ARMY AL&T
SEEING CLEARLY
Afghan Special Security Forces conduct a helicopter raid on Taliban compounds in Kapisa province in August. In providing support to partner nations through FMS, the U.S. needs to consider what capability the partner militaries can use and sustain in a way that will enhance their long-term capacity development. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Nicholas Byers, Resolute Support Headquarters)
the infrastructure to support a radio that requires regular software updates, proprietary parts and highly skilled radio operators is simply nonexistent in Afghan- istan. Access to the internet is limited, even within ANASOC, so the ability to disseminate updates and to independently pursue training does not exist organically; nor do troubleshooting procedures. Te resulting inability to update and distrib- ute encryption has a particularly strong impact. Additionally, ANASOC has no practical mechanism to purchase its own spare parts, so its ability to replace broken components depends entirely on the FMS process and the Afghan military’s supply system.
CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS Harris has filled the gap in part by establishing a network of field service representatives across Afghanistan. Te Harris logo is ubiquitous; it can be found at virtually any camp where ANASOC soldiers operate. While this meets the immediate need of on-site subject matter expertise, it does little to build ANASOC’s
organic capacity. If the ultimate U.S. strategic goal is enabling ANASOC’s self- reliance, the dependence on Harris field service representatives to ensure the func- tionality of ANASOC’s tactical radio network is a liability, not an asset.
Even if the previously outlined challenges can be overcome, there are fundamen- tal cultural considerations that simply cannot be ignored when implement- ing a system like Harris radios. At the most basic level, a large percentage of ANASOC soldiers are functionally illit- erate even in their native Dari; English reading comprehension is virtually nonex- istent. Harris radios are operated through a series of digital menus in English, and since ANASOC Soldiers’ English comprehension is negligible, successful operation becomes an exercise of memo- rizing an extended sequence of words in a language they are unfamiliar with. Even if some percentage of the Soldiers can gain operational proficiency in a class- room setting through rote memorization, the likelihood of replicating this process
in a field environment or in combat drops significantly.
Another consideration is that unlike U.S. special operations teams, for whom universal proficiency and empowerment are trademarks of “team” culture, Afghan military culture is defined by consoli- dation of power at the command level. What this means for communications is that access to more capable radios is far more restricted than in a comparable U.S. unit, with ANASOC commanders often the only ones allowed access. As a result, basic very-high-frequency “walkie-talkies” or cellphones become the primary meth- ods of communication for much of the front-line forces.
What is especially troubling in the case of Afghanistan is that unlike with most FMS partners, the United States has been working directly with its military, at an operational level on a daily basis, for 15 years. Te depth of anecdotal evidence highlighting the realities on the ground in Afghanistan far exceeds the depth
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