$$
BY THE NUMBERS
This graphic shows the scope and dollar value of the FMS and the Colombian government’s own contributions to the Colombian military’s overall effort from 1992 to the present. Colom- bia also bought machine guns, ammunition, protective gear, night vision devices, armored patrol vehicles and other equipment and provided additional training. (SOURCE: Security Cooperation Information Portal)
ability to move rapidly and at will anywhere in the country—over the insurgents. Once this occurred, the military was able not only to re-establish government control of an area, but also to hold the territory it had gained.
DECISIVE ACTION Between 2003 and 2007, the Colombian military stood up nine mobile brigades comprising counterinsurgency battalions and combat support and services com- panies prepared to move quickly to any part of the country by whatever means available, bringing the total to 17. Tese brigades had a full-time, guerrilla search- and-destroy mission. Concurrently, the Colombian military on its own con- ducted Plan Patriota to break the FARC’s strategic initiative. Te first phase of the plan, beginning in 2003, was Liber- tad Uno, which broke the guerrilla ring around Bogota. It lasted four months and involved 11,000 troops, including a por- tion from the 17 mobile brigades.
Tese troops broke up into platoon-sized formations and occupied the whole area around the city, supported by an endur- ing logistics pipeline. Te victory was overwhelming, with more than 400 guerrillas captured or killed and many others deserting. Te role of helicopters during this operation, representing a shift in tactics, was to sustain the dis- persed formations, provide limited air support, conduct medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), create fear (through noise and visibility) in the minds of the FARC and instill confidence in the minds of the soldiers.
Te second phase of the operation, Liber- tad Dos, involved attacking the strategic base area of the FARC using a new task force known as Joint Task Force Omega, which included several of the mobile brigades; the full capability of the Colombian Army Aviation Brigade, for the first time in the context of the coun- terinsurgency strategy; and riverine units
from the Colombian Navy. Te Colom- bian military considered Libertad Dos to be a huge success, with all of the core FARC base areas disrupted during the three-year period of 2003-06; the FARC dispersed to jungle areas.
Te rotary-wing assets provided a deci- sive advantage in Libertad Dos in terms of transportation, supply line sustain- ment, MEDEVAC and close air support. Using a similar approach, the Colom- bian military forces conducted offensive operations with decisive rotary-aviation support throughout the country, dispers- ing the FARC and other irregular armed groups to more and more remote terrain. Tis dispersion resulted in 4,500 FARC deserters by 2005.
To support these successes, the Colom- bian Army acquired an additional 29 UH-60L Black Hawks and 13 Russian MI-17s between 2007 and 2009. Addi- tionally, the national logistics pipeline
ASC.ARMY.MIL 141
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
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