MOTOR POOL


Dozens of M1151 HMMWV gun trucks are lined up at the FMS waypoint yard, ready to be title-transferred to the ANDSF. Having transitioned from combat to a train, advise and assist mission, the U.S. military still faces a number of logistical challenges: a long supply chain, a distant seaport and a limited number of airfields. (U.S. Air Force photo by Capt Kevin M. Limani, CSTC-A)


involved while at the same time ensuring that the absolute best product is selected to fill the requirement.


In Afghanistan, however, rather than what’s most appropriate to the need, sourcing for ANDSF requirements


is


driven by time (as above), U.S. export controls, the priorities of competing FMS customers and what may be readily avail- able in U.S. or even third-party stocks. Tese solutions produce a disjointed mix of older U.S. equipment that may be nearing end of production or service life, former Soviet equipment as the default


“developing military” option, or even the random donations of allied nations either inside or outside the coalition.


Te resulting mashup of gear and equip- ment has left the ANDSF with more supply chains than they can effectively draw from, training requirements that they cannot accomplish on vehicles and weapons, and a fleet of gear available only for a year or two before it wears down and cycles out of service.


Te first two factors weigh against a deliberate, interoperable approach that security forces


FMS-specific case of


the broader “one-


year war, 15 times” cliché). Additionally, the FMS system presumes a functioning ministerial-level defense staff that can assess these kinds of enterprise issues, as well as a “total package approach,” mean- ing that each equipment acquisition comes with a training and sustainment package to ensure that it is fielded as a system, not just a piece of equipment.


With U.S. staff rotating in and out fre- quently and with the partner nation having


an inexperienced acquisition


staff, there is nobody to defend the long view and steer toward enduring, legacy defense. Rather than experienced defense acquisition professionals mak- ing decisions, they are, at best, made by well-meaning but underinformed partner nation staff or personnel who rotate on a six- to 12-month schedule, who may be supremely talented but lack the expe- rience to judge what needs to go into a


“total package approach.” Tis lack of an enterprise approach continues to ham- per the U.S. effort and limits ANDSF effectiveness.


can reasonably sustain,


in favor of what’s ready on hand. Short deployment rotations for U.S. advisers weigh against life-cycle management in favor of the short-term threat posed by the next seasonal campaign (an


Te accountability for the equipment transferred from the U.S. military to foreign partners


is an important part


of the process, as the many regulations and conditions embedded in the system make clear. It’s important to understand, however, that the U.S. government


is


not attempting to enforce accountabil- ity at the lowest


levels and somehow


make soldiers or police in these other countries personally financially liable for each piece of gear or equipment that they are issued.


Te fundamental basis for the insistence on accountability is that the U.S. govern- ment wants to ensure that the technology involved in creating this equipment


is


protected and that it will not make its way into the hands of rival militaries or hostile terrorist organizations. Not every- thing transferred via the FMS system is high technology, vulnerable to reverse engineering and theft by rivals or adver- saries. For example, there is nothing secret about an M16 rifle.


Since it is a weapon, it has to be moni- tored carefully and tracked by the Afghan government to ensure that it is accounted for. In the case of night vision devices, however, there is a concern about the technology being exploited, and therefore the controls placed by the FMS system are more stringent. Tis system of emplacing controls on a receiver nation and then verifying compliance is called end-use monitoring


(EUM). Because


of the inherent danger in traveling the country, EUM efforts in Afghanistan have been severely hampered in recent years, forcing CSTC-A to alter its percep- tions of how extensive EUM must be as


ASC.ARMY.MIL 53


RESOLUTE SUPPORT


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