


Guard, where he recently completed a 10-month deployment to Afghanistan. He has earned MBAs from the University of South Carolina and Wirtschaftuniversität Wien in Vienna, Austria, and an M.S. in


international international American studies relations relations from Troy


State University. He also has a B.A. in


and Latin from the University of


Delaware. He is an Acquisition Corps member and a certified program manager through both the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (Level II) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Level III).


Te author would like to express his appre- ciation to Lt. Col. Glenn Deetman, Maj. Adam Kavalsky, Sgt. 1st Class Nicholas Pitz and Sgt. 1st Class Sherwein “Joey” Asun- cion. Teir wisdom, assistance and technical expertise were essential in the development of this article.


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