search.noResults

search.searching

dataCollection.invalidEmail
note.createNoteMessage

search.noResults

search.searching

orderForm.title

orderForm.productCode
orderForm.description
orderForm.quantity
orderForm.itemPrice
orderForm.price
orderForm.totalPrice
orderForm.deliveryDetails.billingAddress
orderForm.deliveryDetails.deliveryAddress
orderForm.noItems
system under development, and con- tinuous monitoring is necessary to ensure that the government obtains proper value. A fixed-price structure is viable after cost and configuration have been stabilized.


Recommendation Keep in mind that:


1. Since PBL contracts require signifi- cant staff to monitor, product offices require significant staff on hand.


2. PBL contracts must evolve as the sys- tem knowledge and configurations mature; otherwise, the contractor will not be incentivized to meet the changing needs of the program.


3. Contractors prefer long-term, fixed- price contracts.


4. Te program office should study and recommend contract types, contract length and metrics, and incentives to drive contractor performance in efforts related to performance data collection and assessment.


5. Product offices should be funded and staffed so that they can effectively manage PBL contracts.


RELIABILITY LL_391: Develop a system reliability model (SRM) using reliability block diagram analysis.


Background Te Center for Reliability Growth, a joint effort between the U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity and the U.S. Army Evaluation Center aimed at improving reliability for Army sys- tems, recommended the use of an SRM, a graphical depiction of a system with an underlying analysis, such as a reli- ability block diagram, a fault tree or an event tree, that identifies critical weak- nesses in the system design. Reliability and design teams can use the SRM to


influence and trace changes to the sys- tem design as well as track operational and sustainment costs.


Recommendation Te contractor should develop an SRM using reliability block diagram analysis. Te SRM should consist of a system’s lowest identifiable functions or elements and their relationships to one another. It should encompass all hardware and non-hardware


elements,


commercial off-the-shelf non-developmental items,


including


equipment, government-


furnished equipment, software, human factors and manufacturing. Te SRM should be used to generate and update reliability allocations and to identify crit- ical elements in the system design.


LL_589: Mechanical systems such as suspensions, drivelines and chas- sis systems (doors, hydraulics, etc.) should be designed with weight growth in mind.


Background Many systemic failure modes seen in the field relate to vehicle weight, spe- cifically the addition of armor or other heavy kits.


Recommendation Historical system weight growth should be investigated and new systems should be designed to accommodate simi- lar weight growth where possible. Test and evaluation phases should evaluate vehicles at potential up-weighted con- figurations to identify possible future problems with add-ons.


LL_896: Significant reliability growth is achievable through proper contract planning and management.


Background A countermeasures system was fielded as a quick reaction capability in response to a critical need in theater. Despite the tech- nology’s effectiveness and the program’s high availability rates, system reliability was not optimal because of an emphasis on accelerated acquisition and fielding.


Deliberate contract planning and man- agement have


resulted in significant


reliability growth over the past five years. Reliability has increased 162 percent since original fielding, from 309 hours mean time between mission-affecting failure in 2010 to 808 hours in 2015. Tis improvement is largely attributed to the government’s emphasis on the Fail- ure Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action System (FRACAS).


Recommendation Including robust FRACAS requirements in the prime contractor’s


significantly


statement of


work and close government manage- ment of


the FRACAS program can increase


ity. Program managers


system reliabil- should require


a full FRACAS investigation on every field return and require incorporation of corrective actions into the repair and pro- duction lines.


For more information on these and other Army Lessons Learned, go to the ALLP at https://allp.amsaa.army.mil; Common Access Card login required


MR. NATHAN HERBERT is an opera- tions research analyst with the U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity at Aber- deen Proving Ground, Maryland. He holds an M.S.


in applied and computational


sity and a B.S. in mathematics from Pennsylvania State University. He is Level II certified in engineering.


mathematics from Johns Hopkins Univer- m


ASC.ARMY.MIL


37


LOGISTICS


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52  |  Page 53  |  Page 54  |  Page 55  |  Page 56  |  Page 57  |  Page 58  |  Page 59  |  Page 60  |  Page 61  |  Page 62  |  Page 63  |  Page 64  |  Page 65  |  Page 66  |  Page 67  |  Page 68  |  Page 69  |  Page 70  |  Page 71  |  Page 72  |  Page 73  |  Page 74  |  Page 75  |  Page 76  |  Page 77  |  Page 78  |  Page 79  |  Page 80  |  Page 81  |  Page 82  |  Page 83  |  Page 84  |  Page 85  |  Page 86  |  Page 87  |  Page 88  |  Page 89  |  Page 90  |  Page 91  |  Page 92  |  Page 93  |  Page 94  |  Page 95  |  Page 96  |  Page 97  |  Page 98  |  Page 99  |  Page 100  |  Page 101  |  Page 102  |  Page 103  |  Page 104  |  Page 105  |  Page 106  |  Page 107  |  Page 108  |  Page 109  |  Page 110  |  Page 111  |  Page 112  |  Page 113  |  Page 114  |  Page 115  |  Page 116  |  Page 117  |  Page 118  |  Page 119  |  Page 120  |  Page 121  |  Page 122  |  Page 123  |  Page 124  |  Page 125  |  Page 126  |  Page 127  |  Page 128  |  Page 129  |  Page 130  |  Page 131  |  Page 132  |  Page 133  |  Page 134  |  Page 135  |  Page 136  |  Page 137  |  Page 138  |  Page 139  |  Page 140  |  Page 141  |  Page 142  |  Page 143  |  Page 144  |  Page 145  |  Page 146  |  Page 147  |  Page 148  |  Page 149  |  Page 150  |  Page 151  |  Page 152  |  Page 153  |  Page 154  |  Page 155  |  Page 156  |  Page 157  |  Page 158  |  Page 159  |  Page 160  |  Page 161  |  Page 162  |  Page 163  |  Page 164  |  Page 165  |  Page 166  |  Page 167  |  Page 168  |  Page 169  |  Page 170  |  Page 171  |  Page 172  |  Page 173  |  Page 174  |  Page 175  |  Page 176  |  Page 177  |  Page 178  |  Page 179  |  Page 180  |  Page 181  |  Page 182  |  Page 183  |  Page 184  |  Page 185  |  Page 186  |  Page 187  |  Page 188  |  Page 189  |  Page 190  |  Page 191  |  Page 192  |  Page 193  |  Page 194  |  Page 195  |  Page 196  |  Page 197  |  Page 198  |  Page 199  |  Page 200  |  Page 201  |  Page 202  |  Page 203