As many people with experience in Afghanistan will attest, the concept of time—specifically projecting into the future, at least from a Westerner’s perspective—can be quite difficult to relay to our Afghan partners. We routinely plan out activities into the future, at least five years at a time.


the vehicles aged out. Tis is expensive and incurs not only vehicle cost but also high transportation cost to deliver the vehicle to theater. If the coalition con- tinued to replace HMMWVs with the current methodology at the authorized fleet size levels, we would replace 14,903 systems at a cost of roughly $3.9 bil- lion over the next decade. Tat is clearly unaffordable given future programmed resource levels.


Tus, right-sizing the primary fleets, espe- cially noncombat power fleets such as the Light Tactical Vehicle, is necessary and must be programmed into future Tashkil authorizations. (For more on the Tashkil change process, see “Bringing Afghan Defense Forces Under Budget,” Page 19.) Tis will be no easy task, as Afghan cul- tural norms dictate that more is better, regardless of readiness and affordability. Yet ANA leaders are beginning to under- stand that in a resource-constrained environment, higher readiness at the price of fewer systems—especially those that do not contribute directly to combat power—is a prudent and necessary trade- off that preserves warfighting capability.


Closely linked to the fleet sizing issue is the


imbalanced maintainer-to-vehicle


ratio as a result of systemic shortages in maintenance personnel. In many corps,


maintainers are not serving as mechan- ics in their positions. Rather, they are consistently assigned to other duties and spend little time actually perform- ing maintenance functions. Tis lowers readiness and keeps maintainers from learning and mastering their trade. By comparison, the U.S. Army standard for the appropriate ratio of wheeled vehicle mechanics to vehicle systems is 1 main- tainer for 15.6 vehicles.


Te current inventory of trained ANA mechanics assigned to a Tashkil posi- tion is estimated at 2,800. Of these, it is unknown how many are actually working within their established main- tenance positions. Based on fleet density, the ANA requires 3,527 mechanics capable of operator- and unit-level main- tenance (10/20 levels); that means the ANA would be more than 600 mechan- ics short if it were at full strength. As an example of an effective sustainer-to- readiness ratio, the Mobile Strike Force Vehicle fleet of 600 vehicles has more than 2,000 10/20-level ANA mechan- ics trained and certified by the original equipment manufacturer. Tis fleet’s readiness rate is steady at over 85 per- cent. Tis exemplifies


the benefit of


getting the right ratio of maintainers to vehicles.


CONCLUSION A number of discrete actions, inextrica- bly linked and mutually supportive, are necessary to remove the most significant barriers to improving the current deplor- able state of materiel readiness plaguing the ANA and adversely affecting combat effectiveness.


Taking all of these actions in a holistic, methodical


approach will strengthen


each link of the ANA supply chain, and individual members will more clearly understand the importance of their con- tributions to the overall system. We can no longer tolerate the status quo; we must demand process improvement at all levels. Such an approach will improve processes without breaking the system, collectively building workable Afghan solution sets to fix problems and create pride in ownership.


For more information, call Headquarters, Resolute Support, EF5 Afghan Defense and Security Forces Capabilities and Per- formance (ANDSF Sustainment) at DSN: 318-449-7847.


MR. KENNETH D. WATSON is serving on a one-year deployment as the executive director of sustainment and EF5 lead for the deputy chief of staff for security assis- tance, Headquarters,


Resolute Support


– Afghanistan. He is permanently assigned as


the deputy director for strategy, capa-


bilities, policy and logistics (J-5/J-4) within the U.S. Transportation Command. He holds an M.A. in military operational art and science from Air University, an M.S. in National Resource Strategy from the Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy and a B.A. in English from California State University, Sacramento. He is Level II certified in life- cycle logistics and is a member of the Senior Executive Service and the Air Force Acqui- sition Corps.


ASC.ARMY.MIL 43


RESOLUTE SUPPORT


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